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ABSTRACT 
The thesis consists of two main parts. First, the thesis is examining the level of 
voluntary corporate disclosure of the Egyptian companies' annual reports during the 
period of 2004-2005 and 2005-2006. The examined level is justified by the impact of 
two groups of determinants; firm characteristics, including firm size, firm 
profitability, and industrial membership, and corporate governance characteristics, 
including board size and role duality. The findings of this part of the thesis indicate a 
relatively low level of voluntary corporate disclosure. Moreover, it is found that firm 
characteristics have a significant impact of the level of voluntary disclosure, while 
corporate governance characteristics have an in significant impact on the level of this 
sort of disclosure. In addition, the thesis examined these relationships not only on the 
total level of voluntary disclosure, but also for each category of this examined 
disclosure. 
Second, the thesis is examining the existence of the auditing expectations gap in 
Egypt through the different stakeholders' perceptions. The findings indicate the 
existence of this sort of gap in Egypt. Therefore, the thesis is investigating the 
usefulness and effectiveness of the traditional methods, including audit report form, 
user's education, and standards settings, in comparison to each other in reducing the 
existing gap. In addition, the thesis provides the theoretical bases for selecting the 
voluntary corporate disclosure auditing as an effective method of reducing such 
existing gap. Therefore, the thesis is investigating the usefulness and effectiveness of 
voluntary corporate disclosure auditing, as a proposed method of reducing the existing 
expectations gap, in comparison to the traditional methods. The findings of this part 
of the thesis indicate that voluntary disclosure auditing is an effective method of 
reducing the auditing expectations gap in comparison to the traditional methods. 
Furthermore, the thesis points the most important categories of voluntary disclosure 
that would be worth it to begin with as have a countable impact on reducing the 
expectations gap. However, it is noted that the relatively important categories of 
voluntary disclosure that would effectively contribute to the reduction of the auditing 
expectations gap are characterized by scoring a relatively low level of disclosure. 
Therefore, the thesis is suggesting two stages to reduce the auditing expectations gap 
through voluntary disclosure auditing. First, is to increase the level of voluntary 
disclosure of these categories in the Egyptian companies' annual reports. Second, is 
auditing these categories of voluntary disclosure as an introductory stage of launching 
the concept of voluntary disclosure auditing. 
Finally, it is recommended by the thesis to introduce this new area of auditing of 
voluntary disclosure. However, this new area of auditing needs further research 
concerning the qualifications and procedures required to apply this new paradigm to 
make it ready to be in action. Moreover, auditing voluntary disclosure does not mean 
that it would be obligatory for the companies to have this sort of disclosure, as this 
would affect the voluntary nature of these disclosures, but if the companies 
have 
chosen to disclose this sort of information voluntarily, so it is obligated to audit these 
disclosures as a matter of securing the stakeholders against any manipulated 
information that may direct them towards making wrong decisions. 
xi 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Information is considered to be the cornerstone of the decision-making process. 
Therefore, information gains a respectable amount of value to the different users. As 
the decision-making process is a critical issue, the quality of this process is dependent 
to a great extent on the reliability and validity of the provided information. 
As the decision process is getting more complicated, the provided information needs 
to be completed from one side, and assured from the other side. Therefore, 
completeness and assurance of information are vital characteristics that are reflected 
on the reliability and validity of this sort of information. Moreover, the evolution of 
the agency theory to include other diversified stakeholders, beside the management 
and shareholders, to end with the stakeholder theory, presents a pressure on the 
preparers of information to satisfy diversified and conflicting needs. Therefore, 
stakeholder theory explains the conflicts of interest and strategic organizational 
behavior. As a result of this diversification and conflict, the information needs to 
include different perspectives as a matter of completeness satisfaction. While on the 
other hand, the source of the provided information requires a great attention to ensure 
that this information is enough assured to be reliable for the decision making. 
With respect to the accounting information, the financial accounting standards are 
developed to ensure that stakeholders are provided with relevant, reliable, and timely 
information on which they can make their decisions (Canibano et al., 1999). 
Therefore, to satisfy the completeness criteria it is required to include financial and 
non-financial information. However, the majority of the accounting standards require 
that the firms disclose financial information. Therefore, as a matter of fact, the firms 
voluntarily disclose additional information to satisfy their stakeholders' needs. This 
voluntary disclosure includes financial and non-financial information in order to 
fulfill the completeness of the provided information. This disclosed information varies 
in between the different firms, as there are no standards that regulate this sort of 
disclosure due to its voluntary nature, resulting in different levels of voluntary 
disclosure from one region to another, even from one firm to another within the same 
region. 
Voluntary disclosure is considered to be a non-Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principals (GAAP) report or Enhanced Corporate Reporting (ECR). The Enhanced 
Corporate Reporting (ECR) is less constrained than the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principals (GAAP) reporting by standards and regulations containing 
more qualitative disclosures and non-financial information (Gibbins and Pomeroy, 
2006). 
Moreover, voluntary disclosures level diversification is considered to be a struggling 
issue as to identify the determinants that affect the disclosure's level. Therefore, 
voluntary disclosure level is affected by some characteristics either related to the firm 
itself, firm characteristics, or related to the firm governance body, corporate 
governance characteristics. The association between voluntary disclosures level and 
2 
these determinants still debatable, as the relationships vary between the different 
regions and cultures. 
As a normal consequence, the more disclosed information would be associated with 
more costs of voluntarily disclosing additional information. However, there are 
different motives and advantages that make the firms bear the cost of disclosing such 
information. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)'s report identified 
several benefits of voluntary disclosures. First is reducing cost of capital. Second is 
enhancing credibility. Third is improving investors' relationship with the firm. Fourth 
is improving investment decisions and getting access to liquid markets (Boesso, 
2002). 
Accordingly, firms voluntarily disclose additional information that it believe that they 
satisfies the interests of the diversified stakeholders. Therefore, the suitable categories 
and level voluntary disclosures are still a questionable issue that is not satisfied by the 
previous literature. The majority of the previous studies examine the voluntary 
disclosure level and relationships on its aggregated level, ignoring the different 
categories of voluntary disclosure and its relationships with the different determinants 
of this sort of information. 
With respect to the information assurance criteria, the auditing process plays a vital 
role to provide the different stakeholders with assured accounting information. 
However, the auditing process is considered to be limited to the provision of 
assurance for the mandatory disclosures identified by the auditing standards. 
Therefore, auditing failed to cope with the evolution in the disclosure improvements. 
3 
It is believed that voluntarily disclosing additional information to satisfy the 
stakeholders' needs is not performed effectively due to the failure of the auditing 
practices to cope with these improvements in the disclosure practices. 
Moreover, it is noted that the auditing practices are not satisfying the needs of the 
different stakeholders, which results in the existence of an auditing expectations gap. 
This expectations gap exists in developed as well as developing countries. Several 
studies examined the existence of this gap, and in each study it proofs that this gap 
still exists, although there are various efforts to reduce it. The literature conducted 
three different methods to reduce this gap. First is to expand the audit report, and 
depend on the long form instead of the short form auditing report. Second is to 
educate the users towards the auditor's roles and responsibilities to reduce their 
expectations regarding the tasks performed. Third, is setting additional standards to 
expand roles and responsibilities of the auditors. 
Additionally, the previous studies are restricted to two methodologies of research. 
First is examining the existence of auditing expectations gap in a specific country as a 
representative of a certain region. Second, is investigating the effectiveness of a 
specific method of reducing the existing expectations gap. The literature has not 
identified any comparative research between the effectiveness of more than one 
method at the same time. Therefore, I believe that any method examined individually 
reflects the usefulness of this entire method rather its effectiveness. 
Regarding the Egyptian context, there is a shortage in research concerning the 
completeness of the provided accounting information 
by voluntarily disclosing 
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additional information. In addition, there is lack of research regarding the assurance of 
the provided information which fails to meet the diversified stakeholders' needs, 
resulting in the existence of the auditing expectations gap. However, the only study 
applied on Egypt by Dixon et al. (2006) has only examined the existence of auditing 
expectations gap in Egypt, but the study has not proposed or investigated the 
effectiveness of any of the methods that could contribute to the reduction of the 
existing expectations gap. 
Moreover, the relationship between auditing expectations gap and voluntary 
disclosure is a mutual relationship. The auditing of voluntary disclosures provides 
assurance to this sort of disclosure which enhances the credibility of it, leading to the 
ability to rely on this sort of information to make different decisions. On the other 
hand, voluntary disclosure auditing expands the role of auditor to include the auditing 
of additional information which satisfies the stakeholders' expectations leading to the 
reduction of the existing expectations gap. 
1.2 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
I am the first in my research area to link between the financial accounting and 
auditing areas of research. I have employed the voluntary corporate disclosure to 
solve the existing auditing expectations gap problem. This is considered to be a 
breakthrough in both areas of research. Moreover, I have introduced, for the first time 
in the area of auditing, a new branch entitled `Voluntary Corporate Disclosure 
Auditing'. The current research provides the conceptual model for this new branch 
and the empirical evidences regarding the feasibility of this new area of auditing 
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which opens the door for various researches in relation to the required techniques and 
codes for implying this sort of auditing. 
Consequently, the thesis contributes to the accounting and auditing knowledge in 
three main areas: 
First, the thesis is the first to provide updated examination to the level of voluntary 
information disclosed through the annual reports of the Egyptian companies during 
the most recent period of time. Moreover, the process is not limited to the 
examination of the total disclosure, but includes, as well, the level of each category of 
disclosure and its contribution to the total disclosure level. 
Second, the thesis investigates the impact of two groups of determinants, firm 
characteristics and corporate governance characteristics, on the examined level of 
voluntary disclosure and identified the significant and insignificant relationships 
between this level and the disclosure's determinants. In addition, the impact of 
voluntary disclosure's determinants is investigated towards each category of the 
examined voluntary disclosure. The thesis is the first study to apply this sort of 
comprehensive investigation for all the categories of voluntary disclosure. 
Third, the thesis suggests that voluntary corporate disclosure is considered to be an 
effective method in reducing the auditing expectations gap through expanding the 
roles and responsibilities of the auditor to include auditing the voluntarily disclosed 
information by the companies in their annual reports. This is considered to be the first 
study to recommend this proposed solution to reduce the auditing expectations gap 
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and provide a conceptual model, evidencing its effectiveness in performing this role 
in addition to the examination of this role empirically in comparison to the other 
traditional methods. 
The thesis argues that the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports is 
relatively considered to be low. Therefore, a checklist is adapted from the previous 
literature and validated to fit with the nature of the Egyptian companies; the checklist 
contains eight different categories of voluntary disclosures which are considered to be 
the benchmark of measuring the level of such disclosures. The results of this 
empirical part, based on descriptive statistical parameters, indicate that there is a low 
level of voluntary disclosure compared to the checklist items. Moreover, the thesis 
showed in this part the contribution of each category of disclosure towards the total 
level of disclosure. 
As a matter of fact, the examined level of disclosure is justified by the impact of two 
groups of determinants on the examined level of voluntary corporate disclosure. The 
first group of voluntary disclosures determinants are firm characteristics, including 
firm size, firm profitability, and industrial membership, while the second group of 
determinates are corporate governance characteristics, including board size and role 
duality. The results argues that there is significant impact of firm characteristics on 
the voluntary disclosure level, while on the other hand there is in significant impact of 
corporate governance characteristics on the level of voluntary disclosure. It is argued 
that the larger and profitable companies, voluntarily discloses additional information 
more than the smaller and less profitable ones. In addition, the Egyptian services 
(non-manufacturing) companies discloses more information more than the 
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manufacturing ones. This paradigm is emphasized using the stakeholders - agency 
theory, as the aim of disclosing this sort of information is to satisfy the different 
stakeholders by providing them with their needs of information to facilitate the 
decision-making process. 
The results of the first part of the empirical analysis are derived using multiple 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression cross sectional panel data with fixed-effects 
regression as the data is gathered based on selective criteria (50 most active 
companies). A robust standard error is employed as the examined data is not normally 
distributed, which needs to be tested using a non-parametric test. Therefore, 
robustness test is used to overcome this problem. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis is 
applied using multiple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) pooled regression with robust 
standard error to examine the sensitivity of the results towards changing the statistical 
test which ensure the reliability of the driven results. 
The second part of the thesis investigates the problem of the auditing expectations 
gap. This problem still exists in most of the countries whether developed or 
developing countries. This gap exists between the annual reports' users (stakeholders) 
from one side, and the auditors from the other side. Stakeholders expect that the 
auditor, when performing the auditing procedures, is providing them with completely 
assurance that the annual reports present the firm's financial situation fairly and truly. 
The problem stems from the stakeholder's over-expectation regarding the auditor's 
roles and responsibilities, as there is a degree of error that might takes place due to 
depending on samples in performing the audit procedures and other analytic tasks 
progressed by the auditor. 
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As a result, the current auditing roles and responsibilities can not satisfy the 
stakeholders' expectations which are reflected on the existence of an auditing 
expectations gap (see for example: Gay et al., 1998; Frank et al., 2001; Gowthrope 
and Porter, 1999; Humphrey et al., 1993; Fadzly and Ahmad, 2004; Best et al., 2001; 
Dixon et al., 2006; and Chowdhury et al., 2005). Therefore, different methods were 
proposed to reduce such gap by the previous literature; these methods are summarized 
in to three methods. Firstly, is expanding the audit report by depending on the long 
form audit report instead of the short term as to increase the awareness of the 
stakeholders towards the auditor's roles and responsibilities (see for example: 
Schelluch and Gay, 2006; Almer and Brody, 2002; and Manson and Zaman, 2000). 
Secondly, is educating the annual reports users (stakeholders) towards the auditor's 
roles and responsibilities (see for example: Epstein and Geiger, 1993; Monroe and 
Woodliff, 1993; and Pierce and Kilcommins, 1996). Thirdly, is setting auditing 
standards to expand the auditor's roles and responsibilities to include additional 
performed tasks (see for example: Dewing and Russell, 2002). Each method seems to 
be effective in reducing such gap when it is examined individually. The previous 
studies have not examined the effectiveness of theses methods in comparison to each 
other as to suggest the most effective method. 
To do so, the thesis examines the existence of the auditing expectations gap in Egypt 
to ensure that the problem still exists and this in comparison to the applied study by 
Dixon et al. (2006) but with the expansion of the examined sample. The results 
argued that the gap still exists. Therefore, based on the stakeholders - agency theory, 
the thesis examined the usefulness and effectiveness of the three traditional methods 
from the view of the perceptions of the different stakeholders in comparison to the 
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auditors' perceptions. The empirical analysis differentiated between the usefulness 
and effectiveness of the different methods towards reducing the auditing expectations 
gap. 
The thesis indicates that for any method being useful in reducing the existing gap do 
not mean that it is effective in doing so. Based on this argument, the empirical 
analysis identified the usefulness and effectiveness of each method in comparison to 
the other ones. The results are driven using the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test, 
as the data is not normally distributed, to identify the significant different between 
two groups of samples, auditors and non-auditors groups. Moreover, the test was 
employed to examine the sensitivity of the results towards changing the statistical test 
which enhance the reliability of the driven results. 
The thesis argued that expanding the auditor's roles and responsibilities to include 
voluntary corporate disclosure auditing would contribute to the reduction of the 
existing auditing expectations gap. Based on the stakeholder -agency theory, 
it is 
emphasized by the previous literature that the voluntary disclosure is playing a vital 
role in reducing the information expectations gap and solving the information 
asymmetry problem which is referred to the accountability of annual reports (Gray et 
al., 1987,1988,1988,1991; Laughlin, 1988; Woodward et al., 1996). However, it is 
argued that this voluntarily disclosed information satisfies only the completeness 
criteria and ignored the reliability one (Doane, 2000; Swift and Dando, 2002; Dando 
and Swift, 2003). 
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The thesis argued that the voluntary disclosure lack reliability as a result of missing 
the credibility of this sort of disclosure. Therefore, the voluntary disclosure credibility 
would be provided by independent auditing. The assurance of voluntary disclosures 
requires expanding the auditor's roles and responsibilities to audit this sort of 
information. As a result, the audited voluntary disclosures would play dual roles. 
First, it effectively reduces the information expectations gap between the stakeholders 
and the directors by providing completed and reliable information. Second, it 
effectively reduces the auditing expectations gap due to the expansion of the auditor's 
roles and responsibilities which meets the stakeholders' expectations. 
Accordingly, reducing both information and auditing expectations gaps, would 
contribute to the improvement of the financial reporting quality. This is illustrated by 
the conceptual model suggested by the thesis that shows the interaction between the 
audited voluntary disclosure and both gaps, information and auditing expectations 
gap. 
Accumulatively, the results of the two empirical parts of the thesis state that, 
according to the stakeholders' perceptions, it is worthy to begin launching voluntary 
disclosure auditing to specific categories of this sort of disclosure rather than auditing 
the whole categories of voluntary disclosure. However, it is concluded that the 
recommended categories of voluntary disclosures to be audited are characterized by 
having low level of disclosure. Therefore, voluntary disclosure auditing would be 
applied on two stages. First, is increasing the disclosure level of the recommended 
categories. Second, auditing these recommended categories of voluntary disclosure. 
From the previously mentioned expected contributions, the following main research 
questions will be investigated: 
1 What is the nature and level of the total voluntary corporate disclosure in the 
annual reports of the Egyptian companies? What is the nature and level of 
each category of voluntary disclosure? What is the trend of the total voluntary 
disclosure and each category of this sort disclosure in the period of 2004-2005 
and 2005-2006? 
2 What is the association of the total voluntary corporate disclosure and its 
different categories, with the firm characteristics, including firm size, firm 
profitability, and industrial membership, and the corporate governance 
characteristics, including board size and role duality, during the examined 
period of time? 
3 Is there still an existence of auditing expectations gap in Egypt? Which of the 
traditional methods, including audit report form, user's education, standards 
settings, is more effective in reducing such gap? 
4 Is voluntary corporate disclosure considered to be an effective method in 
reducing the auditing expectations gap? If so, which categories of voluntary 
disclosure are more critical to begin with? 
The answer of the previously stated research questions are provided by the thesis 
using theoretical evidences and empirical findings. 
12 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This section provides brief overview of the contents of the thesis. Chapter two 
includes an Egyptian background about the Egyptian economy including the different 
sectors of the economy and the economic reform program and the indicators of its 
performance. Moreover, this chapter includes information about the Egyptian stock 
market, Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE), and the main regulations and 
governing bodies that manage the stock exchange's operations and transactions. 
Finally, the chapter includes a framework about the regulatory bodies of the Egyptian 
accounting and auditing standards. 
Chapter three provides updated literature review for the previous studies regarding the 
auditing expectations gap. The first part of this chapter presents the studies that 
examined the existence of auditing expectations gap in the developed countries in 
compared to those applied in the developing countries. The second part includes the 
previous studies regarding the investigation of the different methods of reducing the 
existing auditing expectations gap. 
Chapter four represents the theoretical framework of the entire thesis which is 
composed of three different parts. First is presenting the different theories of 
voluntary disclosure including the stakeholder-agency theory which is the main 
theory of the thesis. Second is indicating the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and information expectations gap. Third is emphasizing the relationship 
between auditing expectations gap and voluntary disclosure, which is the main 
relationship that is examined empirically in the following chapters. 
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Chapter five presents the research methodology of the thesis. This chapter is divided 
in to two main parts. The first part is the methodology of examining the level and 
determinants of voluntary disclosure which presents the quantitative part of the thesis 
depending on secondary data analysis. The second part is the methodology of 
investigating the auditing expectations gap and effectiveness of the different methods 
of reducing this gap presenting the qualitative part of the thesis depending on primary 
data. 
Chapter six is the first empirical part of the thesis which is composed of two main 
parts. The first part is the examination of the level of total voluntary corporate 
disclosure and the level of each category of voluntary disclosure's categories of the 
Egyptian companies. The second part is the investigation of the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and firm characteristics from one side, and between voluntary 
disclosure and corporate governance characteristics from the other side. 
Chapter seven is the second empirical part of the thesis which is composed of five 
different parts. The first part is investigating the existence of the auditing expectations 
gap in Egypt. The second part is examining the effectiveness of the audit report form 
in reducing the existing auditing expectations gap. The third part is examining the 
effectiveness of educating users towards the auditor's roles and responsibilities in 
reducing the existing gap. The fourth part is investigating the effectiveness of setting 
standards that expands the auditor's roles and responsibilities in reducing the gap. The 
final part is investigating the effectiveness of voluntary disclosure auditing in 
reducing the existing gap as a proposed solution by the entire thesis. 
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Chapter eight is the thesis conclusion showing the results and findings of the thesis. 
The chapter also shows the implications to management and the limitations and future 
research of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE EGYPTIAN 
ECONOMY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Egypt is considered to be the most populous nation in the Arab World, and has the 
second largest economy in the Arab world after Saudi Arabia. Strong growth over the 
1990s helped to reduce poverty and support an expanding middle and professional 
class transforming Egypt into an emerging modern economy. This could be observed 
from the economic indicators of Egypt, as its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is $91.7 
billion and per capita GDP $4,282, while its annual growth rate 4.8%. 
Egypt has passed over different stages of economic improvements, specially the 
economic reform program in 1992, which affects its corporate governance framework. 
During the 1960s, the central auditing organization became the governmental agency 
which is responsible for auditing in the public sector, due to the movement toward 
economic management based on central planning, nationalization, and expansion of 
the public sector. 
In the mid-1970s, the Egyptian government applied the "open-door" policy which 
leads to the liberalization of the national economy until the government launched the 
comprehensive economic reform program supported by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). As a result to this economic reform program, the 
Egyptian government launched several initiatives to reform corporate financial 
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reporting and disclosure requirements as well as accounting and auditing standards for 
governing the financial practices. 
2.2 THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF EGYPT 
The Arab Republic of Egypt is located on the north eastern coast of Africa, and 
borders the Mediterranean Sea between Libya and the Gaza Strip. Egypt is basically a 
desert nation; only four percent of the country's total land area of one million km is 
arable. Egypt most notable geographical feature is the Nile River, and almost 99 per 
cent of Egypt population lives in the River Valley and the fertile Nile Delta, north of 
the capital, Cairo (Roquette and Kourouma, 2004). 
2.3 THE MAIN SECTORS OF EGYPTIAN ECONOMY 
Egypt has a fully diversified economy with potentially high growth across all of its 
sectors. And these sectors could be represented by the following chart: 
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Figure 2.1 
The GDP Structure of Each Sector of the Egyptian Economy 
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The different various sectors could be represented as follows: 
2.3.1 Energy 
The oil & gas sector is considered to be the fifth important source of foreign exchange. 
Reserves of oil could remain for about fifty years. Natural gas production ad reserves 
have been growing by 10% or more each year. Egypt already generates most of its 
electricity from natural gas. With new discoveries of gas, after satisfying the demand 
of the domestic the market, Egypt is searching for new export markets and to develop 
export capacity of gas. The oil and gas sector is being one of the most important 
resources of foreign investments in Egypt such as: British Gas, BP, ENI, and Shell. 
In addition, Egypt contains great natural resources which includes petroleum, natural 
gas, phosphates, and iron ore. Moreover, in the Gulf of Suez and in the Western 
Desert crude oil was found, while natural gas is found mainly in the Nile Delta, off 
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the Mediterranean Seashore, and in the Western Desert. Oil and gas contributes about 
12% of the GDP: exports of petroleum and related products (including bunker and 
aviation sales) equals to $2.7 billion in fiscal year 2003-04. 
Moreover, the petroleum products are increasing from 16.8 million metric tons in 
1983 to 25 million metric tons, and the Egyptian government is working on new 
discovery to satisfy the domestic demand and develop this important product of the 
energy sector. 
The other source of energy is electricity, which is considered one of the most 
important infrastructure resources that attracts the foreign investments to the Egyptian 
economy. Always there is additional generation of the electricity capacities to meet 
the required demand. The electricity sector invites the private ownership and 
operations of new electricity power generating facilities up to 20% of total planned 
capacity. 
2.3.2 Agriculture 
Agriculture is one of the key sectors of the Egyptian economy as it represents 16% of 
GDP and 28% of total employment. However, all the agricultural prices are 
decontrolled except for cotton and sugar cane and all agricultural subsidies were 
removed, but there was a combination of improved incentives and introduction of new 
high-yield varieties that led to a good response that may be proved by the growth in 
the agricultural sector by 3-4% in recent years. 
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In addition, approximately one-third of Egyptian labour is engaged directly in farming, 
and the other related jobs, including processing and trading of agricultural products. 
The agricultural operations take place in about 2.5 million hectares (6 million acres) 
of fertile soil in the Nile Valley and Delta. However, Egypt expands the agricultural 
lands by constructing "Toshka" project that will be owned by the private sector to 
grow fresh fruits and vegetable to be exported to Europe in winter months. 
2.3.3 Tourism 
Tourism is one of the sub sectors of the service sector that represents about 50% of 
the GDP of Egypt and considered to be the key engine of growth of Egypt and the 
largest foreign exchanger as it represents about 3% of the GDP of Egypt. Tourism is 
an important source for Egypt of foreign currencies. Egypt earns a competitive 
advantage in this sector due to the variety of tourist locations and attractions. 
Therefore, Egypt is concerned with the development of these locations and attractions 
as this sector also offers various employment opportunities with acceptable returns. 
2.3.4 Construction 
This sector represents 7% of the GDP of Egypt, as it plays dual roles: it is considered 
to be the main sector that is participated in the development and maintenance of the 
infrastructure 
, and 
the demand on this sector creates demand on the steel and cement 
industries besides being an important sector in solving the unemployment problem. 
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2.3.5 Manufacturing 
Manufacturing sectors contributes about 20% of GDP and about 13.4% of employed 
workforce. There are key industrial sectors in Egypt includes textiles and clothing, 
food and beverages, furniture, and metallurgy. However, there are other several sub- 
sectors that are characterized by a rapid growth, including steel production food 
processing industry, textiles and garments industry, pharmaceuticals, automotive 
assembly, and electronics industry. 
Egypt is still one of the most important industrial countries in the Middle East and 
Africa, as it has attracted different multinational companies beside the domestic 
industrial companies, and that is a result of the facilities that the Egyptian government 
has offered for the industrial investors, including suitable infrastructure, the tax 
allowances, and the exports support. 
2.3.6 Transportation and Communication 
The service sector contributes over 50% of GDP, which includes sub-sectors as 
tourism, financial services and the receipts from the Suez Canal. This sector 
is 
characterized by being so sensitive to any external shocks and political tensions. 
The Transportation and Communication sector is one of the most important service 
sectors in Egypt and represents about 11% of its GDP. 
The most important 
transportation channel is the Suez Canal, as its revenue is considered to be increasing 
revenue due to the globalization of markets and the 
increase of exports and imports 
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between the foreign countries. But, as mentioned, the revenues of this source are 
sensitive to any political or economic shocks. 
The focus has been on the development of the information technology sector and the 
telecommunication, which has attracted a lot of multinational companies to work in 
the Egyptian market. This sector is rapidly growing and considered to represent a 
switch from the manual culture to an electronic culture due to the introduction of the 
electronic commerce and the well-established technology, especially in the field of 
phone services and electronic networks. 
2.3.7 Trade, Finance, and Insurance 
This sector is considered to be a service sector and represents 10% of the GDP of 
Egypt. This sector includes the banking sector, which is composed of four 
governmental banks besides a variety of private multinational banks under the 
supervision of the Egyptian Central Bank (ECB). The different multinational banks 
are designed to activate investments in Egypt, which was the most important reason 
that made the Egyptian government think about the privatization of the four 
governmental banks. The government has privatized one of the four banks. 
This sector also includes the Egyptian capital market whish is named The Cairo and 
Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE), and it is taking a great consideration from the 
government for its establishing and development as it is the most 
important motivator 
of the economy as a whole, therefore, it would be discussed 
in a separate point by 
itself in this chapter. 
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2.3.8 Other Services 
The other services represent 17% of the Egyptian GDP, and include some additional 
services that by themselves represent small contribution, such as insurance companies 
which represents only 1.1 % of the GDP of Egypt. 
Finally, it was observed that the Egyptian economy relies basically on tourism, oil and 
gas exports, and Suez Canal revenues, most of these sub sectors are controlled by the 
public sector. 
2.4 THE ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM 
In the 1990s, the government of Egypt began to apply an economic reform program to 
improve its economical situation, was designed to be applied in different phases; the 
first phase had focused on stabilizing the economy, improving the exchange rate and 
public finance and to stabilize the inflation rate. The second phase is concentrating 
and focusing on the trade and investment issues, and restructuring the private sector 
and the banking sector (Egyptian ministry of investment report, 2005). 
The reform in both phases is applied with full support from the International 
Monetary and the World Bank and targeted to improve both the monetary and 
fiscal 
policy, as the economical indicators showed that the Egyptian economy suffers 
from a 
hyper-inflation rate of more than a 20%, negative real interest rate, which is about 
minus 6%, and a large budget 
deficit more than 20% as a percentage of the Egyptian 
GDP (Omran, 2001). 
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As mentioned, the economic reform program was applied gradually on two different 
stages: the programs aims to restore fiscal balance reorient both external and internal 
prices to more realistic levels and liberalize the Egyptian economy. These economic 
liberalization policies were in exchange for a foreign debt relief package (Monique 
Roquette and Kourouma, 2004). 
Egypt applied this reform in a relatively successful way as the success of Egypt in the 
application of its reform program could be illustrated by the following table: 
Table 2.1 
Some Economic Indicators Before and After the Economic Reform Programme 
Description 1990/91 1997/98 
Total external debt US $ 49.2 billion US $ 26.6 billion 
Total external debt as a 151% 37.7% 
percentage of GDP 
Real interest rates (6%) 5% 
Inflation rate 21.2% 4.1% 
Total foreign reserve 3.6 21.8 
(Billions of US$) 
Budget deficit as a 18.2% 0.06% 
percentage of GDP 
Real GDP growth rate 3.6% 5.7% 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, the Egyptian Cabinet Information and Decision Support Centre 
(Cairo: CBE and IDSC, Various issues, 1992-1998). 
Moreover, Egypt has achieved valuable efforts in decreasing its total external debt 
from US $ 49.2 billion to US $ 26.6 billion, a decrease of 46%, and that decline is due 
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to the debt forgiveness from the Gulf States, the United States and Paris Club 
rescheduling agreement (Omran, 2001). 
However, as a result of the decline in the total external debt, the percentage of the 
total external debt to the GDP has decreased from 151 % to 37.7% by a higher rate of 
decrease of 75% than the decrease of the external debt itself, which shows the higher 
consequences of the decline of the external debt (Omran, 2001). 
In addition, it is included that the real interest rate ratio has been increased from (6%) 
to 5% which is a good indicator of the Egyptian economy as this increase caused the 
change of the situation of the interest rate from being a negative rate to a positive 
interest rate (Omran, 2001). 
Concerning the inflation rate, there is a significant decrease from %21.2 to 4.1% 
which means that there is a decrease by a rate of 85% which means that the inflation 
rate after the reform program is being more controllable and acceptable (Omran, 
2001). 
From table 2.1 it could be seen that the total foreign reserve has increased from US 
$ 3.6 billion to US $ 21.8 billion by a rate of increase of more than 500%, which is 
considered to be a high rate of increase that reflects the Egyptian policies to attract the 
foreign currencies and exchange them with the domestic Egyptian pounds which 
means more investment opportunities that are available 
for foreign investors in Egypt 
during the period of the reform program of Egypt. 
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Regarding the budget deficit percentage, it has decreased from 18.2 % to 0.06%, 
which indicated a sharp decrease by 97%, which means a good improvement in the 
Egyptian government overall performance (Omran, 2001). 
Finally, as a result of all the previous improvements, there is an improvement of the 
real GDP growth rate from 3.6% to 5.7% by about 58% which is considered to be a 
good improvement for the Egyptian economy during this period of time. 
During the mid 1990s there was a progress done towards lower inflation rate, but 
despite of this decline in the inflation rate, the real (GDP) growth declined between 
1999 and 2002, but in 2001 there was an accelerated rate of GDP growth per capita 
that have reached US$3,520, while the unemployment rate remained consistently high 
at 8-9%, representing a significant deviation from the targeted rate of 7.3% outlined in 
the fourth five-year plan of 1997/98 - 2001/02 (Roquette and Kourouma, 2004). 
The Egyptian economic reform program co-operated with the public enterprises 
reform program in 1991 by the application of law 203 for the year 1991. This reform 
program is the privatization program which includes several areas of reform, mainly 
the sale of public assets and shares, and the restructuring of the companies as long as 
they remain owned by the state by comprising technical, financial, and labour 
restructuring. 
Since 1991, the Egyptian government has achieved valuable progress in the reform 
program of its macro-economics program. 
This improvement can be shown by the 
progress of different economic 
indicators, the decrease of the fiscal deficit from 17% 
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of GDP to only 5%, import tariff rates have been reduced from a maximum of 120% 
to only 70% and are expected to go lower. Finally, the inflation rate has been reduced 
from 17% to less than 10% (Youssef, 1996). 
In addition, the foreign exchange rate is freely determined, that causes the 
stabilization of the Egyptian pound over three years. The total foreign reserves are 
still stable at US $17 billion (Youssef, 1996). 
The reform actions were applied directly through policy changes, and indirectly 
through educational and other measures to improve economic and social welfare. The 
reform policies are based on four dependent dimensions: investment, savings, 
institutional reform, and exports promotion (Elregal, 2003). 
Moreover, the Egyptian reform program is concentrating on the encouragement of the 
private policy participation by offering initiative measures in the economic legal, 
monetary, and financial and institutional spheres. As a result, the new economic 
policy and business environment offers the investors attractive initiatives and 
opportunities (Eiregal, 2003). 
Therefore, the industrial cities and duty-free zones benefit from the advanced 
infrastructure, stable economy, and liberalization of trade. These developments have 
attracted an increasing number of multinational corporations (Eiregal, 2003). 
One of the most important constraints of privatization and the reform program 
is that 
Egypt still lacks the appropriate business environment. The important constraint on 
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the government choices in the privatization options is the serious unemployment 
situation and social problems that may result from the transfer of ownership. There is 
also a belief that in efficiency exists in both, public and private ownership, therefore 
the inefficiency is due to managerial disqualifications rather than the form ownership 
(Youssef, 1996). 
The privatization program was applied selling only the minority shares, which means 
that the majority ownership of most of the companies still remains in the hand of the 
state. The Egyptian structured reform program aimed to improve the performance of 
the privatized companies to maximize its profit or to change its situation from being 
loss-making to profit-making status which is considered to be a short term objective 
(Youssef, 1996). 
The Egyptian government applied a diagnostic process on the companies that are 
decided to be sold. The diagnosis process aimed to identify whether the problems are 
due to external factors or internal factors. In other words, the main objective of this 
diagnostic process of the Egyptian economic reform program is to identify the 
symptoms and causes of the internal and external problems, as to change the status of 
these companies from losing companies to profitable companies to be attractive 
companies when selling them (Youssef, 1996). 
The performance of the Egyptian privatization program could be shown by the 
following table: 
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Table 2.2 
Number of Privatized Companies in Egypt 
Companies sold to the public (through 34 
the stock market). 
Companies sold to anchor investors. 8 
Companies sold to labour unions 15 
Number of companies of which more 57 
than 51 % of equity sold to private 
sector. 
Number of companies sold as assets 17 
Number of companies of which more 9 
than 40% of its equity sold through the 
stock market 
Number of companies of which less 9 
than 40 % of equity sold through the 
stock market 
Number of companies of which less 18 
than 50 % of equity sold to date 
Total number of companies covered by 92 
the privatization programme 
Source: The Egyptian Ministry of Public Enterprise Sector, Privatizatio n Programme performance from 
the start to 24-5-1998, Unpublished Report, (Cairo: MPES, 1998). 
It was noticed that the total number of the privatized companies in Egypt, either 
fully 
or partially, was 92 out of the total number of companies of Egypt which 
is 314 
companies, that means that 28% of the state-owned enterprises 
have been privatized 
fully or partially (Omran, 2001). 
Finally, there were many investment incentives that had been settled 
by the Egyptian 
government to attract investors to Egypt. This included the unified tax 
law number 
187 in 1993 that reduced the marginal tax rates and simplified tax structure and 
administrative, besides the tax allowances. In addition, there was the 
introduction of 
the sales tax to reduce the budget deficit, reducing the exports tariff 
from a maximum 
of 120% to only 50%, and the establishing of the social 
fund of development by the 
president decree number 
40 (Omran, 2001). 
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2.5 THE EGYPTIAN STOCK MARKET 
The stock market is considered to be an essential prerequisite for the achievement of a 
significant growth rates of economies, and this stock market needs to be well 
established and at the same time to be developed and updated to be well-ranked 
compared to the other stock markets in the other different economies. 
Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE) is the Egyptian stock market, which is 
considered to be a self-regulatory authority and is managed by an elected board of 
directors under the supervision of the Capital Market Authority (CMA). This board is 
composed of eleven members: the chairman is assigned by the Council of Ministers, 
six members represents the stock exchange brokers, two members represents banks, 
one member is appointed by the Central Bank of Egypt, and one is from the CMA 
(The Ministry of Foreign Trade, 2004). 
The Stock exchanges were established in 1883 and 1903 respectively, and reached 
their historical peak in the 1940s when they, together, ranked as the fifth largest stock 
exchange market in the world. After several years of decline in the performance of the 
Egyptian stock exchange market, the stock market started growing again in 1992 with 
the economic reform program, privatization, and the regulatory changes in the 
Egyptian environment (The Ministry of Foreign Trade, 2004). 
Egypt established its capital market by regulating the Capital Market Law 95 of 1992 
(CML) that regulates the capital market framework and the supervision and control of 
the stock market and the market intermediaries that deals with the Egyptian stock 
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market. In addition, new regulations and rules were established as decrees of the 
minister of foreign trade to address other issues including disclosure requirements, 
stock exchange listing requirements, minority stockholders rights, and securitization 
(The Ministry of Foreign Trade, 2004). 
The Central Depository Law 93 of 2000 (CDL) regulates the stockholders record 
keeping, clearing and settlement. In addition, in 2003 the National Democratic Party 
(NDP) approved the reforms to the company and accounting / auditing laws (The 
Ministry of Foreign Trade, 2004). 
Accordingly, Egypt established a new capital market law in year 2001. The new law 
aims to provide greater protection to the investor, and offering a code of conduct for 
the operations of the brokers and portfolio managers. 
The regulations of the Egyptian stock market are settled by the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA), which is reporting to the Minister of Foreign Trade (MOFT). The 
CMA has wide administrative powers, including diversified actions as warnings, 
delisting, suspending and revoking license, imposing monetary penalties, cancelling 
transactions, conducting inspections, and suspending shareholder decisions (The 
Ministry of Foreign Trade, 2004). 
The CMA is composed of seven board members, two of them, including the chairman, 
are appointed by the President for a renewal three year term, the others are appointed 
by the Prime Minister for a two-year renewal term Moreover, the CMA budget is 
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derived from the fee income of the stock market (The Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
2004). 
After the Egyptian economic reform program, which was co-operated with the 
privatization program in the 1990s, there was a rapid growth in the Egyptian stock 
market. At the end of 2002, market capitalization as a percent of GDP was 29%, 
which increased from 21% in 1996, and decreased from 37% in 1999. Depending on 
this measure, the Egyptian stock market is considered to be smaller than the other 
stock markets in Jordan, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, but comparable to Morocco (The 
Ministry of Foreign Trade, 2004). 
In terms of absolute size, the Egyptian stock market is performing well, as the 
Egyptian stock market index in local currency terms rose by almost 97.1 % through 
September 2003, while the increase of the Egyptian stock market index in US Dollars 
is somehow lower of about 51.4% (The Ministry of Foreign Trade, 2004). 
The Egyptian stock market is characterized by a large number of listed companies due 
to the tax advantages associated with the listing in the stock market: 1148 companies 
were listed at the end of 2002, increasing from 656 listed companies in 1992. 
However, the number of listed companies declined to 1079 by the end of September 
2003 due to the enforcement of strictly listing requirements. At the end of 2003, up to 
300 companies were expected to be deleted and 800 companies to remain listed (The 
Ministry of Foreign Trade, 2004). 
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CASE has three listing schedules: the official schedule, the unofficial schedule 1, and 
the unofficial schedule 2. Public enterprises are listed in the official schedule, while 
the foreign securities were listed on the unofficial schedules. There are no differences 
between the three schedules concerning the tax advantages or the listing requirements, 
but this classification to encourage the listing of companies with special conditions as: 
partially privatized companies, closed, companies, or technology companies (The 
Ministry of Foreign Trade, 2004). 
2.6 THE EGYPTIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The Accounting Practice law (133/1951) and its amendments govern professional 
accountants and auditors, especially in the private sector. This law governs the 
registration and licensing of accountants and auditors, and provides a framework for 
bookkeeping and financial reporting, and gives the authority to the ministry of finance 
to develop a standardized chart of accounts and detailed instructions on the 
accounting treatments and reporting formats. The main objective of this law is to 
create a uniform accounting system and auditing practices, and to develop and apply 
the accounting standards that are the prerequisite for the introduction of high-quality 
financial reporting to the market economy (Wahdan et al., 2005a). 
The Accounting Practice Law is followed by establishing the company law (159/1981) 
and its executive regulations. This law requires all the registered companies under the 
company law to maintain accounting records and present annual audited 
financial 
statements. In addition, this law requires that the annual meeting of the shareholders 
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should evaluate the performance of the auditor and appoint a new auditor or renew the 
appointment of the existing auditor (Wahdan et al., 2005a). 
Moreover, the company law required that the following points must be satisfied in the 
auditor report that is presented in the shareholders' meeting: (a) the company maintain 
proper accounting records, (b) all legal requirements have been applied to all of the 
accounts, (c) all the information (evidence) for accomplishment of the auditor's duties 
has been collected, and (d) the financial statements represents the financial condition 
and results of operations in a fair and true view. Therefore, there are four main 
characteristics that are found in the Egyptian listed companies: (a) there is a 
separation between the owners and the managers of the listed companies; (b) 
considerable state ownership in privatized companies, (c) weak board independence, 
and (d) disclosure is not a common practice (Wahdan et al., 2005a). 
Egypt has had a stock exchange market since 1882. This stock exchange market was 
considered to be the fifth most active market in the world in the 1950s, but in the late 
1950s the stock exchange activity decreased and remained inactive for 30 years. In the 
1990s, with the launching of the economic reform program, the Egyptian government 
decided to refresh its capital market by issuing a new capital market law (No. 95 of 
1992) which regulates the capital market practices, and provides the legal framework. 
For the Cairo and Alexandria stock exchange, and regulates the incorporation and 
operations of market participants (Wahdan et al., 2005a). 
According to the capital market law, all listed companies are required to follow and 
apply the Egyptian accounting standards. At the beginning of applying the capital 
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market law the listed companies are required to prepare financial statement 
incompliance with the international accounting standards. Then the ministerial decree 
(503/1997) mentioned that the listed companies are required to use the Egyptian 
accounting standards and in the absence of the Egyptian accounting standards 
regarding the accounting treatment, the requirements set by international accounting 
standards were applied (Wahdan et al., 2005a). 
Moreover, the capital market law required all listed companies to publish financial 
statements in two widely-distributed newspapers and to establish an audit committee. 
In addition, recently the capital market authority has issued a new capital market law 
that has been activated since August 2002 to ensure that the prepared and presented 
financial statements comply with accounting, auditing, and legal requirements 
(Wahdan et al., 2005a). 
In addition, Egypt has established the banking law (163/1957) that requires all banks 
to follow the accounting and auditing requirements and guidelines that are set by the 
central bank of Egypt. Therefore, all banks in Egypt are required to report their 
financial statements following the Egyptian accounting standards and these statements 
required to be audited. The central bank of Egypt controls the audits of the financial 
statements and the auditor performance and also reviews the auditor report and annual 
financial statements prior to stockholder meeting (Wahdan et al., 2005a). 
The Banking law required that two auditors - it is allowed that they are from the same 
auditing firm - must audit bank financial statements and ensure the audit quality. 
Moreover, the banking law requires that individual auditors cannot sign audit reports 
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for more than two banks per year. In addition, the Egyptian central bank requires 
banks to file annual, semiannual, and quarterly reports including financial statements 
(Wahdan et al., 2005a). 
Finally, the central auditing organization law (144/1988) governs the auditing of 
government departments and agencies (public sector enterprises, and companies in 
which ownership interest of public investment is not less than 25 per cent). The 
central auditing organization is considered to be an independent public organization 
that reports directly to the people assembly by submitting its reports to parliament. 
The most important role of the central auditing organization is the harmonization of 
public sector accounting and auditing standards with the internationally accepted 
standards. 
2.7 THE EGYPTIAN PROFESSIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
2.7.1 Auditing Profession 
The Egyptian society of Accountants and Auditors is considered to be the body of 
accounting profession in Egypt; it is an association of chartered accountants that 
develops educational and professional standards. It is composed of about 1,200 
members, where about 700 members are actively involved in auditing practice. The 
society is a member of the International federation of Accountants (IFAC). 
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In 1946, a royal charter established the Egyptian society of Accountants and Auditors 
and it was given further statutory recognition by the ministerial order No. 2280. The 
society is managed by the board of directors and is constituted under its own statutes. 
Members have been admitted when they satisfied one or more of the following 
conditions: (1) Membership in the institute of chartered accountants in England and 
Wales, or another accepted foreign professional body, (2) Doctoral degree in 
accounting or auditing with three years of full-time work experience in practice, (3) 
At least three years of full-time work experience in the office of a practicing Egyptian 
society of Accountants and Auditors member or equivalent and successful completion 
of the two-part examination (the first examination is performed after one-and-a-half 
years; and the second final part is taken at the end of three years). 
The registration committee for Accountants and Auditors in the ministry of finance is 
responsible for registering professional Accountants and Auditors; this registration 
committee has a list of more than 80,000 registered accountants who provide auditing 
services. 
The registration rules requires that to be registered as a trainee accountant he/she must 
be a graduate with a bachelor degree and a major in accounting. These trainees may 
qualify for first-level registration as accountants if they achieve three years of 
professional work in a practicing accountant office or equivalent, after that they have 
the authority to practice as auditors of sole proprietorship and partnership enterprises. 
The accountants may apply for the final registration certificates after additional five 
years of employment experience; this final registration certificate gives the authority 
to the accountant to act as auditor of joint stock companies. 
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In addition, to be qualified as auditor of joint stock companies can be done by 
registering directly through membership in the Egyptian society of Accountant and 
Auditors. However, many practicing auditors, of the Egyptian society of Accountants 
and Auditors, lack necessary professional competence for providing high-quality 
auditing service. 
In Egypt, the code of ethics was established in 1958 and the ethics violation criteria 
(such as: Fraud) was discussed by the syndicate law (40/1972). However, the ministry 
of finance and syndicate law has played an important role to increase the awareness of 
legal requirements, but practically there is little awareness among many practicing 
auditors of international best practices concerning conflicts of interest and auditor 
independence (Wahdan et al., 2005b). 
2.7.2 Auditing Education 
The Egyptian public universities quality needs to be improved as they suffers from the 
lack of modern courses and few qualified teachers to face the rising number of 
students. The accounting and auditing courses needs to be updated to include 
international standards and practices, but that may be faced by the lack of the 
appropriate learning text books and educational materials in international accounting 
and auditing. 
Private universities in Egypt, such as AUC, BUE, GUC, now offer English-language 
accounting programs using internationally-comparable courses and English-language 
text books. But these universities are characterized by high tuition fees which restrict 
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huge number of students to be accessed to these universities. In addition, some public 
universities began to introduce an English-language section in the accounting 
department (Wahdan et al., 2005b). 
Moreover, one of the most important weaknesses is the registration process, as one of 
its requirements is that the applicant must work for practicing licensed accountant or 
equivalent throughout the stipulated apprenticeship period. This requirement is 
evidenced by a letter from the employer and neither this letter subjected for 
verification or the applicant participation in any actual audit assignment during the 
apprenticeship period. In addition, the Accounting practice law does not require the 
audit practitioners to undertake any regular training or continuing their professional 
education. On the other hand, international best practice stipulates that every 
practicing auditor should complete at least 30 hours of continuing professional 
education per year to be updated with the new and recent development in the 
accounting and auditing practices (Wahdan et al., 2005b). 
In response to this problem of knowledge some universities offered some training 
programs using the upgraded text books and educational materials, but these programs 
may be eliminated by the difficulty of accessibility of these programs to all of the 
auditor professionals. 
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2.8 THE ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING STANDARDS IN EGYPT 
The Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade in May 1997 issued ministerial decree 
(478/1997) to establish the permanent committee for standards of accounting and 
auditing which are responsible for setting the accounting and auditing standards in 
Egypt. The settlement of the accounting and auditing standards in Egypt is done by 
selecting the international accounting and auditing standards that are applicable to the 
Egyptian situation (Wahdan et al., 2005b). 
The selected international accounting and auditing standards are translated in to the 
local language and are used to draft the Egyptian standard that reflects the 
requirements of the Egyptian laws and regulations. The draft is then submitted to the 
permanent committee to be discussed, finalized, and adopted. The final draft of the 
Egyptian standard is submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Trade to be issued by a 
ministerial decree (Wahdan et al., 2005b). 
The first time to introduce Egyptian Accounting standards was done by the ministerial 
decree 503/1997. By the end of May 2002, the ministry of Foreign Trade introduced 
ministerial decrees issued 22 Egyptian Accounting standards and six Egyptian 
Auditing standards, concentrating only on the presentation of the final audit report 
regardless the necessarily improvements of the whole process of auditing (Wahdan et 
al., 2005b). 
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2.9 ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 
STANDARDS 
The Ensuring compliance with accounting and auditing standards is affected by a 
group of problems that may face the application of these standards in Egypt. One of 
the most important problems is the lack of the guidelines for the application of the 
Egyptian standards, also the lack of capacity of those who prepare and audit financial 
statements, and the lack of the regulatory mechanisms for imposing sanctions the 
accountants and auditors who fail to comply (Wahdan et al., 2005b). 
The capital market authority reviews the annual financial statements presented by the 
listed companies to ensure that these statements are filling the requirements of the 
preparation and the disclosure required by the capital market authority from one side, 
and from the other side making sure that these financial statements are prepared and 
audited following the Egyptian accounting and auditing standards (Wahdan et al., 
2005b). 
However, the recent reviews of the capital market authority reveal that many listed 
companies have not complied with disclosure requirements, and the audit reports 
frequently were not in compliance with required reporting format. In the case of the 
violation of the financial statements of a listed company to the accounting and 
disclosure requirements, the capital market authority request that the company correct 
and redo its financial statements. If the company refuses, the capital market authority 
may get a third party to redo the financial statements and the cost must be paid by the 
company. Also, the capital market authority may cancel stock market of violators. 
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Despite that, the capital market authority has no authority to apply penalties for non 
compliance or incentives for compliance with financial reporting requirements. 
The central Bank of Egypt has no mechanism for monitoring compliance with the 
accounting and disclosure regulations. The Banking supervision department depends 
on specific measures to enforce the accounting and reporting requirements. In 
addition, the external banking supervision department reports any violations of 
established standards, rules, regulations, and laws, but the central bank does not 
impose any effective penalties on auditors who fail to comply with the requirements 
(Wahdan et al., 2005b). 
In Egypt, auditors' performance is self-regulated as they issue their audit report 
without any quality assurance check by another reviewer, whether inside the auditing 
firm or outside the firm. Therefore the audit firms lack the incentives to implement 
appropriate quality controls (Wahdan et al., 2005b). 
Although shareholders have the authority to appoint, remove, and set the auditors, 
practically the company top management controls these decisions. Therefore, there is 
a considerable pressure on auditors to meet the wishes of the top management which 
may affect the independence of the auditors in performing their tasks and 
responsibilities of the auditing process (Wahdan et al., 2005b). 
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2.10 AUDITING STANDARDS IN PRACTICE 
Auditors in Egypt are following the six auditing Egyptian standards in the 
presentation and format of the auditors report, and any other international standard of 
auditing that relate to other aspects of auditing. Due to the difficulty of accessing the 
practice manuals, knowledge deficiencies constrain the degree of compliance, with 
applicable auditing standards varies among large and small firms, as large firms have 
greater capability to provide quality services (Wahdan et al., 2005b). 
The auditor report sometimes introduce a "clean bill of health" report for clients even 
when there are serious and material issues that should be explained in the report, but 
the auditor usually mention these serious and material issues in the long form report, 
this practice may results in distortion for the users of the audited financial statements. 
2.11 CONCLUSION 
Egypt is characterized by an exclusive location that is associated by a variety of 
economical sectors that each of them may direct the Egyptian economy towards 
achieving a competitive advantage over its sectors: it was concluded that there was a 
breakthrough that was achieved by Egypt during the 1990s by applying its economic 
reform program cooperated with the privatization program of the public enterprises, 
which may be reflected in the improvement of the economical indicators of the 
Egyptian economy. 
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As a prerequisite to completing the improvement framework, the Capital Market Law 
improved the performance of the Egyptian stock market that is considered to be the 
engine of the economy. If it continues development and updating the stock market, 
that could be reflected on the growth of the Egyptian economy as a whole with its 
different sectors. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The auditing expectation gap is an important terminology that affects the quality of 
the decision-making process as the corporate annual reports are considered to be the 
main basis for many users to make different decisions. It is important that such reports 
meet the users' expectations in their decision making process. Many studies in 
different countries investigated the existence of the auditing expectation gap and 
recommended one or more theoretical approaches that would help to reduce this gap. 
The current chapter critically evaluates the prior studies that examined the existence 
of the auditing expectations gap and the appropriate methods to reduce this gap. These 
approaches can be summarized in to three methods. First, the expansion of the audit 
report by using the long-form instead of the short-form audit report. Second, is 
increasing the degree of education of the annual reports' users in terms of the auditing 
process and the auditors' responsibilities. Third, is setting auditing standards that 
expands the auditors' functions and responsibilities to satisfy the needs and 
expectations annual reports' users. 
The majority of previous studies suggested the above approaches without any 
empirical investigation for the effectiveness of such methods. One of the main 
objectives of the current study is to empirically measure the effectiveness of these 
approaches in reducing the auditing expectation gap and to examine the potential 
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impact of the audited voluntary disclosure in reducing such gap in the Egyptian 
context. 
This chapter is divided into four main parts: First, defining the auditing expectation 
gap. Second part is reviewing the previous studies which examined the existence of 
the gap in the developed countries. Third section is reviewing the prior studies which 
investigated the existence of the gap in developing countries. Final part is showing the 
different methods of reducing this gap. 
3.2 AUDITING EXPECTATIONS GAP DEFINISIONS 
Liggio (1974) is the first to define the expectation gap as the difference between the 
actual and the expected performance. This definition is extended by the Cohen 
commission (Commission on auditors responsibilities, 1978) where the expectation 
gap is represented by the gap between the public expectations and needs, and the 
expected accomplishment of the auditors. Moreover, the expectation gap could be 
defined as `the difference between what the public and financial statement users 
believe auditors are responsible for and what auditors themselves believe their 
responsibilities are' (AICPA, 1992). 
Monroe and Woodliff (1993) defined the expectation gap as the difference between 
the beliefs of auditors and those of the public concerning the auditors' responsibilities 
and duties. Jennings et al. (1993) argued that the expectation gap represents the 
difference between the public expectations about the responsibilities and duties of the 
auditing profession and what the auditing profession actually provides. 
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Porter (1993) defined the expectation - performance gap as the gap between the 
expectations of the society about the auditors, and the performance of the auditors. In 
addition, Porter identified that the expectation - performance gap is composed of two 
main components. First, the reasonableness gap which represents the gap between the 
society's expectations about the achievements of the auditors, and the reasonably 
expected accomplishment of the auditors. Second, the performance gap which 
represents the gap between the reasonably society's expected accomplishment of the 
auditor's, and the perceived achievement of the auditors. 
Moreover, Porter (1993) subdivided the performance gap into two gaps. First, the 
deficient gap, which is the gap between the reasonably auditors expected duties, and 
the existing auditors' duties that are identified by the law and professional 
promulgation. Second, the deficient performance, which is the gap between the 
expected auditors' performance standard of the existing duties, and auditors' 
performance as expected and perceived by society. 
Moreover, the auditing expectation gap has three main components (Thomas et al., 
2004). First, the deficit performance gap which shows the difference between the 
actual performance of the auditor and the proposed performance as outlined by the 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) and quality control standards. 
Second, the deficit standards gap which shows the difference between the settled 
standards and the public reasonable requests from the auditor. Third, the unreasonable 
expectation which represents the unrealistic and not necessarily public's expectations 
regarding the auditor's performance. 
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Figure 3.1 
The Nature of the Auditing Expectations Gap 
Perceived 
Performance 
of Auditors 
Auditor's 
Duties as 
Outlined in 
Current 
Standards 
Duties 
Reasonably 
Expected 
of Auditors 
Society's 
Expectations 
of Auditors 
(1) 
Deficient 
Performance 
(2) 
Deficient 
Standards 
(3) 
Unreasonable 
Expectations 
Source: C. William (Bill) Thomas, Juan Alejandro JR, and Marchall K. Pitman (2004) `The audit 
expectation gap of the 2 1st Century' Today's CPA, July/August 2004. 
Tricker (1982) defined the expectation gap as `the result of a natural time lag in the 
auditing profession identifying and responding to continually evolving and expanding 
public expectations'. However, Epstein and Geigere (1994) defined the expectation 
gap as the difference between the public expectations from the accounting profession 
and the actual performance of the accounting profession, and that is due to the public 
failure to know about the nature and limitations of an audit. 
On the other hand, Humphrey (1997) defined the expectation gap as `a representation 
of the feeling that auditors are performing in a manner at variance with the beliefs and 
desires of those for whose benefit the audit is carried out'. He also identified that the 
expectation gap could be defined more narrowly as a "role - perception gap" which 
represents that users expectations are capable of comparison with a predetermined 
notion the reasonably expected from the auditors to provide. As a result this leads to 
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the "ignorance gap" that the expectation gap could be narrowed or even closed by the 
users' education. 
In addition, other researchers identified that the expectation gap exists when there are 
different beliefs hold by the auditors and the public related to the auditor's duties and 
responsibilities and the messages conveyed by audit reports (Wollf et al., 1999; Koh 
and Woo, 1998; Frank et al., 2001). Moreover, according to Godsell (1992) the 
expectation gap exists when `there is a widespread belief that a person who has any 
interest in a company (shareholders, potential investors, take-over bidders, creditors, 
etc. ) should be able to rely on its audited accounts as a guarantee of its solvency, 
propriety and business viability. Hence, if it transpires, without any warning that the 
company is in serious financial difficulty, it is widely felt that somebody should be 
made accountable for these financial disasters, and this somebody is always perceived 
to be the auditors'. While Innes et al. (1997) defined the expectation gap from the 
auditors' and users' perspectives as the gap between the normative view (what the 
auditors should do) and the positive view (what auditors are actually doing), while 
Wolf et al. (1999) defined the expectation gap as the difference between the desires of 
the public from the auditors and the understood role of the auditors to be 
encompassed. 
Moreover, Shaikh and Talha (2003) defined the expectation gap as `the gap between 
society's expectations of auditor and auditor's performance as perceived by society', 
and they mentioned that the causes of this gap might be due to that the auditing is 
characterized by being probabilistic, the misunderstanding and unreasonable 
expectations of the non-auditors about the audit function, the unavailability of the 
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evaluation of the audit performance depending on the data and the information after 
the audit completion, the time lags in responding to the changing expectations due to 
the development of the audit responsibilities, the new expectations and accountability 
requirements due to the corporate crises, and the professions efforts to control and 
maintain the expectation gap. 
Regarding the reasons of the existence of the auditing expectation - performance gap, 
Sweeney (1997) classified the issues that results in the expectation gap into seven 
classes are: going concern, fraud and illegal acts, and warning of impending collapse, 
accuracy, management performance, independence, and duty of care, while Monroe 
and Woodliff (1993) classified these issues into only three classes are: auditor's 
responsibilities, reliability of the audited financial statements, and prospects of the 
audited entity. Finally, Best et al. (2001) agreed with Schelluch (1996) that the 
reasons of the existence of the expectation gap may be related to the areas of the 
responsibilities, and reliability and decision usefulness of audited financial statements. 
3.3 EXAMINING THE EXISTENCE OF THE AUDITING EXPECTATIONS 
GAP 
There are many studies that examined the existence of the auditing expectation gap in 
developed and developing countries. These studies are shown below. 
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3.3.1 Developed Countries 
Gay et al. (1998) investigated the existence of the audit expectation gap in Australia 
by using a seven-point Likert scale questionnaire that is distributed over a sample of 
581 Australian auditors selected randomly from members of the institute of chartered 
accountants in Australia, 304 company secretaries / accountants randomly selected 
from Australian business monthly top 500 business entities as well as the top 110 
finance companies/entities, and 495 shareholders. But before distributing the 
questionnaires, a pilot study was applied by 200 auditors. The questionnaire measure 
the perceptions of the different categories of the sample regarding auditor 
responsibilities, financial statements reliability, and the decision usefulness of 
financial statements which are the same variables used by Schelluch (1996). 
The study used the Mann-Whitney U-tests to calculate the significant differences in 
responses perceptions, the results of the test indicated the existence of high level of 
perception significant differences of the three groups of the sample, which is 
considered to be evidence to the existence of the auditing expectation gap in 
Australia. However, the study has not added any contribution to the work of 
Schelluch (1996) in proving the existence of the auditing expectation gap using the 
same variables; even the study has not recommended any proposed approaches that 
may cause the reduction of this auditing expectation gap in Australia. 
Frank et al. (2001) examined the existence of the auditing expectation gap 
in the USA 
by distributing a questionnaire that is designed on a 10-point scale to a sample of 100 
auditors, a sample of 100 prospective 
jurors, and a sample of 100 accounting students. 
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The distributed questionnaires aim to identify the significant differences of the 
perceptions of the 3 samples regarding the audit knowledge, the auditor's role, and the 
general attitudes toward the profession. The study used Kruskal-Wallis parametric test 
to examine the mean differences between the three groups of the samples, the test 
shows significant differences between the perceptions of the three samples regarding 
the three independent variables which indicates the existence of the expectation gap in 
the USA. The study examined the existence of the auditing expectation gap without 
any evidence showing how wide this gap or the effective approaches (if any) that 
could reduce this gap in the USA. 
Gowthrope and Porter (1999) examined the existence of the auditing expectation - 
performance gap in New Zealand compared to the auditing expectation - performance 
gap in the United Kingdom in 1999 (cross sectional study), compared to the auditing 
expectation - performance gap in New 
Zealand in 1989 (longitudinal study). The 
study concentrates on 3 main variables; the structure, the composition, and extend of 
the auditing - performance gap. 
The study is applied using questionnaire that was 
mailed to 1610 selected members of four groups; auditors, auditees, and audit 
beneficiaries from inside, and from outside, the financial community in the UK, and 
1534 members of the same groups in New Zealand. The study found that there 
is a 
wide auditing expectation - performance gap 
in the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand. However, the study has recommended different solutions to narrow this gap 
but without examining any of these solutions, and which solution 
is more effective in 
the United Kingdom, and in New Zealand, as the results would be different in 
between the two countries depending on the cultural differences of both of them. 
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McEnroe and Martens (2001) supported their study in (1992) by examining the 
existence of the auditing expectation gap in the United States by distributing a 
questionnaire composed of two groups of respondents; 500 audit partners from the 66 
largest public accounting firms in revenue, their response rate was 23.4 %, and 500 
investors from the American Association of Individual Investors with response rate of 
86%. The questionnaire is designed to investigate the auditing expectation gap based 
on different dimensions: oversight responsibilities, the economic viability of the 
entity, and fraud. The results of the study are derived using a two-tailed t-test, F-test 
and the wave technique. 
The study depends only on investigating the existence of the auditing expectation gap 
and recommending that the public education would reduce the auditing expectation 
gap. These results are driven but examining how valid and effective applying this 
solution would be regardless of whether or not there may be other solutions that can 
reduce this gap more effectively than education. Moreover, the sample is limited to 
only two groups (one of them is the preparer of the auditing report) regardless the 
other users which affects the ability to generalize the results of the study over the 
perceptions of the other users. 
Humphrey et al. (1993) investigated the existence of the auditing expectation gap in 
the United Kingdom. The study used the questionnaire technique to gather the data 
from the different groups of respondents; accountants in public practice, corporate 
finance directors, investment analysis, bank leading officers, and financial journalists. 
The examination of the auditing expectation gap is examined regarding the role of the 
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auditor, the prohibitions and regulations placed on audit firms, and the decisions 
auditors expected to make. 
However, the study used a simple regression to identify the significant differences 
between the different groups of respondents towards the independent variables of the 
study. The results of the study indicated that there are wide significant differences 
between the different respondents which lead to concluding the existence of the 
auditing expectation gap in the United Kingdom. The study has not applied a robust 
test, which means that the results of the study could be defective. Also the study has 
not recommended or examined the effectiveness of the different methods that could 
solve the problem, as the study addressed the problem and offered the evidence of its 
existence without solving it. 
The previous studies are summarized in table 3.1 as follows: 
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Table 3.1 
Examining Auditing Expectations Gap in the Developed Countries 
Author (s)& 
Date 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample Size Analysis & 
General Results 
Gay et al. Auditor Auditing 581 Analysis 
(1998) responsibilities, expectation Australian Mann-Whitney U- 
financial gap. auditors, 304 tests. 
statements company Results 
reliability, and the secretaries / The existence of 
decision accountants, the auditing 
usefulness of and 495 expectation gap in 
financial shareholders. Australia. 
statements. 
Frank et al. The audit 
(2001) knowledge, the 
auditor's role, and 
the general 
attitudes toward 
the profession. 
Gowthrope 
and Porter 
(1999). 
The structure, and 
composition, and 
the extent of the 
auditing - 
performance gap. 
Auditing 100 auditors, Analysis 
expectation 100 Kruskal-Wallis 
gap. prospective parametric 
üirnre 100 RPCtnltc 
JL &I v10, "vv 
accounting 
students. 
Auditing Mailed to 
expectation 1610 
gap. selected 
members of 
four groups; 
auditors, 
auditees, and 
audit 
beneficiaries 
from inside, 
and from 
outside, the 
financial 
community 
in the UK, 
and 1534 
members of 
the same 
groups in 
New 
Zealand. 
The existence of 
the auditing 
expectation gap in 
the USA. 
Analysis 
Mann-Whitney U- 
tests. 
Results 
The existence of 
the auditing 
expectation gap in 
the United 
Kingdom and 
New Zealand. 
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Author (s)& 
Date 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Sample Size Analysis & 
General Results 
McEnroe and Oversight Auditing 500 audit Analysis 
Martens responsibilities, expectation partners 1- Two-tailed 
(2001). the economic gap. from the 66 t-test. 
viability of the largest 2- F-test. 
entity, and fraud. public 3- Wave 
accounting 
firms in 
revenue, and 
500 
investors 
from the 
American 
Association 
of Individual 
Investors. 
Humphrey et 
al. (1993). 
technique. 
Results 
The existence of 
the auditing 
expectation gap in 
the United States 
of America. 
Analysis 
Simple regression 
analysis. 
Results 
The existence of 
the auditing 
expectation gap in 
the United 
Kingdom. 
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The role of the 
auditor, the 
prohibitions and 
regulations placed 
on audit firms, 
and the decisions 
auditors expected 
to make. 
The 
Auditing 
expectation 
gap. 
Accountants 
in public 
practice, 
corporate 
finance 
directors, 
investment 
analysis, 
bank leading 
officers, and 
financial 
iournalists. 
3.3.2 Developing Countries 
Fadzly and Ahmad (2004) investigated the existence of the auditing expectation gap 
in Malaysia based on the work of Monroe and Woodliff (1993), when examining the 
effect of education on reducing the expectation gap in Australia. They used survey 
questionnaires which is comprised of two parts; the first part of the questionnaire is to 
examine the existence of the audit expectation gap, while the second part is related to 
the effect of the reading materials (in the form of brochures) on the respondent's 
expectations by applying the post-test method as having two groups: treatment groups 
(with brochure) and control groups (without brochure). In both parts of the 
questionnaire, it was based on the instruments used by Best et al. (2001) and 
Schelluch (1996) in investigating the expectation gap in Singapore, as the 
questionnaire is designed that the respondents would make their responses on a seven 
point bipolar Likert scale. The questionnaire of Fadzly and Ahmad (2004) 
concentrates on three main areas: responsibility, reliability, and decision usefulness. 
Moreover, the questionnaire was distributed among a sample of 1300 individuals 
consists of 300 auditors and the major users of the financial statements: 300 bankers, 
400 investors (including 100 as experimental), and 300 stockbrokers. However, the 
responded questionnaires were 398, which results in a response rate of 30.6 %. The 
study concluded that a wide gap was found regarding the auditor's responsibilities 
toward fraud detection and prevention, preparation of financial statements, and 
internal control, in addition to the auditor's scope gap of legal responsibility and 
culpability in fraud related business failure. Regarding this study, it may suffer from 
the limitation of generalizing its results due to the dependency on a convenience 
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sampling to obtain the investor's sample in experimental and non-experimental 
procedures. Besides, using the post-test method instead of the pre-test-post-test 
method which may eliminates the strength of the study results. 
Koh, and Woo (2001) examined the existence of the auditing expectation gap in 
Singapore between auditors and managers, the study identified five determinants that 
may exists this gap; the auditing knowledge, the years of working experience, the 
management position in the organization, and the functional area. The study is based 
on the questionnaires that are designed on a seven-point Likert scale and distributed 
over a randomly selected sample of 500 auditors in the big 6 auditing firms in 
Singapore, and 500 managers of the top 1000 companies in Singapore. 
The statistical analysis of the study is divided into two parts; the first part examining 
the existence of the auditing expectation gap between the auditors and managers is 
done by applying the Logit analysis. The second part of the statistical analysis is 
aiming to test the relationship of the existing auditing expectation gap and its 
determinants by applying n-way ANOVA besides the Duncan multiple comparisons 
to study the differences in expectations between the auditors and managers over the 
determinants of the auditing expectation gap. The study offered evidence of the 
existence of the auditing expectation gap between the managers and auditors in 
Singapore, therefore the study is limited to one category of users which restricts the 
ability of the results to be generalized over the expectations of the other categories of 
the financial reports in Singapore, therefore the results lost its generalization power 
over other users or other geographic places. 
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The study of Best et al. (2001) applied on Singapore used a research methodology 
identical to the study used by Schelluch (1996) in developing an instrument that 
measure the messages communicated by the short form report audit report in 
Singapore, without comparing it to the effect of the long form report to show the 
effectiveness of the long form audit report in reducing the audit expectation gap. The 
sample consists of 300 subjects distributed equally over three groups of respondents; 
auditors, bankers, and investors (whom represented by general public 30 subjects, 
financial analysts 35 subjects, and brokers 35 subjects). The sample is characterized 
by being small as to be well representative of the whole population of the three 
selected categories of respondents. 
Best et al. (2001) used the same methodology of Schelluch (1996) to measure the 
expectation gap by examining the message that is communicated to the users by using 
the short - form audit report 
in Singapore. The study examined the expectation gap 
using a seven point Likert scale questionnaire that was introduced to three main 
categories; auditors, bankers and investors with different levels of experience and 
accounting knowledge in order to measure three different factors; responsibility, 
reliability, and decision usefulness. The significant differences between the different 
categories of respondents are tested using the Mann-Whitney U-test besides using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to examine the normality of distribution of the collected 
data. 
The results that are achieved by Best et al. (2001) indicated that there is a quite wide 
audit expectation gap in Singapore, but the study's results have not offered an 
evidence about the effectiveness of using the long form audit report instead of the 
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short form audit report, which is considered one of the objectives of the study that has 
not been achieved by its results. However, using Best et al. (2001) the same 
methodology of Schelluch (1996) may not be acceptable as the two studies are 
applied on two different countries, Singapore and Australia, so the cultural differences 
between the two countries may affect the results of the study which is considered one 
of the important limitations that the study suffers from. 
Dixon et al. (2006) investigated the existence of the auditing expectation gap in Egypt 
using the research methodology used by Schelluch (1996), Best et al. (2001), and 
Fadzly and Ahmad (2004) to measure the message communicated by the audit report 
form. This study concentrates on the same independent variables, responsibility, 
reliability, and decision usefulness, to examine the existence of audit expectation gap 
in Egypt. The questionnaire is distributed over a sample of the same three categories 
of respondents used by Best et al. (2001), auditors, bankers, and investors, with a 
sample size of 300 respondents distributed equally to the three categories. 
Based on the existence of the significance differences between the mean test scores of 
the auditors from one side, bankers, and investors from the other sides, it indicates the 
existence of a wide expectation gap in Egypt without examining the effectiveness of 
any of the existence approaches that may reduce the audit expectation gap in Egypt, 
or recommending a proposed approach that may be the root of the audit expectation 
gap in Egypt and at the same time could be the solution for reducing this existing 
audit expectation gap. Moreover, the results are identically driven as with Fadzly and 
Ahmad (2004), Best et al. (2001) using the same tests. In addition the same limitation 
that affects their studies concerning the limited sample size (300 respondents). 
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Besides that, the study suffers from the limited ability to generalize the results due to 
the cultural differences that exists between Egypt, Malaysia, and Singapore. 
Chowdhury, and Innes (1998) applied an exploratory study to identify whether or not 
an auditing expectation gap exists in the public sector of Bangladesh. The study is a 
qualitative research as it is depending on a semi-structured interview (face-to-face 
interview). The exploratory nature of the study made it only limited to identifying the 
existence of the audit expectation gap, but extents the study to investigate the causes 
of this auditing expectation gap. The sample used in this research is composed of 17 
Comptrollers and Auditor Generals (CAG), 15 members of the Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC) of parliament, and nine senior representatives from the five 
International Funding Agencies (IFA). It examines the effect of the auditor 
accountability, auditor independence, auditor competence, auditor materiality and 
audit evidence, true and fair, and performance audit as independent variables on the 
audit expectation gap. 
The study shows significant differences in the perceptions of the different categories 
of the study sample which indicates the existence of auditing expectation gap 
in 
Bangladesh. The study goes further and illustrated the reasons of the expectation gap 
in the public and the private sectors of Bangladesh; regarding the private sector, the 
study depends on the previous literature to 
identify that the causes of auditing 
expectation gap are related to the fraud 
detection, true and fair view, auditor 
independence, the relationship between auditors and users. On the other side, 
regarding the public sector, the auditing expectation gap may results 
from the 
independency from ministry, absence of formal communication, the scope of 
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performance audit, the format and contents of report, auditors' competence, objectives 
of audited entities, and timeliness of reporting. However, this study can be criticized 
because it concentrates on the investigation of the auditing expectation gap in the 
public sector then generalizes the results about the existence of the auditing 
expectation gap in this sector on the private sector, depending on qualitative analysis 
on a sample of public sector respondents which is considered to be a restriction. 
Moreover, the study depends on the semi-structured interviews without any 
quantitative research assisted by statistical analysis to support this qualitative analysis 
that may lead to some biased results. Finally, the study suffers from the relatively 
small number of respondents which also affects the ability of the generalization of the 
results of the study. 
To overcome the previous limitations, Chowdhury et al. (2005) applied the same 
study of Chowdhury and Innes (1998), but extended it to include, beside the applied 
qualitative analysis in the form of semi-structured interviews, a quantitative analysis 
by distributing over the same sample a questionnaire of different questions about the 
dimensions of audit concepts tested before using the semi-structured interview. The 
questionnaire is designed based on seven-point Likert scale, and is analyzed using the 
Mann-Whitney U-test which is a non-parametric test equivalent to the t-test to fit with 
the ordinal measurements as to be able to use the ranks. The results of the current 
study support the results of the previous studies concerning the existence of the 
expectation gap in Bangladesh. In spite that this study overcame the limitation of the 
previous studies concerning applying a quantitative analysis to support the results of 
the qualitative analysis the problems are generalizing the results of the existence of 
the audit expectation gap in the public sector over the private sector without applying 
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any examination of this sector, besides the relatively small number of respondents as 
mentioned in the limitations of the previous study. 
Siddiqui, and Nasreen (2004) examined the existence of auditing expectation gap in 
Bangladesh by concentrating on three independent variables; audit responsibility, 
audit reliability, decision usefulness of audited financial statements, and these 
variables are similar to the independent variables of the studies of Schelluch (1996), 
Best et al. (2001), and Fadzly and Ahmad (2004). The study is applied using the 
questionnaire approach which is constructed on the base of a seven point Likert scale. 
This questionnaire is distributed over a sample of 100 undergraduate students in the 
department of Accounting & Information systems, university of Dhaka, who 
completed a course in auditing and they represents only the academic view, while 115 
former students of the same department who qualified as charted accountants and 
working in different companies as accountants or internal auditors represent both the 
academic and professional views. 
The results of the study, built on using the F-test and the t-test to identify the 
significant differences between the two categories of the collected sample, indicated 
the existence of wide auditing expectation gap in Bangladesh in terms of the tested 
three independent variables, However, this study suffers from the relatively small 
sample, and the limited categories tested as the users diversify in their education, 
knowledge, and experience, but this diversification was not taken in consideration in 
this study which limits the generalization power of the results over the diversified 
users. 
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Lin and Chen (2004) investigated the existence of the auditing expectation gap in 
China with respect to audit objectives, auditor's obligation to detect and report fraud, 
auditor independence, and third party liability of auditors. The investigation is applied 
using a questionnaire that is based on a 5-point Likert scale and distributed over a 
sample of audit beneficiaries as: investors, creditors, government officials, business 
management, and academics from one side, and the public practitioners in China from 
the other side. 
There are 800 questionnaire distributed over the two groups of the sample, 300 
questionnaires were sent to external user-groups of financial analysts from investment 
institutions, credit and loan officers at commercial banks, and government officials in 
charge of business financing and accounting at various government authorities. 
Another 300 questionnaires were sent to business management subjects in State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Public Listed Companies (PLCs) randomly selected 
from the China industrial enterprises and the China listed companies' reports 
respectively, with mail questionnaires sent to the general managers or controllers (or 
chief accountants) in the sample enterprises. A total of 120 questionnaires were 
mailed to practicing public accountants at the accounting/auditing firms listed in the 
China securities yearbook. Finally, 80 questionnaires sent to educators engaged in 
auditing teaching and research at the universities across the country. 
The study applied a Mann-Whitney ranked test to compare the mean of the responded 
questionnaires, besides using the t-test to examine the significant differences between 
the different categories of the sample. Based on the previous analysis of the sample, 
the study offered an evidence of the existence of the auditing expectation gap in 
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China. However, this study is suffering from an important limitation which is that the 
members of the auditing firms were originally certificate public auditors who were 
mainly staff of the state audit bureaux, therefore their perceptions would be biased 
towards the government and would be similar to the perception of the government 
respondents, and so do not show any significant difference than their perceptions due 
to the bias toward the government. Moreover, in spite of the diversification of the 
categories of the sample, there is a low response rate of 24.8% which may affect the 
generalization of the results of the study over the whole population. 
Desira and Baldacchino (2005) examined the existence of the auditing expectation 
gap in Malta based on the methodology used by Schelluch (1996), Best et al. (2001), 
and Fadzly and Ahmad (2004) to measure the significant differences between the 
different categories of the study sample regarding the auditor responsibility, the 
reliability of the audited financial statements and usefulness of financial statements to 
examine the existence of the auditing expectation gap in Malta. 
The study used the questionnaire technique which is distributed over a sample of 100 
potential jurors with the exemption of members of parliament, police and armed 
forces, and any person falling within the exempted categories was disregarded during 
the sample creation stage. Another 100 questionnaires were distributed over 
warranted Maltese auditors. The results are driven by applying the Chi-squared test to 
illustrate the significant differences between the two groups of samples, besides 
performing the Mann-Whitney U-test to check for the statistical differences 
between 
the same groups of samples. The previous tests show that there 
is significant 
difference in the perceptions of the two groups, which means the existence of the 
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auditing expectation gap in Malta. Although, this study is criticized by applying the 
same methodology of Fadzly and Ahmad (2004) in Malaysia on the context of Malta 
which may result in misleading results due to the different cultures between Malaysia 
and Malta. Moreover, the study is characterized by having a very low response rate of 
the jurors sample (18%) compared to a high respond rate of the auditors sample (56%) 
which may affect the consistency of the samples and so affects the accuracy of the 
driven results. 
Concerning Saudi Arabia, Hudaib and Haniffa (2003) investigated the existence of the 
expectation gap by collecting data in three different stages. The first stage is applying 
pilot semi-structured interviews with a number of auditors, credit mangers, financial 
analyst, shareholders, financial directors and governmental body representatives. The 
second stage is applying mail questionnaires to 350 subjects comprising large 
auditors, small auditors, financial directors, credit managers, investment analysts and 
funds managers, substantial shareholders, other shareholders, and governmental 
bodies. The final stage is applying depth face-to-face interviews with 48 selected 
respondents representing the previously mentioned eight groups. 
However, the designed questionnaires are similar to those used by Porter (1993) and 
Humphrey et al. (1993). The study concentrates on the relation of the auditors' role, 
and the audit environment, with the auditing expectation gap. This relation is 
concluded by applying the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks as a 
non-parametric test using the SPSS package. The results indicate the existence of the 
expectation gap in Saudi Arabia. The results of the study could not be reliable as they 
are built on the same questionnaire that is applied by Porter (1993) in New Zealand, 
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and Humphrey (1993) in the United Kingdom. Therefore, there may be some cultural 
differences that may affects the results and reduce its validity as when applying the 
questionnaire on different culture it needs a sort of adaptation to fit with the culture it 
is applied on. From the other side, the study offered the evidence of the existence of 
the expectation gap in the Saudi Arabia without examining the effective solution (if 
any) that would fits with the Saudi Arabia culture. 
In addition, Al-Twaijry (2006) examined the existence of the auditing expectation gap 
in Saudi Arabia by applying a qualitative analysis using the face-to-face interviews. 
The study is applied on a sample of 100 companies selected from the largest 1000 
Saudi Arabia companies. The sample is composed of academic staff, directors of 
internal audit departments, external auditors, governmental, accounting and internal 
auditing bodies. 
Based on the applied interviews with the different categories of the sample, it was 
concluded that the auditing expectation gap in Saudi Arabia is composed of five 
categories: the gap between what corporate management expects external auditors to 
do when performing the independent audit and what their real task is, the gap between 
how corporate management should appreciate its internal auditing and how 
management recognizes the internal auditing in reality, the gap between what auditees 
expect corporate auditors searching for when doing their duties and what the internal 
auditors real job is, the gap between what the business sector required in internal 
auditors (qualification and experience) and what internal auditors real qualifications 
and background are, and the gap between the scope of internal auditing as expected 
by the professional standards (SPPIA) and what the internal auditors are really doing. 
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The study depends only on the qualitative analysis to evidence the existence of the 
auditing expectation gap and that may have some disadvantages such as the biased 
perceptions of the interviewers while running the interview or analyzing the data. 
Moreover, the study has not recommended the solutions to reduce the gap and which 
of these solutions would be more effective and fits with the environment of the Saudi 
Arabia. 
The previous studies are summarized in table 3.2 as follows: 
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Table 3.2 
Examining Auditing Expectations Gap in the Developing Countries 
Author (s) 
& Date 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Sample Size Analysis & Results 
Fadzly and Responsibility, Auditing 300 auditor, Analysis 
Ahmad reliability, and expectation 300 bankers, Mann-Whitney U-test. 
(2004). decision gap. 400 investor Results 
usefulness (including 100 A wide gap regarding 
as the auditor's 
experimental), responsibilities toward 
and 300 fraud detection and 
stockbroker. prevention, preparation 
of financial statements, 
and internal control, 
auditor's scope gap of 
legal responsibility and 
culpability in fraud 
related business failure. 
Koh and The auditing Auditing 500 auditors in Analysis 
Woo knowledge, expectation the big 6 1. Logit analysis. 
(2001). the years of gap. auditing firms 2. n-way ANOVA. 
working in Singapore, Results 
experience, and 500 The existence auditing 
the managers of expectation gap between 
management the top 1000 the managers and 
position in the companies in auditors in Singapore. 
organization, Singapore. 
and the 
functional 
area. 
Best et al. Responsibility, Auditing 300 subjects Analysis 
(2001). reliability, and expectation distributed 1. Mann-Whitney 
decision gap. equally over U-test. 
usefulness three groups 2. Kolmogorov- 
of Smirnov test. 
respondents; Results 
auditors, Existence of audit 
bankers, and expectation gap in 
investors. Singapore. 
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Author (s) 
& Date 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Sample 
Size 
Analysis & Results 
Dixon et al. Responsibility, Auditing 100 auditors, Analysis 
(2006). reliability, and expectation 100 bankers, Mann-Whitney U-test. 
decision gap. and 100 Results 
usefulness. investors. The existence of wide 
auditing expectation gap 
in Egypt. 
Chowdhury 
and Innes 
(1998). 
Chowdhury 
et al. 
(2005). 
Auditor 
accountability, 
auditor 
independence, 
auditor 
competence, 
auditor 
materiality and 
audit 
evidence, true 
and fair, and 
performance 
audit 
Auditor 
accountability, 
auditor 
independence, 
auditor 
competence, 
auditor 
materiality and 
audit 
evidence, true 
and fair, and 
performance 
audit 
Auditing 
expectation 
gap. 
Auditing 
expectation 
gap. 
17 
Comptroller 
and Auditor 
General, 15 
members of 
the Public 
Accounts 
Committee of 
parliament, 
and 9 senior 
representatives 
from the five 
International 
Funding 
Agencies. 
17 
Comptroller 
and Auditor 
General, 15 
members of 
the Public 
Accounts 
Committee of 
parliament, 
and 9 senior 
representatives 
from the five 
International 
Funding 
Agencies. 
Anal 
Exploratory study. 
Results 
Existence of auditing 
expectation gap in 
Bangladesh. 
Analysis 
1. Mann-Whitney 
U-test. 
2. t-test. 
Results 
Existence of auditing 
expectation gap in 
Bangladesh. 
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Author (s) 
& Date 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Sample 
Size 
Analysis & Results 
Siddiqui Audit Auditing 100 Analysis 
and Nasreen responsibility, expectation undergraduate 1. F-test. 
(2004). audit gap. student, and 2. t-test. 
reliability, 115 charted Results 
decision accountants. Existence of wide 
usefulness of auditing expectation gap 
financial in Bangladesh. 
statements. 
Lin and Audit Auditing 300 external Analysis 
Chen objectives, expectation user-groups of 1. Mann-Whitney 
(2004). auditor's gap. financial test. 
obligation to analysts 2. t-test. 
detect and (investment Results 
report fraud, institutions, Existence of the 
auditor credit and loan auditing expectation gap 
independence, officers at in China. 
and third party commercial 
liability of banks, and 
auditors. government 
officials), 300 
business 
management 
subjects 
(SOEs) and 
(PLCs), 120 
public 
accountants, 
and 80 
educators. 
Desira and Auditor Auditing 100 potential Analysis 
Baldacchino responsibility, expectation Jurors, and 1. Chi - squared 
(2005). the reliability gap. 100 warranted test. 
of the audited Maltese 2. Mann-Whitney 
financial auditors. U-test. 
statements, Results 
decision Existence of the 
usefulness of auditing expectation gap 
financial in Malta. 
statements. 
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Author (s) 
& Date 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Sample 
Size 
Analysis & Results 
Hudaib and Auditor's role Auditing Depth face-to- Analysis 
Haniffa and the audit expectation face Kruskal-Wallis one-way 
(2003). environment. gap. interviews analysis of variance by 
with 48 and ranks. 
mail Results 
questionnaires Existence of the 
to 350 large auditing expectation gap 
auditors, small in Saudi Arabia. 
auditors, 
financial 
directors, 
credit 
managers, 
investment 
analysts and 
funds 
managers, 
substantial 
shareholders, 
other 
shareholders, 
and 
governmental 
bodies. 
Al-Twaijry None. None. 100 Analysis 
(2006). companies Face-to-face interviews. 
selected from Results 
the largest Existence of the 
1000 Saudi auditing expectation gap 
companies, the in Saudi Arabia. 
sample is 
composed of 
academic 
staff, directors 
of internal 
audit 
departments, 
external 
auditors, 
governmental, 
accounting 
and internal 
auditing 
bodies. 
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3.4 THE ROLE OF THE AUDIT REPORT FORM IN REDUCING THE 
AUDITING EXPECTATIONS GAP 
The auditing report has passed over different decades of changes and improvements 
as to improve the communicated messages that are sent by the reports to the users of 
the annual reports. The audit report has been changed from 1948 to 1988, as there was 
a concern that users might not be correctly interpreting the auditors' intended 
messages. 
Therefore, in 1978, the commission on auditors' responsibilities known as the Cohen 
Commission, identified several possible deficiencies in the auditors' report and 
suggested the use of standardized language may have made the report a symbol which 
was not carefully read, considered and fully understood by users. Moreover, the 
Cohen Commission suggested that the auditors' report should be revised as to ensure 
that it describes the role and responsibilities of the auditor. Therefore, the audit report 
needs to be corrected by applying the standard audit report (Boyd et al., 2001). 
After a while, exactly January 1,1989, a new audit report was introduced, as the 
traditional two paragraph report was expanded to three paragraphs that explains the 
nature of an audit, the differences between this report and the old one are the title and 
in the introductory, scope and opinion paragraphs of the report. Moreover, the new 
report labeled as the "Independent Auditor's Report" (Boyd et al., 2001). 
Post to 1989, there was introductory paragraph that extracted from the scope 
paragraph of the old report. This introductory paragraph of the new report includes 
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entity audited, the financial statements presented, and the time period of the financial 
statements. Also, the word `examined' was replaced by the word `audited' in the audit 
report, and two sentences were added to the introductory paragraph identifying the 
responsibilities of both management and the auditor (Boyd et al., 2001). 
In addition, there were other modifications that are applied to the scope paragraph of 
the old report, as it includes that the examination was made in accordance with 
GAAS, and that the auditor performed the necessary tests in the circumstances. This 
sentence has been deleted by the new report and instead of it a new paragraph is 
presented including new five phrases which are newly added to the auditor's standard 
report (Boyd et al., 2001). 
However, the new report has eliminated the phrase "presents fairly" and exchanged it 
with the phrase "in all materials respects" indicating that the materiality concept was 
used by both the management in the preparation of financial statements, and the 
auditors in the audit of financial statements. Furthermore, SAS No. 58 revised the 
reporting standards of GAAS to require a separate explanatory paragraph in the audit 
report when accounting principles have not been applied consistently. Finally, 
Referred to the SAS No. 95, the "changes in financial position" was replaced by the 
statement of cash flows. 
Chung (1995) conducted an experiment on two groups of auditors from the big six 
public accounting firms and six smaller firms in the USA. The experiment requires 
examining the clients account balances in six different cases. In the first case, 32 
auditors were selected depending on their availability and willingness to participate in 
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the experiment with at least two years experience. The second case, 26 auditors 
selected on the same selection base of the first case with average auditing experience 
of 4.36 years. The two groups were trained before applying the experiment. Using the 
inter quartile index and the surprise index to analyze the results, it was concluded that 
the first group of auditors showed a mixture of under-confidential and good 
calibration, while the second group showed a mixture of good calibration and over 
confidence. The aggregation of the two results shows tendency towards under- 
confidence. 
Hatherly et al. (1997) investigated the existence of the auditing expectation gap in the 
United Kingdom, besides examining the effect of the long form audit report on the 
perceptions of the MBA students at the University of Edinburgh. This is done by 
designing a questionnaire based on a seven point Likert scale and is distributed over 
500 auditors, 140 MBA students. The researchers distributed the short form audit 
report with the other reports to 70 students, and distributed the long form report with 
the other reports to the other 70 students. This questionnaire was pilot tested by 12 
part-time MBA students and comments were also received from a number of 
academics and practicing auditors. 
The questionnaire is concentrating on examining the effect of the expanded report on 
the perception of the sample (auditing expectation gap) concerning 14 dimension of 
auditing; auditors' independence, auditor's judgment, fraud, auditor accountability, 
extent of audit, management of company, investment / disinvestment, purpose of 
audit, management's representation, specific versus whole, performance monitoring, 
accounting standards, credibility, conflict between management and auditors, 
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satisfaction, management / auditor responsibility, variability of company, and proper 
accounting records. 
The study used stem and leaf plots, chi-squared goodness, and Bartlett's test of 
homogeneity of variances to calculate the significance levels of students' perceptions, 
besides using a non-parametric test which is Wilcoxon and Mann-Whitney. The 
results indicated a significant difference between the two groups of MBA students. 
This significant difference results from the different audit report forms that are 
distributed for each group. Therefore, the audit report form affects the perception of 
the readers and could be used to reduce the existing auditing expectation gap that 
exists between the auditors and the users in the United Kingdom. 
However, the study concentrated on an academic category of users regardless the 
other categories of users which may have no accounting or even business 
backgrounds and may not react actively as the MBA students reacted. The different 
audit report forms caused significant differences in the perception of the students may 
not be evidence that it would be an effective approach to reduce the audit expectation 
gap. That is because the researchers have not mentioned why they have chosen this 
approach to reduce the auditing expectation on the expense of the other approaches. 
Therefore, the results could not be reliable as they may be other solution (if any) that 
may be more effective for the reduction process. 
Best (1999) examined the effect of the long form audit report on reducing the auditing 
expectation gap in Singapore. The study used a research methodology identical to that 
which applied by Schelluch (1996) in Australia. The Likert seven-point scale 
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questionnaire is designed to measure the messages communicated by the short-form 
audit report to the different users of the annual reports in Singapore. The 
questionnaire, a covering letter, a sample of audit report, and a prepaid envelope were 
sent to a randomly selected sample of 300 subjects consisting of 100 auditors, 100 
bankers, and 100 investors. The response rate that was achieved was 35% for auditors, 
26% for bankers, and 36% for investors. 
The study measured the existence of the auditing expectation gap in Singapore and 
the effect of the long-form audit report using the following factors; responsibility, 
reliability, and decision usefulness. The results of the study were driven using the 
Mann Whitney-U test to examine the significant differences between the different 
subjects of the sample, besides using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to examine the 
normality of distribution of the data. The results of the study evidence the existence of 
the auditing expectation gap in Singapore, and that the long-form audit report offers 
better understanding of the nature of the auditing function. 
However, the study is limited to a small sample size of the subjects tested by the 
study: 300 subjects may not identify a better representation of the tested population. 
Furthermore, the methodology of the study is identical to that of Schelluch (1996) 
applied in Australia which may expose the study to the effects of the different cultural 
differences between Australia and Singapore. On the other hand, the study indicated 
that the long-form audit report would have a great impact on the understanding of the 
users to the nature of auditing function without offering confident evidences that 
supports this conclusion. Therefore, it needs further tests to evidence this issue 
besides examining whether this method would be more effective than other methods 
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to reduce the expectation gap, or there may be other proposed methods that would be 
more effective in reducing the auditing expectation gap in Singapore. 
Manson and Zaman (2000) investigated the usefulness of the new long-report audit 
form based on SAS 600 in aligning the views of auditors, preparers, and users. The 
study aims to determine to which extent the respondents are satisfied by the new 
form, how it is useful to include different issues, including corporate governance, in 
the auditors report, and whether there are any differences in the perceptions of the 
three groups of respondents. A questionnaire based on seven-point Likert scale is 
introduced to 400 auditors in big 5, top 40 (excluding big 5), 400 preparers (finance 
directors) of selected 200 UK companies, and 200 users including investment analysts 
and corporate bankers. The response rate was 41%, 30%, and 23% respectively, 
which results in having overall response rate of 33%. 
The questionnaire focuses on the measurement of different dimensions to achieve the 
objectives of the study; general auditors responsibilities, the nature of auditors' work, 
the extent of auditors responsibilities, going concern and fraud or illegal acts, non- 
financial information in annual reports, Internal control and materiality, issues arising 
during the audit, and corporate governance. 
The study used the t-test and a Mann-Whitney to drive its results. These results 
indicate that there are lower significant differences between the different subjects of 
the sample concerning the study dimensions. This indicates the usefulness of the 
expanded audit report form introduced by SAS 600 in understanding the audit 
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functions and to satisfy the users' needs towards the annual reports supported by the 
expanded report form. 
The study suffers from the limitations of the problems associated with using the 
questionnaire technique. The study has not compared the expanded report form 
introduced by SAS 600 to the old short report form. Therefore, it would not show the 
effectiveness of the new report over the old one. Furthermore, the study has not 
examined the effectiveness of this expanded report form to other different methods 
that may improve the perceptions of the different users towards the auditors' functions 
and responsibilities. 
Schelluch and Gay (2006) examined the significant differences in beliefs about 
messages communicated by both negative and positive assurance audit reports 
between different subjects of auditor, users, and preparers concerning the effect of 
changing the wordings of the auditing report. The subjects tested include 580 auditors, 
301 company secretaries/chief accountants, and 496 shareholders. The response rate 
of the subjects was 59%, 36%, 43% respectively. These respondents were mailed a 
copy of the questionnaire, a covering letter, and a prepaid return envelope. The study 
is concerned by the reliability statements, the responsibilities of auditors and 
management, and the future prospects of entity. 
Furthermore, the study was using a seven-point Likert scale questionnaire which 
includes 15 bipolar adjectival statements. The responds of the sample subjects were 
analyzed using Mann-Whitney U-test to compare the different groups of respondents 
from one side, and between the negative and positive assurance report from the other 
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side. The results of the study indicate that the change of the wording of the audit 
report may cause significant differences between the respondents concerning the 
different reports. This shows that the form of the audit report may change the beliefs 
of the users of the annual report which results in the reduction of the auditing 
expectation gap. 
However, the study concentrated on the significant differences towards the different 
reports, which does not mean that the existence of different response towards the 
different forms of reports may be effective in reducing the auditing expectation gap. 
At the same time, there might be other methods to reduce the auditing expectation gap 
rather than using the different audit form. There must be an investigation of the 
effectiveness of the different methods of reducing the auditing expectation gap 
compared to the change in the audit report form. 
Almer and Brody (2002) applied a simulated experiment to examine the effect of the 
rephrasing of the audit report. The examination is applied by sending the experiment 
materials, which consists of financial statements and a summary of financial ratios 
relevant to going concern judgments, profitability, leverage, liquidity, capital 
intensiveness, and cash position, to a sample of 14 people at six big public accounting 
firm locations and bankers at 13 bank locations. A total of 57 auditors' and 69 
bankers' responses were received resulting in a response rate of 36% and 55% 
respectively. The auditors were asked to identify the status of their client, while the 
bankers were asked to assume that they had received annual financial statements and 
the related modified audit report for an existing borrower, and it was requested from 
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both groups to provides a numeric association for `substantial doubt' in the context of 
the company. 
The variables that are examined in the study are two groups of variables: independent 
variable which is represented by the ownership structure of the company, and 
dependent variables which are the participants' general numeric association for 
`substantial doubt' tested by ability to continue (0% probability of failure) or no 
ability to continue (100% probability of failure), second participants' numeric 
associations within the context of the tested company. Therefore, the study is based 
on three basic hypotheses. The first is H I. Auditors' general numeric associations for 
a going concern modification will be lower than bankers' general numeric 
associations for a going concern modification. The second is H2B. Auditors' numeric 
associations for a going concern modification will be higher for public companies 
than for private companies. The third is H2B. Bankers' numeric associations for a 
going concern modification will not be different for public companies and private 
companies. 
The hypotheses of the study were tested using one-way ANOVA and the results 
indicated that when auditors issue a modified report, they believe that the entity has 
lower probability of failure than bankers believe when they receive the audit report. 
Therefore, the auditors' and bankers' understanding of the modified audit report were 
differentially affected by ownership structure as the auditors reported higher numeric 
associations under public ownership structure, while bankers did not. These results 
indicated that the modified audit report was understood in different ways due to the 
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differences between the auditors and bankers perceptions towards the message 
conveyed by the same report. 
Accordingly, the modified audit report has not decreased the differences of 
perceptions between the two types of users. Therefore, there is an existence of an 
auditing expectation gap, and the modified report has not been able to reduce this 
auditing expectation gap between the different users. Moreover, the reaction of the 
respondents toward an experiment could not be recognized when they are dealing 
with the real case. The diversification of locations of the auditors and bankers selected 
for the experiment might eliminate the ability to generalize the results over the 
auditors and bankers. Furthermore, the experiment has not included any other 
alternatives that might reduce the auditing expectation gap and to examine its 
effectiveness towards the other methods that may be able to reduce the auditing 
expectation gap. 
The previous studies are summarized in table 3.3 as follows: 
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Table 3.3 
The Role of Audit Report Form in Reducing the Auditing Expectations Gap 
Author (s) Independent 
& Date Variable(s) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Sample 
Size 
Analysis & Results 
Hatherly et Audit long Auditing 500 Analysis 
al. (1997). form report expectation auditors, 1- stem and leaf 
gap (Users 140 MBA plots 
perception). students. 2- chi-squared 
The goodness, 
researchers 3- Bartlett's test of 
distributed homogeneity of 
the short variance. 
form audit 4- Wilcoxon-Mann- 
report with Whitney. 
the other Results 
reports to 1- Existence of 
70 students, auditing 
and expectation gap 
distributed in the United 
the long Kingdom. 
form report 2- Audit report form 
with the could be used to 
other reduce the 
reports to existing gap. 
the other 70 
students. 
Best Responsibility, The Auditing 300 Analysis 
(1999). reliability, and expectation subjects 1- Mann Whitney-U 
decision gap. consisting test. 
usefulness. of 100 2- Kolmogorov- 
auditors, Smirnov. 
100 Results 
bankers, 1- The existence of 
100 auditing 
investors. expectation gap 
in Singapore. 
2- The usefulness of 
long-form audit 
report. 
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Author (s) 
& Date 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Sample 
Size 
Analysis & Results 
Manson and General Users' 400 auditors, Analysis 
Zaman auditors expectations. 400 preparers I- t-test. 
(2000). responsibilities, (finance 2- Mann- 
the nature of directors), Whitney 
auditors' work, and 200 users test. 
the extend of including Results 
auditors investment The usefulness of 
responsibilities, analysts and the audit expanded 
going concern corporate form introduced by 
and fraud or bankers. SAS 600 in 
illegal acts, understanding the 
Non-financial audit functions and 
information in to satisfy the users 
annual report, needs towards the 
Internal control annual reports 
and materiality, supported by the 
issues arising expanded report 
during the form. 
audit, and 
corporate 
governance. 
Schelluch The reliability The auditing The subjects Analysis 
and Gay statements, the expectation tested include Mann-Whitney U- 
(2006). responsibilities gap. 580 auditors, test. 
of auditors and 301 company Results 
management, secretaries / The change of the 
and the future chief wording of the 
prospects of accountants audit report results 
entity and 496 in the reduction of 
shareholders. the auditing 
expectation gap. 
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Author (s) & Independent 
Date Variable (s) 
Almer and Ownership 
Brody (2002). structure of the 
company. 
Dependent 
Variable (s) 
Participants' 
general 
numeric 
association for 
`substantial 
doubt' tested 
by ability to 
continue (0% 
probability of 
failure) or no 
ability to 
continue 
(100% 
probability of 
failure), 
second 
participants 
numeric 
associations 
within the 
context of the 
tested 
company. 
Sample 
Size 
A total of 57 
auditors and 69 
bankers 
responses were 
received 
resulting in a 
response rate 
of 36% and 
55% 
respectively. 
Analysis & 
Results 
Analysis 
One-way 
ANOVA. 
Results 
The modified 
audit report 
has not 
decrease the 
differences of 
the perceptions 
between the 
two types of 
users, 
therefore, there 
is an existence 
of an auditing 
expectation 
gap and the 
modified 
report has not 
been able to 
reduce this 
auditing 
expectation 
gap. 
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3.5 THE ROLE OF THE USERS EDUCATION IN REDUCING THE 
AUDITING EXPECTATIONS GAP 
Epstein and Geiger (1993) argued that the auditing expectation gap could be narrowed 
partly by increasing the public understanding of the audit nature and its limitations. 
This means the role of educating the financial statements' users towards the auditors' 
functions and responsibilities. Moreover, the study recommended that the AICPA 
should increase the educational efforts with clients and audit committees at 
shareholders' meetings in professional and organizations. To ensure that the education 
may reduce the auditing expectation gap, the study applied a survey regarding the 
level of assurance the auditors should provide for detecting material misstatements as 
a result of error (unintentional misstatements), and as a result of fraud (intentional 
misstatements), over a sample of different investors who owned 100 or more shares of 
a stock listed on the American or New York stock exchange. The respondents 
obtained were 246 representing individuals from all 50 states. 
The study survey found that, in general, the more educated an investor was regarding 
accounting, finance and investment analysis (including using the auditor's report), the 
less likely to require absolute auditor assurance. However, the study focused only on 
one category of users (investors) and did not include the other categories of the users. 
The study is limited to describe the data without any further parametric or non- 
parametric data that may give more significant results that could be generalized over 
the whole population of investors. Therefore, the study is characterized by being 
limited and having low generalization power. 
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Monroe and Woodliff (1993) suggested that the users' education would reduce the 
audit expectation gap. The study examined the effectiveness of the users' education 
on reducing the expectation gap. The study used a semantic differential scales 
regarding the auditor responsibility, the auditor reliability, and the future prospects. 
The study includes: 141 auditing students at the beginning of the semester, 43 
marketing students at the beginning of the same semester, 74 auditors, 114 auditing 
students at the end of the semester, and 30 marketing students at the end of the same 
semester. 
Moreover, the marketing students are used as a control group sample as they have no 
previous auditing background. The scale was filled by the students at the beginning of 
the semester and another time at the end of the same semester. The data is analysed at 
the beginning and at the end of the semester using Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis 
of variance to test the differences in responses between the five reports within each 
subject group, besides using the Chi-Square statistics to examine the significant levels 
between the samples. 
The results of the study showed that at the beginning of the semester there were 
significant differences in beliefs between auditors and both groups of students which 
represent the existence of the expectation gap. At the end of the semester, the 
students' beliefs had changed due to the perceived information about the 
responsibilities of the auditors, which results in reducing the auditing expectation gap. 
However, the results of this study could not be generalized, as the examined sample 
includes students whom are not considered to be a group of the annual reports' users. 
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Students could be a controllable sample to accept educating which would be more 
difficult to do so with the users. In addition, the number of students at the beginning 
of the semester is different than the number of student at the end of the semester 
which may affect the consistency of the study and the ability to compare the results. 
Moreover, the study examined the effectiveness of education without comparing it to 
the effectiveness of the other methods that could reduce the auditing expectation gap 
more effectively. 
Hussain (2003) argued that the solution that fits with reducing the auditing 
expectation gap is the education of users about auditors' functions and 
responsibilities. The study depends on using the same instruments of Humphrey et al. 
(1993) study of examining the expectation gap in Britain. The study used 7-point 
Likert scale questionnaire, and distributed over a sample of 35 students in Sultan 
Qaboos University (Oman) before attending the audit class and the same number of 
students after attending the audit class. The questionnaire is focusing on questioning 
about auditors and auditing process, auditors' role with respect to audited financial 
statements, auditors' role with respect to audited company, and auditor's 
responsibility to owners and creditors. 
The study used the paired t-test to drive the results of the responses of the students 
before and after the auditing class. The results show that the perception of the students 
changed as a result of attending the auditing course. Therefore, the study argues that 
the change in the students' perceptions is due to the auditing education which reduces 
the expectation gap between the students and the auditors. 
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However, the study solved the problem of Monroe and Woodliff (1993), which is the 
ability to compare the results after and before the education, as in this study the 
number of students before the beginning of the auditing class equals the number of 
students after attending the auditing class, but the study depends on the students to 
examine the effect of education in reducing the auditing expectation gap instead of 
examining the effect of education on the users of the annual reports. The other 
problem is not comparing the effect of education in reducing the auditing expectation 
gap to the effect of the other solutions as to recommend the most effective method 
that fits with the culture of Oman. 
Pierce and Kilcommins (1996) examined the availability to offer evidence that the 
provision of auditing courses contributed to reducing the auditing expectation gap. 
The study depends on the questionnaire survey which was completed by five groups 
of students at the beginning of the academic year and again at the end of the same 
academic year. The five groups include 133 business studies year one students, 112 
accounting and finance year one students, 93 accounting and finance year two 
students, 47 accounting and finance year three students with elective course of 
auditing, and 43 accounting and finance year three students without elective course of 
auditing. 
The questionnaire is designed based on a five-point Likert scale concentrating on the 
duties, ethical and legislative framework, liability, and audit report. The data of the 
questionnaires are tested using the mean scores to rank the main issues included in the 
questionnaires at the beginning of the semester and at the end of the same semesters. 
The study indicates that there are considerable benefits of education, as the results 
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before having the auditing courses differs after having the auditing courses, which 
gives a signal to the importance of the education in changing the perceptions of the 
students towards the auditors' responsibilities. Therefore, the education is considered 
to be effective in reducing the auditing expectation gap. 
However, the study is criticized by having the same faults of the other studies. It is 
depending on the students instead of the users of the financial statements whom are 
not controllable as much as the students to be educated. Also the analysis is 
depending on a mean score which is considered a descriptive analysis rather than 
applying other statistical test to drive the relations between the different variables of 
the study. Furthermore, the study has not examined the other solutions of the auditing 
expectation gap to compare it with the education method as to identify the most 
effective method that would be able to reduce the auditing expectation gap more 
effectively. 
Gay (2002) argued that the education would be an effective method that results in 
reducing the auditing expectation gap. The study focused on four groups of 
respondents; 581 auditors randomly selected from members of the institute of 
Chartered Accountants in Australia, and other three groups of students, 169 second 
year financial accounting students at the beginning of the first semester, 143 third year 
auditing students at the beginning of the second semester, and 110 at the end of the 
same semester. 
The respondents were sent a covering letter, prepaid return envelope, and a copy of 
the questionnaire which is built on a seven-point Likert scale measuring the effect of 
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education on the auditing expectation gap regarding responsibility, reliability, and 
decision usefulness. The study results indicate that education reduces the auditing 
expectation gap. These results are driven by applying Mann-Whitney U tests of 
comparison between the groups, and between review and audit reports within each 
group. 
However, the study focuses on a sample of students who are not users of the annual 
reports of the companies and would accept to be educated while the users may refuse 
to do so. Furthermore, the number of the students at the beginning of the study is not 
equal to their number at the end of it which may affect the effectiveness of the study. 
In addition, the study examined how effective the education in reducing the auditing 
expectation gap without comparing this method to the other methods of reducing the 
auditing expectation gap to identify the most effective method that could be used if 
there is any more effective method that could be used. 
The previous studies are summarized in table 3.4 as follows: 
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Table 3.4 
The Role of Users Education in Reducing the Auditing Expectations Gap 
Author (s) & 
Date 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Sample 
Size 
Analysis & 
Results 
Epstein and The level of Users Different Analysis 
Geiger (1993). assurance the Education. investors who Descriptive 
auditors should owned 100 or analysis. 
provide for more shares of Results 
detecting a stock listed The more 
material on the educated an 
misstatements American or investor was 
as a result of New York regarding 
error stock accounting, 
(unintentional exchange, the finance and 
misstatements), respondents investment 
and as a result obtained were analysis 
of fraud 246 (including 
(intentional representing using the 
misstatements). individuals auditor's 
from all 50 report), the 
states. less likely to 
require 
absolute 
auditor 
assurance. 
Monroe and Auditor 
Woodliff responsibility, 
(1993). the auditor 
reliability, and 
the future 
prospects. 
The Auditing 
expectation 
gap. 
141 auditing 
students at the 
beginning of 
the semester, 
43 marke ting 
students at the 
beginning of 
the same 
semester, 74 
auditors, 114 
auditing 
students at the 
end of the 
semester, 30 
marketing 
students at the 
end of the 
same semester. 
Analysis 
1-Kruskal- 
Wallis one- 
way analysis 
of variance. 
2-Chi-Square 
test. 
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Author (s) & 
Date 
Hussain 
(2003). 
Pierce and 
Kilcommins 
(1996). 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Auditors and 
auditing 
process, 
auditors' role 
with respect to 
audited 
financial 
statements, 
auditors' role 
with respect to 
audited 
company, and 
auditor's 
responsibility 
to owners and 
creditors. 
Duties, ethical 
and legislative 
framework, 
liability, and 
audit report. 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Auditing 
expectation 
gap. 
Auditing 
expectation 
gap. 
Sample 
Size 
35 Students 
pre audit class, 
35 students 
post audit 
class. 
133 Business 
studies year 
one students, 
112 accounting 
and finance 
year one 
students, 93 
accounting and 
finance year 
two students, 
47 accounting 
and finance 
year three 
students with 
elective course 
of auditing, 43 
accounting and 
finance year 
three students 
without 
elective course 
of auditing. 
Analysis & 
Results 
Analysis 
Paired t-test. 
Results 
The change in 
the perception 
of the students 
is due to the 
auditing 
education 
which reduces 
the expectation 
gap between 
the students 
and the 
auditors. 
Anal 
Mean scores 
analysis. 
Results 
The education 
is considered 
to be effective 
to reduce the 
auditing 
expectation 
gap. 
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Author (s) & 
Date 
Gay (2002). 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Responsibility, 
reliability, and 
decision 
usefulness. 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Auditing 
expectation 
gap. 
Sample 
Size 
5 81 auditors 
randomly 
selected from 
members of 
the institute of 
Chartered 
Accountants in 
Australia, and 
other three 
groups of 
students; 169 
second year 
financial 
accounting 
students at the 
beginning of 
the first 
semester, 143 
third year 
auditing 
students at the 
beginning of 
the second 
semester, and 
110 at the end 
of the same 
semester. 
Analysis & 
Results 
Analysis 
Mann-Whitney 
U tests. 
1? Pcnltc 
The study 
results indicate 
that the 
education 
reduces the 
auditing 
expectation 
gap. 
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3.6 THE ROLE OF THE STANDARDS SETTINGS IN REDUCING THE 
AUDITING EXPECTATIONS GAP 
In 1988 the Audit Standards Board (ASB) issued its nine statements on Auditing 
standards, these standards known as "The Expectation Gap Standards" which could 
grouped in to the following categories: 
1 Detection of fraud and illegal acts: SAS No. 52, `The Auditor Responsibility to 
Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities, ' and SAS No. 54 `Illegal Acts by Clients'. 
2 More effective audits: SAS No. 55, `Consideration of the Internal Control 
Structure in a Financial Statement Audit, ' SAS No. 56 , 
`Analytical Procedures, ' SAS 
No. 57, `Auditing Accounting Estimates'. 
3 Improved external communications: SAS No. 58, `Reports on Audited Financial 
Statements, ' SAS No. 59, `The Auditors' Consideration of Equity's Ability to 
Continue as Going Concern'. 
4 Improved internal communications: SAS No. 60, `Communication of Internal 
Control Structure Related'. 
5 Matters noted in an audit, SAS No. 61, `Communication with Audit Committees' 
(Giacomino, 1994). 
Dewing and Russell (2002) investigated the existence of the expectation gap in the 
UK and the possibility to reduce this gap. The study depends on designing a five- 
point Likert scale questionnaire that is concerned with the independence, audit value- 
added, audit quality, and auditors' liability. The questionnaire is validated by applying 
a pilot study by conducting 13 interviews to obtain a range of views about the validity 
of the questionnaire. 
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Moreover, after validating the questionnaire by applying the pilot study, the 
questionnaire was distributed over the study sample which consists of 81 Institutional 
Fund Managers Association (IFMA) members. The response rate of this sample was 
37 per cent which is composed of accountant and non-accountant fund managers. The 
results of the study are derived using descriptive analysis indicating that the 
expectation gap phrase is frequently described by the sample. Furthermore, there are 
required reforms regarding the strengthen of the auditors' independence, the frequent 
auditors rotation, the extension of the scope and responsibilities of the auditors, the 
need for more independency in monitoring of auditors' work, and strengthening the 
public regulations of the auditors. 
However, the study focuses only on one part of the problem which is the managers 
regardless of the other categories of the different users. The study recommended the 
solutions that would reduce the auditing expectation gap without examining the 
comparability of this method to the other approaches that may be more effective in 
reducing this gap. Furthermore, the study depends on the descriptive analysis which 
may not get significant results that may support the results of the study. 
The previous studies are summarized in table 3.5 as follows: 
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Table 3.5 
The Role of Standards Settings in Reducing the Auditing Expectations Gap 
Author (s) & 
Date 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Sample 
Size 
Analysis & 
Results 
Dewing and Independence, The auditing 81 Institutional Analysis 
Russell (2002). audit value- expectation Fund Descriptive 
added, audit gap. Managers analysis. 
quality, and Association Results 
auditors' (IFMA) Expectation 
liability. members. gap phrase is 
frequently 
described by 
the sample, 
and that there 
are reforms 
regarding the 
strengthen of 
the auditors' 
independence, 
the frequent 
auditors 
rotation, the 
extension of 
the scope and 
responsibilities 
of the auditors, 
the need for 
more 
independency 
in monitoring 
of auditors' 
work, besides 
strengthening 
the public 
regulations of 
the auditors, 
are required. 
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3.7 CONCLUSION 
It is concluded from the previous discussion of the literature review regarding the 
auditing expectation gap that this gap is still an existing problem whether in the 
developed or in the developing countries which requires more efforts to reduce this 
existing gap. This existence of this problem affects the decision making process of the 
different users who get benefit from the published annual reports of the different 
companies. 
The prior studies are classified to two groups. First group of studies examined the 
existence of the auditing expectations gap in a specific context. Most of the studies 
included in this group examined the gap existence using the questionnaire survey. 
Most of the studies employed the same questionnaire regardless the different cultures 
of the different contexts. Therefore, this group of studies ignored the cultural effects 
of the different countries, and so applied the previously used questionnaires with out 
any sort of adaptation as a matter of validation for the employed data gathering 
technique. Therefore, the current research will overcome this problem by adapting the 
employed data collection technique, questionnaire or checklist, on the Egyptian 
context to ensure the validation of the derived results based on these techniques. 
Moreover, it is concluded that there is only single research that was applied on the 
Egyptian context by Dixon et al. (2006) regarding the auditing expectations gap 
problem. However, it suffers of the same defects of the previously mentioned studies 
which would be overcome by the current research, which 
is the most updated research 
in the Egyptian context, as it would be seen in the following chapters. 
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The second group of studies is concerned by the appropriate solution for the reduction 
of the auditing expectations gap. There are three different appropriate solutions that 
are recommended by the prior studies. First solution is expanding the audit report and 
using the long form audit report instead of the short form audit report. Second 
solution is educating the financial statements' users towards the auditor's roles and 
responsibilities. The third solution is concerned with the required standards settings 
expending the auditors' roles and responsibilities. 
The second group prior studies select one of the three approaches and investigated the 
effect of the selected method on the auditing expectations gap. As a matter of fact, the 
three methods would have a positive impact on the reduction of the expectations gap. 
However, knowing the appropriate and effective method needs to examine the impact 
of the three methods simultaneously at the same time as to maintain the consistency of 
the comparison. None of the previous studies applied this sort of comparison between 
these methods. Also, the single research that is applied on the Egyptian context has 
not examined the effectiveness of any of the different solutions that would contribute 
to the reduction of the expectations gap. Therefore, the current research would 
examine the effectiveness of the different methods in comparison to each other. 
Moreover, the research would propose a forth solution, audited voluntary disclosures 
that was not examined before by the prior studies, and compare its effectiveness to the 
traditional solutions in reducing the expectations gap. Therefore, the current research 
would overcome the defects of the prior studies and contribute to the 
knowledge 
through recommending another solution that is believed to be more effective 
in 
reducing the auditing expectations gap. 
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As a matter of fact, this additional solution requires a theoretical base to support the 
argument that this solution would be more effective in reducing the auditing 
expectations gap in comparison to the traditional methods which would be introduced 
in the next chapter. The examination of the different traditional methods in 
comparison to the proposed method would be applied over the Egyptian context as a 
unique situation passed over different reform programs which are shown in the 
previously presented chapter of the Egyptian economy background. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The theoretical framework of the current study focuses on reducing the information 
expectations gap and the auditing expectations gap using the audited voluntary 
corporate disclosure. The importance of theory is that theories enable us to understand 
in general terms how the world works, to move around, mentally, among the objects 
and relationships to which they relate, and to act in ways that, as far as we can tell, 
will not defeat our reasonable expectations. A theory will not save us from 
unreasonable expectations nor from the vagaries of chance in any form. A theory will 
not tell us what to do; but it will tell us what it is possible to do and what is not 
possible to do. In that way it removes countless things from consideration when we 
are confronted with the necessity of choosing or acting (Chambers, 1996). 
Different prior studies focused on the role of the voluntary disclosure in reducing the 
information expectations gap and solving the information asymmetry problem. These 
studies provide evidence that this solution is restricted to the degree of assurance and 
credibility associated with the voluntary disclosure. It is a vital 
issue to rely on a 
credible sort of disclosure to make different decisions. Therefore, the usefulness of the 
provided disclosure depends on the credibility and assurance of this sort of 
information not just the information completeness. 
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The current study argues that the lack of voluntary disclosures' credibility would 
affect the effectiveness of this sort of disclosure in reducing the information gap or 
solving the information asymmetry problem. Therefore, the current research argues 
that voluntary disclosure requires to be assured by an independent third party. This 
sort of assurance service is more appropriate to be provided by auditors, which in turn 
would expand their roles and responsibilities leading to raising the degree of 
stakeholders' satisfaction and approaching their expectations leading to the reduction 
of the expectations gap between auditors and users. Therefore, the current chapter 
provides theoretical framework of evidences that support this argument. 
Corporate voluntary disclosure is considered to be the heart of the current study. 
Therefore, this chapter will include its definition, its different categories and the 
incentives and constraints of disclosing voluntary information. In addition, there are 
different theories explaining the different motives of the voluntary disclosure. This 
chapter would give a brief idea of such theories. However, the study would rely on the 
stakeholder-agency theory that would fit with the nature and scope of the empirical 
work. 
Moreover, the following discussion will include the previous studies' evidence 
regarding the role of voluntary corporate disclosure in reducing the information 
expectations gap. Based on the stakeholder-agency theory, there are different studies 
that provided evidence arguing that expanding the role of the auditor will satisfy the 
needs of the stakeholders, and in turn this study argues that the there 
is a vital role of 
the audited voluntary corporate disclosure in reducing the auditing expectations gap. 
4 
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4.2 THEORIES OF VOLUNTARY CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
Positive accounting theory `is concerned with explaining accounting practice. It is 
designed to explain and predict which firms will and which firms will not use a 
particular method, but it says nothing as to which method a firm should use' (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 45). The stakeholder theory (managerial version) and 
legitimacy theory provide alternative explanation to the positive accounting theory 
about the drivers that make the organization make particular disclosures without 
prescribing particular actions, or methods of disclosure (Deegan, 2000). 
According to Guthrie and Parker (1990) `The political economy perspective perceives 
accounting reports as social, political, and economic documents. They serve as a tool 
for constructing, sustaining, and legitimizing economic and political arrangements, 
institutions and ideological themes which contribute to the corporation's private 
interests. Disclosures have the capacity to transmit social, political, and economic 
meanings for a pluralistic set of report recipients' (p. 166). 
The perspectives of the legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory are seen to 
be 
consistent and build on the assumptions of the political economy perspective 
(Deegan, 
2000; Gray et al., 1996). Thus, it is stated that legitimacy theory and stakeholder 
theory are two theories referred to as system-oriented theories where 
`a system- 
oriented view of the organization and society permits us to 
focus on the role of 
information and disclosure in the relationship(s) between organizations, the state, 
individuals and groups' (Gray et al., 1996, p. 45). Therefore, the 
important advantages 
of the voluntary disclosure by the firms 
for both firms and managers are explained by 
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three main theoretical theories: legitimacy theory, signaling theory, and agency theory 
(Watson et al., 2002). 
4.2.1 Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy is considered to be `a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of the entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some social 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definition' (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). 
Mathews (1993) stated that `the social contract would exist between corporations 
(usually limited companies) and individual members of society. Society (as a 
collection of individuals) provides corporations with their legal standing and attributes 
and the authority to own and use natural resources and to hire employees. 
Organizations depend on community resources and output both goods and services 
and waste products to the general environment. The organization has no inherent 
rights to these benefits, and in order to allow their existence, society would expect the 
benefits to exceed the costs to society' (p. 35). 
The survival and growth of the company depends on its ability to distribute economic, 
social, or political benefits to the different groups that represents the source of its 
power (Shocker and Sethi, 1973). Early accounting theory identified the users of 
accounting information as shareholders and creditors, and the annual report's 
disclosure was directed to serve only the interests of these two groups of users (Gray, 
1995). 
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Moreover, the legitimacy theory assumes that the company would not survive unless 
it is congruent with the society in which it operates (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). 
However, there is a social contract between the company and its society of operations. 
The social contract contains explicit terms in the form of legal requirements, and 
implicit terms in the form of non - legislated social expectations (Gray et al., 1996). 
A number of researchers invoked legitimacy theory to explain disclosures in 
environmental and social disclosure (Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Patten, 1992; Deegan 
and Gordon, 1996). 
However, Deegan and Rankin (1996) mentioned that the failure to comply with 
society expectations leads to revocation of the contract mentioned by Gray et al., 
1996). Deegan (2000) stated that `organizations continually seek to ensure that they 
operate within the bonds and norms of their respective societies, that is, they attempt 
to ensure that their activities are perceived by outside parties as being legitimate' 
(p. 253). It is indicated that the social expectations would encompass economic, 
environmental and social factor relationships (Elkington, 1997). 
Therefore, legitimacy theory presents that corporate disclosure reacts to 
environmental factors (economical, social, political) and that disclosures legitimate 
action (Preston and Post, 1975; Hogner, 1982; Lehman, 1992; Lindblom, 1994). 
However, Guthrie and Parker (1989) provided evidences that the legitimacy theory is 
not adequate as means of explaining the social disclosure during a specific period of 
time. This is based on the absence of any reaction of economic, social or political 
events as a result of the social disclosures. 
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Based on legitimacy theory, social disclosures are one of the methods used by the 
firm to influence the public policy process. This can be done directly by addressing 
public and/or legislative concerns, or indirectly, by projecting company's image as 
socially aware. Therefore, the greater the company is exposed to the social and 
political environment, the greater the need to attempt to influence the process through 
social disclosure (Patten, 1992). Moreover, according to Guthrie and Parker (1989), 
legitimacy theory argues that the corporate disclosures are made as reactions to 
environmental pressures (economical, social, and political) and to legitimate the 
company's existence and actions. 
Lindblom (1994) differentiates between legitimacy as a status or condition and the 
legitimating as a process. According to Lindblom (1994), the legitimacy is defined as 
`a condition or status which exists when an entity's value system is congruent with the 
value system of the larger social system of which the entity is part. When a disparity, 
actual or potential, exists between the two value systems, there is a threat to the 
entity's legitimacy' (p. 2). 
Moreover, Tinker and Neimark (1987) states that `the public in general, become 
increasingly aware of the adverse consequences of corporate growth. They pressured 
both business and government to make outlays to repair or prevent damage to the 
physical environment, to ensure health and safety of consumers, employees, and those 
who reside in the communities where products are manufactured and wastes are 
dumped, and to be responsible for the consequences of technological unemployment 
and plant closings' (p. 84). Moreover, the evidence suggests that the society's 
confidence in business has decreased. Therefore, businesses are 
forced to respond to 
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the diversified social issues that are consequences of their activities (Tinker and 
Neimark, 1987). 
Moreover, based on legitimacy theory, the organization is said to be a part of a wide 
social construct that has different expectations that must be met to maintain the 
ongoing of its operations (Ratanajongkol et al., 2006). Corporate social disclosure is 
motivated by the legitimacy activities (Horgner, 1982). Legitimacy theory forms a 
sort of stress on the corporations to react to the community's expectations (Guthrie 
and Parker, 1989). Therefore, the community's expectations are satisfied by 
additional disclosure of social information (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000). 
Additionally, under the previously stated stress of the community, the annual report is 
an evaluation for the responsiveness of the management to the different 
environmental issues that affects the corporation's performance. Hence, the voluntary 
disclosure of the environmental and social issues is not limited to the role of offering 
information, but also shows the perception of the management towards considering 
satisfying the expectations of the stakeholders (Deegan and Rankin, 1996). 
The studies of Patten (1992) and Deegan and Rankin (1996) on the Australian 
companies showed that the increasing of the concern about the community that the 
companies are operating in, including the stakeholders expectations and interests, 
increased the level of the social responsibility information in the annual reports. This 
response is believed to be a supporting evidence for the legitimacy theory in the form 
of corporate reaction to the society to gain its approval for the company's existence 
and growth. 
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Legitimacy theory is based on perceptions, and any response of the management 
would be in the form of disclosure. Hence, the measurement of the stakeholders' 
perceptions indicates their interests and expectations which need to be satisfied. The 
management satisfies these expectations in terms of additional voluntary disclosure 
that is not motivated by standards or regulations, but motivated by the incentive to 
satisfy the stakeholders' expectations and change their perceptions towards the 
management's response to the social and environmental issues. Using the disclosure 
by the management to satisfy the stakeholder's needs reduces the expectations gap 
between the two parties (Cormier and Gordon, 2001). 
Legitimacy theory includes four strategies. First, the organization is seeking to inform 
and educate its key stakeholders about actual changes in the organization's 
performance and activities. This strategy was initiated as a response to the existence 
of the legitimacy gap due to the actual failure of the organization's performance. The 
social disclosure is used to apply the four strategies. The second and fourth strategies 
are concerned with the expectations of the stakeholders. The difference between these 
two strategies is that both of them are willing to correct and change the stakeholders' 
expectations, but the second strategy is willing to do that without any changes in the 
behavior of the organization, while the fourth strategy is accepting to act in other 
behavior to do so. Therefore, the two strategies having the same objective but the first 
using a negative approach, while the second strategy acting positively (Lindblom, 
1994). 
To this extent the legitimate strategies present the key stakeholders' expectations. The 
success of implementing any legitimate strategy will involve the addressing of the 
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current values of either the corporation's society, or the business key stakeholders 
(Lewis and Unerman, 1999). This shows that the legitimate strategies are 
stakeholders' oriented. 
The previously stated strategies of the legitimacy gap are shown in the following 
figure: 
Figure 4.1 
Organizational Legitimacy Strategies 
Manipulate Social 
Perceptions by 
associating itself to 
symbols, values, or 
institutions, which 
posses with strong 
legitimacy base 
Adapt itself to confirm 
to prevailing definitions 
of legitimacy by 
changing its behavior 
and informing the 
relevant public about 
this 
LEGITIMACY 
STRATEGIES 
Alter the existing 
social definition of 
legitimacy to match 
present organizational 
practices, without 
changing its behavior 
Modify external 
expectations to concur 
with current firm 
performance 
Source: Khor, A. K. (2002) `Social Contract Theory, Legitimacy Theory and Corporate Social and 
Environmental Disclosure Policies: Constructing a Theoretical Framework' Nottingham University 
Business School. 
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However, it is noted that `a relationship between legitimacy theory and disclosure was 
only marginally supported for environmental issues, unconfirmed for energy and 
community issues and subject to contradictory evidence for human resources issues' 
(Guthrie and Parker, 1989, p. 351). In addition, Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) 
concluded that legitimacy theory provides limited explanation for the decision to 
disclose environmental information. It is observed that firms refer to legitimacy 
theory through voluntary disclosures as a fear from violating the social contract 
(Joseph, 2007). 
Furthermore, given that the legitimacy theory is dealing with perceptions, the 
legitimacy theory has not provided an appropriate measure of the effect of disclosure 
changes in the perception of the relevant publics in isolation from other influences 
and events in the society (Campbell et al., 2003). Therefore the theory has not 
provided any attention to the conflict of interests of the stakeholders, and so it 
assumed that the voluntary disclosure is likely to be credible and reliable, which is 
somehow considered to be questionable issue. 
4.2.2 Signaling Theory 
Another theoretical approach used in the definition of voluntary disclosure is 
signaling theory. The development of this theory is to explain behavior in the labour 
markets, but it is also used for voluntary disclosure. Signaling is a reaction to 
information asymmetry as managers have more information than investors have. The 
information asymmetry can be reduced if the party with more information signals to 
others. This is done as the higher quality firms' managers distinguish themselves from 
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the lower quality ones. In order to signal successfully, managers should use credible 
signals (Eccles et al., 2001). 
It is argued that when information is costless, the seller will disclose both good and 
bad information, as buyers would put the worst interpretation on non-disclosure 
(Grossman, 1981). Likewise, disclosing favorable information by the firms is done as 
non-disclosure will result in users inferring content of such information as 
unfavorable (Milgrom, 1981; Jung and Kwon, 1988). Such disclosure provides 
credible signals about a firm's value as the firm would be penalized if the firm 
provides misleading information (Hughes, 1986). Furthermore, managers voluntarily 
disclose both good and bad news, as the good news signals quality and bad news is 
signaled to prevent a decline in the firm's share price (Skinner, 1994). 
Information plays an important role in the agency relationship because the agent's 
rewards and compensation may be based not just on the realized outcome but also on 
the results signaled by the accounting information system. Therefore, accountability 
information work perfectly only if the signals from the accounting system endeavors 
of the agent (Bromwich, 1992). In addition, signaling theory predicts that the healthy 
firms are likely to disclose more information than the distressed firms (Ross, 1979). 
4.2.3 Stakeholder - Agency Theory 
Agency theory `may help to explain the lack of existence of a comprehensive 
accounting theory. It implies that a framework of accounting theory cannot be 
developed because of the diverse interests involved in financial reporting. However, 
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there is an even more basic reason why agency theory will have limited direct impact 
on financial accounting. Agency theory is a descriptive theory in that it helps to 
explain why a diversity of accounting practices exists. Therefore, even if subsequent 
testing supports this theory, it will not identify the correct accounting procedures to be 
used in various circumstances, and thus accounting practice will not be changed' 
(Schroeder and Clark, 1995, p. 45). Moreover, agency theory provides a necessary 
explanation of why the selection of particular accounting method would affect the 
organization (Deegan, 2000). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasized that the agency theory shows the contract 
between one party (principal) and another party (agent). By means of this contract, the 
principal will delegate the authority to the agent to make different decisions on the 
behalf of this principal. Using the terms of agency theory, there is a contract between 
the shareholders (principal) and the management (agent) regarding managing and 
operating the organization on the behalf of them. Moreover, there is another contract 
that is between the shareholders (principal) and the auditor (agent) regarding 
controlling and auditing the disclosures of the management about the organization's 
performance. 
Auditing may be useful where the information is issued by the agent, who may be 
better informed than the principal or may provide information which puts him/her self 
in the best possible situation. Auditing helps in verifying and validating such 
information (Bromwich, 1992). 
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The relationship between the shareholders (principal) and the corporate managers 
(agent) created much uncertainty due to various information asymmetries (Deegan, 
2000). Agency theory explains why managers voluntarily disclose information. It is 
assumed by the agency theory that managers and shareholders have different interests 
(Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989a, 1989b, 1992, Firth, 1980; Hossain et 
al., 1994). Shareholders will seek to control managers' behavior through bonding and 
monitoring activities. Therefore, managers may have an incentive to try and convince 
shareholders. Through greater disclosure, companies attempt to reduce cost of capital 
by reducing investor uncertainty (Ball and Foster, 1982; Watson et al., 2002). 
Moreover, agency theory indicates that managers will disclose social information if it 
increases their welfare, by means that the benefits of this disclosure overweigh its 
associated costs (Ness and Mirza, 1991). 
Agency theorists argue that corporations are structured to minimize the costs of 
getting some participants (agents) to do what other participants (principals) desire. 
Therefore, participants agree to co operate with each other within the organization 
rather than dealing with each other through the market (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995). 
There are two kinds of managerial failures that restrict the agent from acting perfectly 
towards the principals (shareholders). Firstly, failures of managerial competence 
related to unwitting mistakes in the discharge of managerial control. Secondly, 
failures of managerial integrity related to willful behaviors on the part of managers 
negatively impact the value of firm's assets (Moldoveanu and Martin, 2001). 
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4.2.3.1 Agency Costs 
The separation of the ownership and management that occurs between the principal 
and the agent results in a variety of agency problems and different agency costs 
including monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). 
4.2.3.1.1 Monitoring Cost 
The monitoring costs are paid by the principal to measure, observe, and control the 
agent's performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). Denis et al. (1997) described 
the monitoring as a process that is restricted to certain groups. The monitoring process 
must have necessary expertise and incentives to monitor the management, and provide 
credible thread to management's control of the company. Therefore, the cost of 
undertaking an audit is referred to as a monitoring cost (Deegan, 2000). However, too 
much monitoring would results in constricting the managerial initiative (Burkat et al., 
1997). 
Moreover, critics of Cadbury (1992) showed that the high level of monitoring may act 
as deterrent to managerial entrepreneurship. However, it is required to have an 
optimal level of monitoring the agent's performance in a way that does not restrict the 
agent from performing his stewardship role. Thus, the stewardship theory indicates 
that the performance variations arise from whether the structural situation facilitates 
the effective actions by the management (Donaldson, 1988). 
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The small board of directors' size and the role duality of the chairman of the board of 
directors being the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at the same time, as corporate 
governance characteristics, would facilitates the decision making process and achieve 
the stewardship role. On the other hand, the small size and role duality's benefits 
would be on the expense of the other shareholders' interests and the whole 
performance of the organization. Therefore, the monitoring of the agent's 
performance needs to be tied to a degree that does not affect his stewardship role. This 
balance would have a positive effect on the agent's performance (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991). 
4.2.3.1.2 Bonding Costs 
The bonding costs are adhered to the agent's compensation systems when they act in a 
manner of behavior that satisfies the interests of the principal (shareholders). The 
agents need to disclose additional information to show their shareholders that they are 
acting in a satisfactory behavior that fits with their interests. Managers are bonding 
themselves to prepare financial statements. This is costly, and referred to the positive 
accounting theory as a bonding cost (Deegan, 2000). 
Moreover the agents would accept bearing the bonding costs as to reduce the 
monitoring costs (McColgan, 2001). The optimal bonding contract would satisfy the 
shareholders interests. However, the agent would not satisfy all the request of the 
shareholders, therefore there would not be a perfect bonding contract that satisfies all 
the needs of the shareholders (Denis, 2001). 
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4.2.3.1.3 Residual Loss 
The existence of the residual or agency loss is due to the existence of the monitoring 
costs and bonding costs. This residual loss is due to the imbalance between the 
monitoring cost and the bonding cost. That means the failure of the agent to satisfy 
the needs of the shareholders regarding monitoring the agent's performance and so the 
agency contract is imperfectly satisfied (McColgan, 2001). 
4.2.3.2 Agency Conflicts 
As a result of the conflicts of interests between the principal and the agent contract 
there are four problematic areas; moral hazard, earning retention, risk aversion, and 
time horizons (McColgan, 2001). 
4.2.3.2.1 Moral Hazard Agency Conflicts 
The single manager who owns the firm consumes private perquisites rather than 
investing in positive net present value as his ownership stake in the company 
decreases. Therefore, the investment decision is considered to be dependent on the 
ownership structure (Jensen and Mecking, 1976). 
Jensen (1993) argued that moral hazard problems are likely to appear in larger 
companies as increasing firm size increases its complexity and the 
difficulty of 
monitoring which increases the monitoring costs. The corporate size 
is considered to 
be an indicator for the complexity and higher monitoring cost. 
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4.2.3.2.2 Earnings Retention Agency Conflict 
The different studies found that director remuneration is an increasing function of 
corporate size, which incentives management to focus on size growth rather than 
shareholders' return growth (Brennan, 1995b). Moreover, Jensen (1986,1993) argues 
that managers prefer to retain earnings to have size growth, greater prestige, and 
ability to be awarded high levels of remuneration, while shareholders prefer higher 
cash dividends. This indicates increasing conflict of interest between the management 
and the shareholders. 
4.2.3.2.3 Time Horizons Agency Conflict 
The conflict between the management and the shareholders concerning the timing of 
cash flows. The shareholders are concerned with the cash flow in the future, while the 
management concerned with the cash flows for their employment term in the short 
term. This conflict would affect the research and development expenditures. It is 
noted that the managers reduces the research and development expenditures, while the 
shareholders requires increasing these research and development expenditures 
(McColgan, 2001). 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) examined the research and development expenditures near 
the retirement of the top management. It is found that the research and development 
expenditures are reduced which indicated that the management is concerned by the 
short term, while the shareholders are concerned by the long term benefits of the 
research and development expenditures. 
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4.2.3.2.4 Managerial Risk Aversion Agency Conflicts 
The majority of company directors are tied to the company they are working in, and 
their income is depending on the performance of the company. Therefore, the 
managers prefer minimizing the risk of their company's stock, and avoid the 
investment decisions which increase the risk of the company (Denis, 2001). 
4.2.3.3 Stakeholder Theory 
There are many similarities between legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory. 
Therefore, Gray et al. (1995b) state that `it seems to us that the essential problem in 
the literature arises from treating each as competing theories of reporting behavior, 
when stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory are better seen as two overlapping 
perspectives of the issue which are set within a framework of assumptions about 
political economy' (p. 52). 
Stakeholder theory involves the recognition and identification of the relationship 
between the company's behavior and the impact on its stakeholders (Ansoff, 1965). 
Gray, et al. (1995b) stated that `the corporation's continued existence requires the 
support of the stakeholders and their approval must be sought and the activities of the 
corporation adjusted to gain that approval. The more powerful the stakeholders the 
more the company must adapt' (p. 55). Atkinson et al. (1997) suggested that the term 
`stakeholder' recently introduced in conjunction with the development of new 
performance measures for better strategic planning. While Gray et al. (1996) state that 
`a `stakeholder' is any human agency that can be influenced by, or can itself 
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influence, the activities of the organization in question' (p. 33). Since the organization 
has many stakeholders, therefore, it owes accountability to all its stakeholders (Gray 
et al., 1996). In addition, it is stated that the more important the stakeholder to the 
organization, the more effort will be made to manage and manipulate this relationship. 
This is done by offering more information, especially voluntary disclosures, to gain 
the support and approval of these stakeholders. Freeman (1984) suggested that 
stakeholder theory explains the relationship of the firm to its external environment. 
Moreover, Stakeholder theory states the `all persons or groups with legitimate 
interests participating in an enterprise do so to obtain benefits and that there is no 
prima facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over another' (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995, p. 68). Thus the stakeholder model is shown in the following figure: 
Figure 4.2 
The Stakeholder Model 
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Source: Donaldson, T, and Preston L. (1995) `The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, 
Evidence, and Implications' Academy of Managerial Review, Vol. 20, No. 1,69 - 91. 
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The stakeholder theory can be , and 
has been used and presented in different ways that 
are distinct involving various methodologies, types of evidence, and criteria of 
appraisal. Therefore, stakeholder theory is justified in literature explicitly or implicitly 
using three different approaches. First, the descriptive approach which attempts to 
show that the theory's concepts are corresponding to observed reality. Second, the 
instrumental approach which points to evidence connection between stakeholder 
management and corporate performance. Third, the normative approach aims to 
appeal to underlining concepts such as individual or group rights, social contract and 
social corporate responsibilities (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). The normative 
approach is considered to be the central core of the theory. The instrumental is the 
second level of the theory which predicts if certain practices are carried out, then 
certain results are obtained. The external shell of the theory is its descriptive aspects 
explaining the observed relationships in the external world. The descriptive accuracy 
of the theo resumes the truth of the core normative conception. 
Therefore, stakeholder theory has been advanced and justified based on `its 
descriptive accuracy, instrumental power, and normative validity' (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995, p. 69). These aspects are interrelated and quite distinct that they involve 
different evidences and have different implications (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
Moreover, the theory is considered to be a moral and philosophical guide for the 
organization (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). It is argued that the company should 
serve only the interests of the shareholders of the corporation (Wijnberg, 2000). There 
are two perspectives concerning the disclosure to the stakeholders of the corporation. 
First, is the ethical (moral or normative) branch of stakeholder theory where all the 
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stakeholders have the right to get a full disclosure of the corporation and its impact 
upon them regardless using this information or not. Moreover, Hasnas (1998) states 
that, according to the normative stakeholder theory, management must give equal 
consideration to the interests of all stakeholders and, when these interest conflict, 
manage the business so as to attain the optimal balance among them. This, of course, 
implies that there will be times when management is obliged to at least partially 
sacrifice the interests of stockholders to those of the other stakeholders. Hence, in its 
normative form, the stakeholder theory does imply that business has true social 
responsibilities' (p. 25). 
Second, the corporation satisfies only the needs of the powerful stakeholders, and this 
power could be in the form of political power by the government, or political power 
by other stakeholders. Information is a major element that can be employed to manage 
(manipulate) the stakeholders to gain their support and approval, or distracting their 
opposition and disapproval (Gray et al., 1996; Deegan, 2000). Therefore, 
organizations would have the incentive to disclose information about their programs 
and initiatives with respect to the powerful stakeholders' expectations (Deegan, 
2000). Consequently, information disclosure programs help in reducing information 
asymmetries, which in turn affect the relative political power of different actors 
(Grant, 1997). 
Stakeholders are classified into two groups: primary stakeholders, whose continuing 
participation is necessary for the survival of the corporation, and secondary 
stakeholders, who are not essential to the survival of the corporation although their 
actions and responds can significantly damage or benefit the corporation (Freeman, 
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1984; Clarkson, 1995). In addition, stakeholder theory also recognizes the existence 
of trade-offs in resource allocation between competing stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 
1992). However, the rights of stakeholders should be considered to be equal 
(Freeman, 1994). The stakeholder's concept is satisfied by designing non financial 
measures (Logsdon and Lewellyn, 1998). Furthermore, stakeholders' theory arises 
due to the rejection of the concern about maximizing the benefits of a single 
stakeholder (shareholders) (Wijnberg, 2000). 
Moreover, Atkinson et al. (1997) stated that `a model for measuring company's 
performance helps all members - customers, suppliers, employees, and community - 
understand and evaluate their contributions and expectations. By focusing on the 
secondary processes for achieving primary objectives, such as profit, the system 
provides a tool for monitoring implicit and explicit contractual relationships with 
stakeholders' (p. 25). Donaldson and Preston (1995) provides a theoretical foundation 
of the stakeholder theory. The main hypothesis of this theory is the existence of a 
connection between an action and an outcome. The predictions of the normative 
assumption mentioned that all the stakeholders deserve moral consideration. 
Moreover, stakeholder theory differs from other theories that it is intended to explain 
and to guide the structure and operation of the established corporation. 
Many authors suggested that `the trust between managers and key shareholders can 
lead to competitive advantage for firms' (Berman, 1998, p. 45). The competitive 
advantage that the organization can achieve is the output of the connection between 
the organization and its stakeholders. Accordingly, the competitive advantage's 
degree is measured and disclosed using the voluntary disclosure. This outcome is an 
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item of the market disclosure in the list of the different categories of the voluntary 
disclosure. Therefore, this disclosure shows the outcome that indicated the success of 
the action. Furthermore, directors can communicate with stakeholders using voluntary 
disclosure (Watson et al., 2002). 
The stakeholder theory's main advantage is providing a means for dealing with 
multiple stakeholders with multiple conflicting interests. The organization is not 
focusing on the interests of the individual stakeholder. It is believed that the 
satisfaction of interests of the different stakeholders is achieved using system centered 
theory (Freeman, 1984). Moreover, Rowley (1997) theoretically argued that the way 
the organizations are treating their multiple interdependent stakeholders is influenced 
by the structure of a stakeholder relationship network. 
The interaction of the organizations with their stakeholders is determined by two 
structural factors of stakeholder networks. First, the interaction between the 
organization and its stakeholders is determined by the density of stakeholders' 
network which measures the degree of interconnectedness between an organization's 
stakeholders. Second, the interaction between the organization and its stakeholders is 
determined by the focal organization's centrality in the stakeholders' network which 
measures the degree to which an organization in a network falls on a path between its 
stakeholders in the network (Rowley, 1998). 
The high density network allows the exchange of information and the coordination 
between the different activities among the stakeholders. Therefore, high density 
network provides the opportunity for the stakeholders to interact with each other 
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effectively (Oliver, 1991). Thus, the product of the highly density network is efficient 
communication and the shared expectations across the network. In contrast, the less 
dense network does not create shared behavioral expectations between the different 
stakeholders (Mintzberg, 1983). If the focal organization's centrality is high, by 
means that the organization is centralized between the different stakeholders, that 
would influence the formation of shared behavioral expectations and facilitates 
information exchange (Rowley, 1997). 
Furthermore, stakeholder theory addressed the relationship between the organization 
and the external environment including its corporate social responsibility and 
corporate social performance. The stakeholders are the parts that have the ability to 
affect (directly or indirectly) the resources of the organization. On the other hand, 
they are affected by the different economical, technological, social, political, and 
managerial perspectives of the organization. Therefore, the theory is concerned by the 
congruency between the organization and its stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). 
Regarding the explanation of the environmental, social, and ethical disclosure, 
stakeholder theory explains the observable relationships in the real world based on its 
descriptive aspect (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Using the managerial branch of the 
stakeholder theory, the disclosed `information is a major element that can be 
employed by the organization to manipulate the stakeholder in order to gain their 
support and approval, or distract their opposition or disapproval' (Gray et al., 1996, 
p. 46). 
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Therefore, this managerial aspect focuses on the relationships and interactions 
between the organization and the various stakeholders who compose the 
organizational environment, rather than cons idering the whole organizational 
environment, and assuming the homogenous of stakeholders' perception and 
expectations as legitimacy theory does (Laan, 2006). As a result, stakeholder's 
priorities may not necessarily be homogenous. Some stakeholders may acquire stocks 
in firm with intend to exercise them influencing social action, while others may 
acquire the firm's stocks to advance the firm's financial performance (Wolfe and 
Putler, 2002). Thus, Lev (1988) stated that `the usefulness of information is clearly an 
adequate standard in a `multi-person' setting of many users with varied preferences 
and objectives' (p. 2). 
Moreover, stakeholder theory considering the heterogeneity of stakeholders, and the 
inability to provide all information needs, results in the occurrence of conflict 
between these stakeholders. The resolution of this conflict reflects the amount of 
power stakeholder group hold in the organization's environment (Miles, 2002; 
Mitchell et al., 1997; Tilt, 1994). From the view of stakeholder theory, the 
organization's objective is to balance the conflict demands of various organization 
stakeholders (Roberts, 1992). Therefore, under the management branch of stakeholder 
theory, environmental, social, and ethical disclosure, as a category of the voluntary 
disclosure, `assumed to assist in gaining, maintaining or restoring organizational 
legitimacy in the eyes of those stakeholder groups whose needs have been addressed' 
(Laan, 2006, p. 25). 
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Stakeholder theory focuses on two core questions. First, it asks, what is the purpose of 
the firm? The answer of this question encourages managers to share the sense of the 
value they create, and bring their key stakeholders together. This result in generating 
outstanding performance which is determined in terms of its purpose and marketplace 
financial metrics. Second, stakeholders' theory asks, what responsibility does 
management have to stakeholders? The answer to this question requires managers to 
identify how they want to do business regarding kinds of relationships they want and 
need to create with their stakeholders to achieve their purpose. Therefore, 
stakeholders are important constituent and profits are critical feature of this activity, 
but concern for profits is the result rather than the driver in the process of value 
creation (Freeman et al., 2004). Moreover, Stakeholder theory begins with the 
assumption that values are necessary and explicitly a part of doing business, and 
rejects the separation between ethics and economics. This separation results in a 
narrow view of the theory that cannot possibly do justices to the panoply of human 
activities that is value creation and trade (Freeman, 1994). 
Furthermore, government agencies, investors, and other stakeholders are demanding 
more disclosure of company environmental information due to their interest in the 
environmental issues and its related costs and liabilities (Mastrandonas and Strife, 
1992). In respond to this demand, many corporations are issuing voluntary 
environmental reports independent of the traditional annual financial reports (CFO, 
1996). Moreover, over the last two decades, environmental issues entered in the 
consideration of stakeholders' risk and return (Neu et al., 1998). 
126 
Based on stakeholders theory the larger companies disclose more information in order 
to attract capital in financial market (Cooke, 1991), while using stakeholders theory 
makes the economic performance and profitability is the motive to voluntary disclose 
information (Gray, 1995). In addition, Deegan and Gordon, 1996, discussed the 
effect of type of industry on the voluntary disclosure decisions. 
Ramanathan (1976) state that `the political economy perspective is deriving the 
concept of a `social contract', suggesting the existence of an organization relies on the 
support of society in general (p. 517). Clarkson (1995) has referred evaluating 
corporate social performance to the stakeholders' satisfaction instead of in terms of 
corporate social responsiveness or satisfying corporate social responsibility. 
The stakeholder theory is used to clarify the corporate social responsibilities' benefits 
for corporations. This is based on the assumption that the corporation depends on 
various groups for resources and survival. Therefore, the corporations need to satisfy 
such groups. Otherwise they would withdraw their support causing the corporate 
decline and may be death. The stakeholders are groups or individuals with diversified 
preferences and interests. Therefore, the corporate social reporting role is reporting 
the positive (good) and negative (bad) effects on the society arising from the 
organization's operations to the key stakeholders as a fulfillment of the corporation's 
social contractual obligations (Ramanathan, 1976; Gray et al., 1988). 
Furthermore, the provision of the voluntary corporate disclosure is a motivated by the 
stakeholders' demands to achieve strategic objectives (Freeman and Reed, 1983). 
Therefore, corporate voluntary disclosure might be seen in the context of strategic 
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decision making (Ullmann, 1985). Beside the traditional stakeholders (owners and 
investors, managers, employees, customers, and suppliers) the community is defined 
as a stakeholder (Boehm, 2002). Therefore, developing stakeholder theory provides 
structure for the social issues of the relationship between stakeholders (including the 
community) and business corporations (Joseph, 2007). 
However, Gray et al. (1995b) stated that `stakeholders and legitimacy theory are 
overlapping perspectives which are set within a framework of assumptions about 
political economy implying that the differences are in levels of resolution of 
perception rather than arguments for and against competing theories as such' (p. 52). 
As mentioned before, with regard to legitimacy theory the audience of interests is 
defined as the society. Within the descriptive managerial branch of stakeholder 
theory, it is considered that organization is a part of a wider social system that 
includes other groups of stakeholders whom should be best managed if the 
organization is to survive. Moreover, as legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory 
believes that expectations of different stakeholder groups affect the operating and 
disclosure policies of the organization. The organization would not respond to the 
stakeholder groups equally, but rather, respond to those who deemed to be powerful 
(managerial perspective of stakeholder theory) (Deegan, 2000). 
Finally, Hill and Jones (1992) integrated the stakeholder concept with agency theory 
by enlarging the standard principal-agent paradigm of financial economics to create 
stakeholder-agency theory which is considered to be a generalized theory of agency. 
In the sense of contractual perspective, stakeholder theory expands agency 
relationship to include other stakeholder. Accordingly, managers can be seen as the 
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agents of all other stakeholders. It is observed that stakeholders differ among 
themselves with respect to their importance to their stake in the firm, and their power 
towards the managers. A similar emergence of theories is done by Freeman and Evan 
(1990) through the emerging of the firm-as-contract analysis with the stakeholder 
concept. Freeman and Evan (1990) stated that `managers administer contracts among 
employees, owners, suppliers, customers, and the community. Since each of these 
groups can invest in asset specific transactions which affect the other groups, methods 
of conflict resolution or safeguards must be found' (p. 352). 
Moreover, integration of the agency theory and firm-as-contract theory with the 
stakeholder theory gives attention to the special role of managers towards all 
stakeholders. The `information asymmetry' between managers and other stakeholders 
expands the management's role to include a duty of safeguarding the welfare of the 
abstract entity that is the corporation and of balancing the conflicting claims of 
multiple stakeholders to achieve this goal. This argument raises the importance of 
monitoring devices that have the effect of reducing information asymmetry and 
enforcement mechanisms (Hill and Jones, 1992). 
4.3 VOLUNTARY CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
It is observed that from 1994, several accounting organizations have issued different 
reports focusing on the different types of voluntary disclosure. The first issued report 
was by the Jenkin's Committee, AICPA (1994) and the ISA 38 entitled `Intangible 
Assets'. Moreover, the financial accounting standards board (FASB) issued a report in 
January 2001 concerning the voluntary disclosure entitled `Improving Business 
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Reporting: insights into enhancing voluntary disclosure'. This report does not state 
that non-financial performance must be disclosed but the firms are encouraged to 
voluntarily report this type of information. Another report issued by the Steering 
Committee entitled `Improving Business Reporting. A Customer Focus: Meeting the 
Information Needs of Investor and Creditors'. 
Meek et al. (1995) defined the voluntary disclosure as in excess disclosure of 
requirements representing free choices of the company's management to provide 
accounting and additional information relevant to the needs of their annual reports' 
users for making decisions. 
Depoers (2000) defined the voluntary disclosure. It said `an item of information is 
considered as discretionary whenever it goes beyond the compulsory information for 
shareholders. Compulsory information has to be understood as all the items whose 
publication is duly required but also the items which the firms must send to 
shareholders who ask for them (for example, social reporting). Whether its nature be 
qualitative, financial or anything else, voluntary disclosures covers all data which 
concern both subsidiaries and the group itself (p. 246). While Adrem (1999) defined 
the voluntary corporate disclosure as `information disclosed over and above existing 
regulations' (p. 5). 
The voluntary disclosure is defined in FASB perspective as `disclosures primarily 
outside the financial statement that are not explicitly required by GAAP or SEC rule'. 
The purpose of the AICPA's reports is to identify the information needs of the 
financial statement's users and to determine the types of the information considered to 
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be useful in predicting earnings and cash flows. To do so, the AICPA suggested new 
types of voluntary disclosures. The suggested types are non-financial and qualitative 
that assists the different stakeholders in predicting the financial companies' 
performances (Boesso, 2002). 
The AICPA committee emphasized few points that are critical for the disclosure of 
`private information, operational measures, forward-looking information and new 
definitions of performance' : 
1 Providing the market with safe and reliable information. 
2 The cost of preparing these detailed business reports, compared to the benefits 
of this type of communication. 
3 The problems associated with auditing investigation of these types of 
information in the absence of well-defined accounting and auditing standards. 
Moreover, the FASB's report correlates several benefits with the voluntary disclosure: 
`lower average cost of capital, enhanced credibility, improved investor relations, 
access to more liquid markets and better investment decisions'. On the other hand, 
there are some costs related to the voluntary disclosure: `competitive disadvantage, 
bargaining disadvantages and litigation from merit less suits attributable to 
information disclosure' (Boesso, 2002). 
Kaplan and Norton (1992) introduced the Balanced Scorecard, based on the theory of 
stakeholders, as performance measurement approach that is based in integrating the 
non-financial measures with the financial ones. Kaplan and Norton (1993) linked the 
non-financial measures to the strategy. Moreover, Kaplan and Norton (1996) 
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emphasized that the Balanced Scorecard is an approach that assists creating and 
developing intangible measures such as: customer relationships, innovative products 
and services, high quality and responsive operating processes, and skills and 
knowledge of the workforce. Moreover, the use of accountability turned into 
competitive advantage (Epstein et al., 2000). Furthermore, providing the stakeholders 
with the proper and expected information supports this relationship which represents 
the main source of competitive advantage (Boesso, 2002). 
Voluntary disclosure is considered to be non-GAAP report or enhanced corporate 
reporting (ECR). The ECR is less constrained than the GAAP reporting by standards 
and regulations, and contains more qualitative disclosures and non-financial 
information (Gibbins and Pomeroy, 2006). Moreover, Gray (1994b) state that 
`accounting should be social rather than a strictly economic concept and that a 
broader concept of accountability would recognize a wide range of groups or 
individuals that have the potential right to more information that is not strictly 
measurable in monetary terms and is of a voluntary nature. Shareholders, employees, 
customers and society in general have a right to financial and non-financial 
information. ' (p. 27). 
In addition, the annual report's preparers can decide to have one of two approaches. 
First is following a negative approach by providing the minimum information 
required by the regulations (mandatory disclosure). Second is presenting a 
corporation's financial performance in the most favorable way by disclosing more 
information than required by these regulations (voluntary disclosure) (Myburgh, 
2001). 
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4.3.1 Incentives of Voluntary Corporate Disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure takes different forms: press releases, investor and analyst 
meetings, conference calls, monthly newsletters, and field visits with existing and 
potential institutional investors (Graham et al., 2005). There are five motivations that 
drive managers to voluntary disclosure decisions: information asymmetry, increased 
analyst coverage, corporate control contests, stock compensation, and management 
talent (Healy and Plepu, 2001). Graham et al. (2005) introduced the limitations of 
mandatory disclosures as a driver of the voluntary disclosure. 
4.3.1.1 Information Asymmetry 
The importance of information asymmetry to accounting theory is that security 
markets are exposed to the information asymmetry problems due to the inside 
information and insider trading (Scott, 2003). Barry and Brown (1985,1986) and 
Merton (1987) argue that if the available information to the managers (insiders) more 
than the investors (outsiders), the investors requests an information risk premium. The 
firm can reduce information risk by reducing the cost of capital through the increase 
of voluntary disclosure. 
Increasing voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetry, and thus increases 
the liquidity of firm's stock (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 
1994; Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996). Graham et al. (2005) emphasized that voluntary 
disclosure reduces the information risk due to the predictable earnings of the 
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company. Moreover, non-financial information improves decision-making due to the 
decrease of the information asymmetry (Fama and Laffer, 1971; Wallace, 1988). 
4.3.1.2 Increased Analyst Coverage 
Information is the inputs of the firm analysis that is done by the analysts. The 
efficiency of the analysis depend on variety of diversified factors, the most crucial one 
is the amount and type of information available for the analysis process. The amount 
of information available for the analysts depends on the level of disclosure, especially 
the voluntary disclosure. 
If the required disclosures are not fully disclosing management's private information; 
then voluntary disclosure reduces the cost of information acquisition for analysts and 
increases the amount of available information, which increases the number of analysts 
(Bhushan, 1989; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). Therefore, voluntary disclosure 
influences the attraction of analysts, by the provision of attractive level of disclosure. 
4.3.1.3 Stock Price Motivations 
The stock price is an important indicator for firm's performance and acts as criteria of 
management's performance evaluation. The poor stock and earnings performance 
result in the risk of job loss motivates managers to use voluntary corporate disclosure 
to reduce the need to explain the poor earnings performance (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). 
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Graham et al. (2005) indicates that unprofitable and young firms care more about 
voluntary disclosure than profitable and older firms. Thus, developing and improving 
voluntary disclosure have a positive impact on the share's market price of the 
company (Fishman and Hagerty, 1989). 
4.3.1.4 Stock Compensation 
Voluntary disclosure is linked to compensation of employees, but managers might act 
in the interest of the current shareholders by reducing the contracting costs associated 
with new employees' stock compensation. Therefore, new employees will demand 
risk premium to cover them from the information advantage acquired by the 
management. 
Furthermore, the managers are having incentives to reduce contracting costs 
associated with stock compensation for new employees by increasing the voluntary 
disclosure (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Miller and Piotroski, 2000). 
4.3.1.5 Management Talent Signaling 
The managers diversify from each others in terms of qualifications and talents. 
Therefore, there are two distinguished types of management. First, managers with 
poor talents and qualifications, and in this case they would avoid any voluntary or 
additional disclosure. Second, managers with highly qualifications and talents and 
motivated to make voluntary disclosure as to represent and signal their talents to the 
stakeholders (Trueman, 1986). 
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However, Graham et al. (2005) indicates that this motive is restricted to the managers 
of the small or high growth firms as the management is still not well known yet and 
needs to represent themselves in the form of achieving good performance, and 
presenting this performance voluntarily in the form of additional disclosure. 
4.3.1.6 Limitations of Mandatory Disclosures 
Voluntary disclosures fill in the gaps in the usefulness of the mandatory disclosures 
and satisfy the needs of the stakeholders that can not be satisfied by the mandatory 
disclosure (Graham et al., 2005). Furthermore, literature has shown that neither 
stakeholders nor companies are satisfied with the mandatory financial reporting 
disclosures as a sole source of corporate information (Holland and Doran, 1998; 
Holland and Stoner, 1996; Holland, 1997). 
4.3.2 Constraints on Voluntary Corporate Disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure is constrained by the reporting standards and stock exchange 
rules and the informal costs (Holland, 2006). There are four constraints on voluntary 
disclosure: litigation risk, proprietary costs, political costs, and agency costs. 
However, Graham et al. (2005) introduced additional constraint of voluntary 
disclosure which is the hardness to maintain the disclosure precedent setting. 
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4.3.2.1 Litigation Costs 
Litigation threat affects the voluntary disclosure in two ways. First, litigation can 
induce managers to disclose information, especially bad news. Second, litigation can 
reduce the incentives of the managers to disclose future forecast information (Skinner 
1994,1997; and Francis et al., 1994). While Graham et al. (2005) provided a strong 
support for delaying bad news to allow analysis and interpretation. 
4.3.2.2 Proprietary Costs 
Firms are not fully disclosing their information due to the existence of the proprietary 
costs associated with the firm's competitive position in the product market 
(Verrecchia, 2001; and Dye, 2001). The proprietary costs are an effective barrier to 
the voluntary disclosure, as the firms do not prefer to be exposed to the competitors, 
although they can get such information from other sources such as: trade journals or 
trade conferences (Graham et al., 2005). Competitors are using the disclosed 
information to change their product plans which restricts the level of voluntary 
disclosure (Lev, 1992; and Daeeough, 1995). The proprietary costs appear if the 
company is surviving in an increased competition or government regulations (Meek et 
al., 1995). 
Proprietary costs arise due to the existence of proprietary information. Proprietary 
information is value-relevant private information to the price of firm's shares, or 
traded debt in capital markets (Cormier and Gordon, 2001). Proprietary information 
may be used by third parties (e. g. employees, customers, suppliers, and competitors) 
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to enhance their interests. Therefore non-disclosure of proprietary information can 
result in lower third party costs (Cormier and Megnan, 1999). 
The proprietary cost is an incentive not to disclose information that might affect the 
firm's competitive position, even if it faces a high cost of capital. Therefore, this 
constraint is sensitive to the nature of competition in the firm's product market 
(Verrecchia, 1983; Darrough and Stoughton, 1988; Wagenhofer, 1990; Feltman and 
Xie, 1992; Newman and Sansing, 1993; Darrough, 1993; Gigler, 1994). 
4.3.2.3 Political Costs 
It is stated that `economists have questioned whether the public interest assumption is 
consistent with observed phenomena. They have proposed an alternative assumption- 
that individuals involved in the political process act in their own self interest (the self- 
interest assumption). This assumption yields to implications that are more consistent 
with observed phenomena than those based on the public interest assumption' (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1979, p. 283). 
Voluntary disclosure makes the regulators pay more attention to the firm and that 
would costs the firm such costs that they could avoid by not disclosing this type of 
information (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978,1986). Firms with high inside ownership 
are more concerned about regulatory costs (Graham et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
voluntary social disclosures can be explained as effort to reduce the political costs of 
the disclosing entities (Ness and Mirza, 1991; McComiskey, 1995). 
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4.3.2.4 Agency Costs 
The agency problem justifies the lack of full disclosure and avoiding the voluntary 
disclosure. The managers limit the voluntary disclosures to avoid unfavorable 
attention of stakeholders (Nagar et al., 2003; Berger and Hann, 2003). 
4.3.2.5 Disclosure Precedent 
One of the main constraints of voluntary disclosure is the desire to avoid setting 
disclosure precedent that might be difficult to be maintained in the future (Graham et 
al, 2005). That indicates that the management should be aware that the level of 
disclosure in a specific time would lead to having at least the same level or above, and 
that the stakeholders would not accept any level below the previously disclosure level 
in the previous period. 
The disclosure precedent constraint is viewed in a similar way to the commitment 
cost associated with increasing voluntary disclosure (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; 
Verrecchia, 2001). Therefore, there is the cost of losing the firm's reputation towards 
its stakeholders by not maintaining the same level of voluntary disclosure level they 
are used to before. 
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4.4 THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY CORPORATE DISCLOSURE IN 
REDUCING THE INFORMATION EXPECTATIONS GAP 
Liggio (1974) defined the expectations gap as `the difference between the levels of 
expected performance as envisioned by both the independent accountant and by the 
user of financial statements' (p. 27). There are many items that are not disclosed in the 
annual reports resulting in the existence of information gap between stakeholders' 
expectations and the disclosures provided by the firm (Hooks et al., 2002). 
Stakeholder theory is concerned with how the organization manages its stakeholders. 
Thus, the disclosed information is assumed to be part of legitimacy and/or social 
construction process. That's justifying the voluntary disclosure that is released by the 
organizations to satisfy their stakeholders (Gray et al., 1997). 
Verdi (2006) defined the financial reporting quality as the role of financial reporting 
in providing information about firm's operations, especially cash flows, to be offered 
to the stakeholders. The FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. I 
described that the financial reporting should `provide information that is useful to 
present and potential investors in making rational investment decisions and provide 
information to help present and potential investors in assessing the amounts, timing, 
and uncertainty of prospective cash receipts' (par. 34 & 37). However, Parker (1986) 
mentioned that the corporate annual reports represent a process of mass 
communication. 
Furthermore, the financial accounting standards are developed in order to ensure that 
the stakeholders are provided with relevant, reliable, and timely information on which 
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they can make their decisions. There are barriers that contradict the provision of such 
information to the stakeholders found in the information asymmetry problem and the 
agency theory (Canibano et al., 1999). Information asymmetry assumptions are 
underpinnings of agency theory and when applied to stakeholder theory, it explains 
the conflicts of interest, and strategic behavior of the organization (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Therefore, information provision, or access to it, is considered to be a proxy of power 
(Huse and Eide, 1996). Power differentials occur not only between different types of 
stakeholders, but also within the same stakeholder category. The large firms' sizes 
and the dispersal of stakeholders increased information asymmetry between more 
informed and less informed stakeholders, as large investors (more powerful) acquire 
monopoly over information (Lev, 1988). 
Accountability is defined as `the duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily 
a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible' 
(Gray et al., 1996, p. 38). Therefore, annual reports and financial statements are 
considered to be mechanisms for discharging accountability. The process of providing 
information is based on the society defined relationship between directors and 
shareholders, which provides these shareholders with a right to information (Gray et 
al., 1996). Therefore, accountability `focuses on the impact of actions of the entity on 
the stakes of individuals, and information that relates to these stakes'. The nature of 
the information would depend on the type of actions based on the size and industry of 
the entity (Joseph, 2007). However, unless the principal can enforce the 
accountability, then no accountability is to be provided, which is considered to be 
`positive accountability' (Tricker, 1983; Stewart, 1984). 
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The information provision is referred to the accountability which is defined as `the 
provision of information between two parties where the one who is accountable, 
explains or justifies actions to the one to whom the account is owed' (Gray et al., 
1997, p. 333). The accountability framework is described in principal and agent terms, 
where principal refers to one who holds to account, and agent refers to the one who is 
held accountable. This framework assumes the existence of contractual obligation 
between the two parties (Gray et al., 1987,1988,1991; Laughlin, 1988; Woodward et 
al., 1996). 
Accountability information covers different areas of accounting. The traditional use of 
information is the fulfillment of the stewardship objectives. This area includes that 
corporate resources actually exist are used for legitimate and legal purposes, and that 
assets and resources have been accounted in a proper way. Auditors play a vital role 
in this area by validating and verifying the organization's stewardship reports 
(Bromwich, 1992). Using an agent-principal model, the selection information systems 
for accountability purpose differ from those for selecting information systems for 
decision making (Gjesdal, 1981). 
Moreover, accountability also is related to the `social contract', the idea that business 
owes its existence to society, which is part of the normative approach of the 
stakeholder theory (Gray et al., 1988; Donaldson, 1982; Donaldson and Preston, 
1995). However, the accountability's definition tends to be more inclusive of other 
stakeholders in recognition of the social contract, as it explain and justify the acts and 
omissions for which one is responsible to people with legitimate interest (ISEA, 
1999). Therefore, accountability referred to whether stakeholders have sufficient, 
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accurate, understandable and timely information on which to rely in their different 
actions (Cohen, 1995). The accountability framework extends the current framework 
by including supplement information to assists accounting bodies to create the 
supplement reports (Joseph, 2007). 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) states that `A primary goal of reporting is to 
contribute to an ongoing stakeholder dialogue. Reports alone provide little value to 
inform stakeholders or support a dialogue that influences the decisions and behavior 
of both the reporting organization and its stakeholders' (GRI, 2002, p. 9). Thus, 
accountability supports stakeholders' relationship with the firm by providing 
information for different decision. Despite of the provided unnecessary information 
for other stakeholders, this information would provide assurance that the firm is 
operating in the interest of the society as a whole (Joseph, 2007). Therefore, 
accountability narrows the information asymmetry between the management and 
different stakeholders, and in between the different categories of stakeholders (Lev, 
1989). Thus, accountability would increase the awareness towards the complexity of 
information disclosures and reduce the information asymmetries. In doing so, 
accountability would also serve to narrow asymmetries of power between different 
classes of stakeholders (Joseph, 2007). 
Miller and Bahnson (2002) stated that `if management truly views shareholders as 
partners, and places creating value for them near or at the top of its primary 
responsibilities, then it should treat them as such. Management should give 
shareholders information on strategic plans and performance and activity solicit their 
feedback on both. If shareholders don't like the strategies and register dissatisfaction 
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with the company's performance, management should listen to their complaints and 
quickly learn what has caused them' (p. 25). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined an agency relationship as `a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principal (s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent' (p. 5). This contract requires the firm (agent) to disclose 
relevant information that enables the investors (principal) to monitor compliance and 
the contractual agreements, and to ensure whether the firm is managing the resources 
in the interest of the investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001). There are monitoring costs 
associated with the monitoring process. These costs are paid by the principal to 
measure, observe, and control the agent's performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
However, Burkat et al. (1997) viewed that too much monitoring would results in 
constricting the managerial initiative. Moreover, the agent may provide voluntary 
information to reduce the bonding costs (expenses incurred to ensure that the agent 
does not undertaking actions not in the principal's interest) and attract future investors 
to invest in the company (Barako et al., 2006). 
The new entrepreneurs and the existing companies would like to attract household 
savings to fund their business ideas and future investment opportunities. Matching 
savings to investment opportunities faces two complications. First, entrepreneurs have 
better information than savers about the different investment opportunities. Therefore, 
there is an existence of information problem due to the information asymmetry or 
`lemons' problem between the entrepreneurs and the savers. Second, there 
is an 
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agency problem between the entrepreneurs and the savers due to the conflict of 
interests of the two parties (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Scott (2003) differentiated between two major types of information asymmetry. The 
first type is the adverse selection which occurs when the firm managers and other 
insiders having information advantage by acquiring more information about the 
current condition and the future forecasts than the investors and the other outsiders. 
The second type is the moral hazard which occurs as a result of the separation of 
ownership and control that characterizes the large sized firms, as the insiders can 
observe the business transactions than the outsiders. The two types of information 
asymmetry are considered to be the main agency problems. 
The equity shares of the firm are sold to the investors to raise cash required for 
investment opportunities. To do so, the firm is exposed to transaction cost which is 
referred to the information asymmetry component of the cost of capital. In perfect 
competition the well informed investor will be able to exchange assets with the firm 
with low cost of capital. In other words, the higher transaction costs, the less the 
investors would be willing to buy the firm's shares which reduce the available 
liquidity and increase the cost of capital (Verrecchia, 2001). 
Epstein and Palepu (1999) provided additional evidence about the existence of the 
information gap between financial reporting practices and financial statement's users. 
They considered that the solution is to provide more voluntary disclosures that `tell 
the corporate story' to the users. It is believed that companies tend to 
disclose the 
required information unless they have good news to 
be disclosed. Taking in 
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consideration corporate disclosure credibility, full disclosure must occur whether 
having good or bad news. 
Moreover, the main motivation to disclose information by the management is to 
reduce the cost of capital, as additional information reduces investors' uncertainty 
(Gray et al., 1995b). Scott (2003) stated that `we can think of financial reporting as a 
device to reduce the adverse selection problem, thereby improving the operation of 
securities markets and reducing incompleteness' (p. 55). This is applied by adopting 
full disclosure policies to increase the usefulness of financial reporting, and to expand 
the available information for the public to reduce the ability of insiders to profit from 
their information advantage. 
In addition, the information dialogue is defined as the type of dialogue where the 
company aims to be transparent about its activities and policies and inform 
stakeholders about them. It is `dialogue' only in so far as the stakeholders are able to 
respond by asking questions of clarification'. However, it is not expected that the 
company learn from stakeholders, and little or no expectation to manipulate or 
educate stakeholder's view. Most early the corporate social and environmental reports 
have satisfied the minimal stakeholder dialogue over the relevance and materiality of 
the information provided (Bendell, 2000). Moreover, one of the most visible drivers 
to disclose the positive social and environmental performance is that releasing such 
information provides market signals and corporate financial gains (Murphy and 
Bendell, 1999). 
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Some researchers have analyzed the connections between information disclosure and 
political behaviour. They found that the people are not motivated by the information 
itself, but instead they are motivated by the relationship between the information and 
their prior expectations. Meanwhile, if the new information does not conflict with 
prior expectations, it would not be expected to see a change in behaviour. Otherwise, 
new information differs than the people prior expectations, would considered to be a 
motive to change the behaviour and act in a different way (Stephan, 2002). 
Information asymmetry between the firm and investors is important driver of firm's 
cost of raising capital required to finance its investment opportunities (Verdi, 2006). 
Furthermore, Information asymmetry prevents the efficient selection of the worthy 
investments. As based on the principal - agent conflict, the investors would select the 
investment opportunities that maximize their welfare regardless the interest of the 
shareholders. Therefore, the firm has the incentive to reduce information asymmetry 
to reduce the cost of capital (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Moreover, the primary role of voluntary disclosure is to correct investor's perceptions 
(expectations) regarding current or future performance (Graham et al., 2005). 
Diamond and Verrscchia (1991) and Baiman and Verrscchia (1996) indicated that the 
greater disclosure the lower cost of capital. While Bushman et al. (1996) showed that 
the less than full disclosure include risk sharing and agency costs, while increasing 
disclosure is associated with proprietary costs. The regulated disclosure is motivated 
by concerns other than market failure (Leftwich, 1980; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
Moreover, the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) (1986) considered the 
historical cost information may appear adequate for stewardship role, but it would be 
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unsatisfactory for decision making. Therefore, the regulated disclosure individually 
would not reduce the information asymmetry. 
The firms disclose more information in order to attract capital in financial market 
(Cooke, 1991). While Berman (1998) argued that `the trust between managers and 
key shareholders can lead to competitive advantage for firms' (p. 54). However, the 
regulatory mandates raise the disclosure levels, but the higher disclosure companies 
already have voluntary disclosures which provide those companies with competitive 
advantage over the other competitors. Therefore, the mandate of the voluntary 
disclosure would not enhance the disclosure, but results in loosing this competitive 
advantage (Einhorn, 2005). Firms release voluntary disclosures motivated by their 
wish to inflate the investor's expectations about the firm value and thereby 
maximizing the firm's stock price (Einhorn, 2005). 
Voluntary disclosure may signal company value as managers have judged the 
disclosure to have value than its cost. But if disclosure is mandated, it does not signal 
value as the reason of this disclosure is just following the regulations without any 
clear implications that the benefits are more than the cost. Therefore, voluntary 
disclosure is enhanced, but that may not achieve the expected advantage as the 
managers may vary from any performance criteria implied by it (Ferreira and 
Rezende, 2006). Information disclosure create value in two ways; directly by 
narrowing the information gap (asymmetry) by decreasing investor's uncertainty 
(agency costs), and indirectly by enhancing value-creating through the reduced cost of 
capital (Lev, 2000). 
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Voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetry (information gap). This 
reduction occurs as a result of the investor's relative confidence that the stock 
transactions occur at a fair price which increase the stock liquidity (Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). Better disclosure practice improve 
analyst's forecast accuracy of next year's earnings (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). The 
financial information alone did not correlate with stock prices and returns, but the 
non-financial information alone (such as: population size and market penetration) did 
(Amir and Lev, 1996). 
Some information are proprietary, so investors accept not releasing it, but if they 
believe that managers have non-proprietary information that is not released they 
would have the impression that it is unfavourable or bad news. Therefore, the 
investors believe that the market value of the company is overstated which results in 
the fall of the stock price of the firm (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985). 
Regarding the credibility of the environmental reports, KPMG (1993) states that 
`disclosing the bad news as well as good is very important if companies want to gain 
credibility for their reports. Otherwise, the reports can appear biased and akin to 
public relations tools. Even if there is considerable data, an otherwise `good' report 
will invite suspicion on all its disclosures if companies are not "up front" about the 
problems they are facing, including fines and prosecutions'. 
However, the greater voluntary disclosure should lower information asymmetry, and 
therefore reduce the cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). In addition, 
voluntary disclosure reduces uncertainty and therefore reduces the information 
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asymmetry problem and lead to the reduction of the cost of external financing (Healey 
and Palepu, 1993,2001). 
Referred to the previous discussion, it can be concluded that voluntary corporate 
disclosure is a proxy of the existence of the information expectations gap as an 
indicator of the occurrence of the information asymmetry problem. Therefore, the 
level of disclosure in the Egyptian annual reports would be able to justify the presence 
of the information asymmetry problem. 
4.5 THE ROLE OF AUDITED VOLUNTARY CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
IN REDUCING THE AUDITING EXPECTATIONS GAP 
The expectations that assurance affect investors' judgment stem from the argument 
that independently audited information reduces information asymmetry and decreases 
uncertainty (Wallace, 1987). Therefore, investors increase reliance on voluntary 
disclosure when assurance is provided on this type of information (Coram, 2004). 
Furthermore, Abdel-khalik (1993), Chow (1982), and Watts and Zimmerman (1983) 
provides significant evidence that shows the increasing demand for auditing regulated 
and unregulated information to provide assurance to stakeholders. Hunton et al. 
(2000) found that auditor provided electronic commerce assurance has a positive 
impact on earning forecasts and stock price estimates. 
Reporting growth, especially the environmental, social, and sustainable reporting, is 
driven by a realization that growing levels of disclosure are being undetermined by a 
credibility gap arising from the lack of confidence in both data and the reporting 
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organizations (Doane, 2000; Swift and Dando, 2002; Dando and Swift, 2003). In 
addition, there is a concern about the provided information, especially voluntary 
disclosures, which is the credibility and the verification of the accuracy of this 
information in the absence of any mandatory requirements, and the caution 
concerning the bias towards disclosing only the good news (Deegan, 2005; Deegan et 
al., 2002; Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Neo et al., 1998). 
In the absence of credible information, stakeholders tend to assume the worst. As a 
result, stakeholders will discount the firm's stock prices, and would not react 
passively to the lack of information. However, they would choose to privately collect 
and analyze data. Due to the high cost of collecting and analyzing such data, only 
sufficient stakeholders with available resources would do so. Consequently, 
unsophisticated stakeholders are driven out of the market that becomes less efficient. 
The remaining stakeholders in the market would face high transaction cost, lower 
trading volume and illiquidity. Therefore, they bid down a firm's stock price 
(Karpoff, 1986; Lev, 1988). 
Agency theory provides the best link between the voluntary disclosure and audit 
quality. Accordingly, one monitoring device that shareholders can use to observe 
manager's behavior is appointing external auditors. An audit firm influences the 
amount information disclosed in financial statements (Singhvi and Desai, 1971). 
Moreover, referred to the accountability paradigm, the agent or the management 
cannot be trusted to provide information that may serve stakeholders interests. 
Therefore, accountability is not essentially concerned with discretionary or voluntary 
disclosure (Swift, 2001). Furthermore, the use of reputable auditor is a reflection of 
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the associated agency costs with the disclosure decisions and a signal to the market 
that the information disclosures are of high quality (Craswell and Taylor, 1992). 
In order to enhance trust in reporting assurance, providers need to be well connected 
to the stakeholders and understand their issues well (Henriques, 2003). Therefore, key 
stakeholders must be identified clearly as addressing assurance statement to specific 
stakeholder has implications for assurance on materiality of the information provided. 
The information is deemed material if its omission or misrepresentation could 
influence the decisions and actions of stakeholders (Owen and O'Dwyer, 2004). In 
terms of stakeholders, materiality is a crucial issue in the area of assurance. It is stated 
that `if stakeholders don't think the information is relevant or material, it just won't 
count' (Zadek, 2003). 
Moreover, KPMG (2002) suggests that the verification arises from `the demand for 
reliable and credible information from management, for managing the company's 
environmental and social risks, and from stakeholders who want assurance that the 
report truly represents the company's efforts and achievements' (p. 18). The 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (2003) states that `all organizations 
want to show themselves in the best possible light. ACCA believes that independent 
external assurance is a vital part of the credibility and trust building process. The role 
of independent assurance is to insure that the reporter presents an account that is fair, 
complete, unbiased and relevant' (p. 7). 
Auditing has different objectives, such as the provision of independent opinion upon 
the company's financial statements, improving management performance, and 
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controlling and monitoring the company's activities. The studies addressed the 
importance of auditing in providing credibility to accounting information which 
assists the different stakeholders in making their decisions (Owen et al., 2000; Burnet- 
Hall, 1994(a); Wood, 1991; Brown, 1962; Gwilliam, 1988;; Wallace, 1987; Show et 
al., 1980; Coopers and Lybrand). The great importance of the auditing function to 
investors is that it facilitates the raise of corporation's capital and conducting their 
business affairs (Schuetze, 2004). Auditors play an important role in verifying and 
validating the enterprise's stewardship reports (Bromwich, 1992). Therefore, the 
purchase of audit results in having reported information likely free from 
misrepresentation and thus more credible (Barton and Waymire, 2003). 
In addition, Karapetrovic (2002) defined a universal audit as `an independent and 
documented system for obtaining and verifying material audit evidence, objectively 
examining the evidence against the stated audit criteria based on audit risk and 
reporting the audit findings to the client' (pp. 150-151). Such audit definition includes 
not only financial audit, but includes other diversified types of audits including the 
voluntary disclosures. 
Miller and Bahnson (2002) stated that `incomplete information can be caused by 
omissions, misrepresentations, or simply lack of trustworthiness. Even if the 
managers are actually telling the truth, no one will act on it if they don't trust the 
reports' (p. 23). Moreover, the uncertainty about the past and present leads to 
uncertainty and lack of confidence about the future predictions. Therefore, the 
investors and creditors are demanding a higher rate of return to compensate for the 
uncertain outcome representing high cost of capital for the managers. Furthermore, to 
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reduce the information asymmetry, the investors and other outsiders are served by 
relevant information that enables them to assess the firm's future. In addition the 
provided information needs to be reliable and free from bias or other management 
manipulation (Scott, 2003). In the sense of agency theory, voluntary disclosure 
presents an excellent opportunity for managers who have access to firm's private 
information to make credible and reliable communication to the market, which in turn 
optimizes the value of the firm (Barako, 2006). 
The attribution theory explains how users perceive the voluntary disclosure of non- 
financial information (Kent and Martinko, 1995). Koonce and Mercer (2002) used the 
attribution theory to show the users' perception towards the voluntary disclosures. It 
is expected that investors would discount positive disclosures as self-serving but 
would not do so for the negative disclosures as they are considered not to be self- 
serving. Based on the attribution theory, users would be more uncertain about the 
validity of the self-serving information and discount it. Thus, owners face moral 
dilemmas due to the inaccuracy to evaluate and determine the value of decisions 
made. That's because the agent takes advantage of the lack of observability of his 
actions and practices to enhance his personal goals referred to the agent-principal 
conflicts (Barako, 2006). 
Assurance would have positive effect on users' stock price estimates and forecasts in 
case of the positive disclosures due to the reduction of uncertainty using information 
assurance. While in case of negative disclosures assurance would not make any 
difference to users (Coram, 2004). Furthermore, audited information is more credible 
than un-audited information (Johnson et al., 1983; Libby, 1979; Pany and Smith; 
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1982). Provision of assurance increases user's perceptions of non-financial reliability 
as the independently audited information reduces information asymmetry and 
decrease uncertainty. Therefore, the value of assurance on disclosure is not 
independent of signal provided by disclosure (Coram, 2004). 
Investors found it difficult to evaluate the impact of the voluntary un-audited 
disclosures on future earnings (Rajgopal et al., 2003). Furthermore, the Elliott 
Committee (1997) suggested that there are new opportunities for assurance services to 
add value to the external audit as a result of the new types of information used by 
decision makers. It defines assurance services as `independent professional services 
that improve the quality of information, or its context, for decision makers'. 
Voluntary enhanced annual report disclosure does not affect the informative power of 
the current stock prices. This result shows that the usefulness of voluntary disclosure 
is a questionable issue (Gelb and Zarowin, 2002). Investors evaluated the audited 
financial reporting as more credible than the un-audited information were more 
optimistic about firm's future earnings based on the audited financial reporting 
(Hodge, 2001). Therefore, information relevance includes the traits of timeliness and 
predictive value for decision making, while reliability contains the traits of 
representational faithfulness, verifiability, and neutrality which differ with respect to 
the nature of items. Such traits are easy to attain for financial information but not for 
intellectual capital and social costs which needs to be quantified (Joseph, 2007). 
Auditing is a way to ensure information reliability and credibility. Therefore, 
managers making voluntary disclosure might also voluntarily hire an auditor. 
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Moreover, having an audit makes manager's disclosures are more credible to users 
than they would be without an audit. Hence, the society requires auditing voluntary 
disclosures than GAAP audit, which provides greater protection of users (Power, 
1997,1999; Jamal and Sunder, 2006). Furthermore, auditors, as well as users, needs 
to pay more attention to non-financial information, but perhaps more attention is paid 
by auditors to focus on GAAP (Bell et al., 1997). 
The firm incurs a disclosure cost in case of disclosing private information. The 
disclosure costs include the preparation costs in addition to the cost of contracting an 
auditor (Verrecchia, 1983). Incurred auditing cost insures the trustfulness of the 
private information as it is the only way to make voluntary disclosure credible to the 
public. The importance of auditing of voluntary disclosure is that bad information is 
kept private while good information is publicity disclosed. Therefore, cost of 
disclosure increases more as information becomes not valuable for disclosure (Suijs, 
2005). The manager's incentive for disclosing bad information is driven by firm's 
reputation and litigation threats besides the proprietary costs that face the firm 
(Skinner, 1994). 
Voluntary disclosures have low and in some cases negative coefficient with future 
earnings which indicates that voluntary disclosure misleads analysts' perception 
regarding the firm's future. These results raised a question about the value relevant 
information about the future earnings (Banghoj and Plenborg, 2006). In the sense of 
agency theory, the managers who have better information than the other outsiders can 
make credible and reliable communication to the market to enhance the value of the 
company. This enhancement of the company's value in the market reduces monitoring 
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costs and in turn reduces the agency costs. Therefore, the more accurate and reliable 
information the companies disclose, the better companies' perception received by the 
public (Barako et al., 2006). The accounting reports can affect the real decisions made 
by managers and other users, rather than just reflecting the results of these decisions. 
This argument illustrates the importance of disclosure in directing stakeholders to 
different decisions stimulating the relative importance of disclosure credibility (Zeff, 
1978). 
Audit effectiveness adds value for investors as research shows that capital providers 
require firms to hire an independent auditor as a condition of financing, even when it 
is not required by regulation (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Moreover, banks require firms 
to present audited financial information, even for private companies. This shows that 
capital providers regard auditors as enhancement for the credibility of the presented 
information (Leftwich, 1983). 
Voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetry between the managers and 
outside investors. Reduction of information asymmetry reduces the cost of capital by 
reducing information risk but this solution is restricted by the costs associated with 
credibility of voluntary disclosure (Barry and Brown, 1985,1986; Merton, 1987). 
The value of the voluntary disclosure in the capital market depends on the degree of 
credibility of the disclosed information. As the voluntary disclosure is self-serving, it 
is not clear whether these disclosures are credible (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
In contrast, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that agency theory explains why 
accounting reports are provided voluntarily to creditors and stockholders, and why 
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independent auditors are engaged by management to testify and verify the correctness 
and accuracy of the provided reports. It is clear that managers are willing to incur 
costs in order to improve the credibility of accounting reports before doing so as a law 
requirement. Moreover, in the sense of agency theory, minimizing agency monitoring 
costs is considered to be economic incentive for managers to report reliable 
accounting reports to the ownership (Wolk and Tearney, 1997). 
Most of the studies as Waymire (1984), Ajinkya and Gift (1984), and Pownall and 
Waymire (1989) found that stock prices react positively to the management forecasts 
of earnings increases, and vice versa. It is observed that the credibility of voluntary 
disclosure is measured by the accuracy and stock prices effects of management 
forecasts. However, management forecasts accuracy can easily be verified by 
investors by actual earnings realization without need for the voluntary disclosures. 
Dye (2001) stated that `the theory of voluntary disclosure is a special case of game 
theory with the following central premise: any entity contemplating making a 
disclosure will disclose information that is favorable to the entity, and will not 
disclose information unfavorable to the entity' (p. 184). Managers may disclose 
information that reduces a firm's stock price and delay disclosing information that 
increases firm's stock price (Aboody and Kaznik, 1999). Furthermore, managers are 
disclosing bad news prior to management buyout, or prior to union negotiations. This 
shows that voluntary disclosure is acting as stock prices control instrument rather than 
reducing information asymmetry (Liberty and Zimmerman, 1986). Moreover, the 
presence of multiple audience (stakeholders), besides the 
investors in the capital 
market, such as competitors in the product market, consumers, suppliers, employees, 
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labor unions, creditors, and regulatory authorities, managers may disclose bad news to 
inflate the investor's expectations by deflating the expectations of the other audience 
(Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990). 
Watts and Zimmerman (1982) stated that `an audit will be successful in changing 
expectations and hence reducing the opportunistic behavior costs (agency costs) borne 
by the managers only if it is expected that the auditor will report some discovered 
breaches of contract. The probability that the auditors will report a discovered breach 
is effectively enhancing the auditing profession's definition of independence' (p. 11). 
Moreover, Elliott (1998) stated that `the audit provides assurance that an information 
set presented to investors and creditors is reliable. But the market place need for high- 
quality information is far greater than just the need for reliable historical cost-based 
financial statements' (p. 2). Moreover, the Elliott Committee (1997) identifies the 
opportunity to provide assurance services in relation to risk assessments, business 
performance measurements, and information system reliability. The heart of the 
minimum auditing is to create value by reducing investors' uncertainty and this 
improves the overall financial reporting quality rather than just attesting to 
management compliance with GAAP, and this causes their clients satisfaction (Miller 
and Bahnson, 2002). 
The market places a stock price premium on independently audited information 
(Dopuch et al., 1986; Willenborg, 1999). Therefore, the provision of information 
assurance services is a natural extension of the traditional financial audit role (Elliott, 
1998). Quality financial reporting revolution is an important key to increase the 
auditors' ability to add value by reducing uncertainty about the quality of information 
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included in management's reports rather than just ensuring management's compliance 
with technical GAAP (Miller and Bahnson, 2002). Under the disclosure principle, the 
released information must be credible. One way to secure the credibility is that the 
released information attested to by third party as an auditor (Scott, 2003). However, it 
is stated that `more assurance will not necessarily mean more and better 
accountability, but merely more `value added' for management as they manage key 
risks imposed by various stakeholders group who need to be controlled' (Power, 
1997, p. 127). 
The Global Reporting Initiative's Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (GRI 2002) 
emphasized the need for independent assurance to add to the credibility of 
sustainability reports: `A range of factors influences the perceptions and expectations 
of users about the credibility of an organization's sustainability report. Consultation 
with stakeholders is the best way to ascertain stakeholder perceptions and 
expectations about building credibility' (pp. 17-18). One of the key criticisms of the 
voluntary social, ethical and sustainability reports is the existence of the huge audit 
expectations gap (Kamp-Roelands, 1999). Therefore, the assurance provision for 
social and environmental reporting, as one of the voluntary disclosure categories, is 
necessary to add credibility and reduce the audit expectations gap (Gonella and Woo, 
2000; Lewellyn, 2000). 
Moreover, the stakeholders are the main concern of the auditor in performing his 
duties towards assuring the credibility of the voluntary disclosure. Therefore it is 
stated that `the assurance provider evaluate whether the reporting organization has 
responded to stakeholders concerns, policies and relevant standards and adequately 
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communicated these responses in its report' (AccountAbility, 2003, p. 18). However, 
the agency problem of adverse selection or hidden information appears if the auditors 
do not discover this information. To overcome this problem, auditors seek to signal to 
their quality by their actions in offering quality services (Bromwich, 1992). 
Furthermore, the need for external verification and assurance is supported by several 
key assertions. First, external verification improve environmental reporting because of 
the scrutiny inherent in such an examination. Second, external verification of periodic 
environmental reports will provide additional credibility and assurance to the annual 
financial reports with environmental considerations. Third, the threat of litigation and 
other actions by shareholders or regulatory authorities for misrepresentations in the 
periodic environmental reports may be reduced by third party verification. Therefore, 
external verification may prevent corporations from disclosing inaccurate or 
misleading information and ensuring that the disclosure is reliable. Fourth, without 
credibility offered by the external verification, some investors may consider the 
environmental reporting is a sort of `green wash' (Aeppel, 1993; Greer and Bruno, 
1996). In addition, the corporations in order to secure their reputations against the risk 
of disclosing untruthful information, many of them now have their disclosure verified 
(audited) by independent experts in social, environmental, and ethical field (Lann, 
2006). 
The auditing profession should widen its scope to encapsulate environmental issues as 
to keep its position as a source of credibility of information for the diversified 
stakeholders. Therefore, there is a crucial need to activate the role of audit profession 
regarding the environmental issues remain to maintain the auditor report of being 
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reliable by the diverse users (Mousa, 2004). The auditor's role in reducing the 
uncertainty about the low-quality information in GAAP financial statements would 
not be useful as providing a greater degree of comfort in consuming and relying on 
the unregulated reporting. It is believed that the new supplemental unregulated 
reporting offers a special opportunity to auditors to add much more value to their 
clients (users) by quality financial reporting consultation services (Miller and 
Bahnson, 2002). 
The Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE), the body of accounting 
professions in Europe have published its assurance on sustainability report and stated 
that `the assurance provider issues a report that enables users to place more credibility 
on the information reported by the company. Each user of the report may benefit 
through being able to take decisions based on information in sustainability report with 
less uncertainty about the information'. Moreover, the FEE report desire is to avoid 
creating an expectation gap `whereby a user mistakenly assumes that there is more 
assurance than is actually present' (FEE, 2002, p. 17). 
Moreover, only the supply of financial information leads to unproductive behaviors 
and outcomes, while providing the information demanded by the capital markets 
produce changes in the roles played by managers, auditors, financial statement users, 
standards setters, and regulators (Miller and Bahnson, 2002). Adams and Evans 
(2004) provided some assurance guidelines as key principles for the assurance of 
ethical, social, and environmental reports. The aim of these guidelines is to reduce the 
audit expectations gap. To apply such assurance the stakeholders need more power to 
issue such appointment of auditors. 
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Based on the previous discussion, it can be argued that expanding the auditor's role 
and responsibility, to include the auditing of voluntary disclosure, is expected to 
reduce the audit expectations gap more effective rather than the traditional approaches 
(ie. auditor's report, users' education, and standards settings). 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
It is concluded from the previously presented chapter that there are different theories 
that justifies the different voluntarily disclosure practices. First theory is legitimacy 
theory which argues that the different organizations are disclosing more information 
voluntarily as to satisfy the community and environment it is operating in. Therefore, 
legitimacy theory argue that any sort of additional environmental disclosure would 
satisfy the organizational environment regardless the conflict of interests that could 
occur in between the stakeholders whom part of the organizational environment 
assuming that they got equal power and same interests. Moreover, legitimacy theory 
the organizational community would be satisfied by environmental, social and ethical 
disclosures regardless the role of the other categories of voluntarily disclosed 
information. 
Second theory is signaling theory which indicates that additional disclosures would 
signal to the relevant parties and the capital market that the organization is disclosing 
such information to reduce information asymmetry. However, signaling theory 
ignored the credibility of these disclosures and the way it is going to be perceived by 
the relevant parties. 
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Third theory is conjunction between stakeholder and agency theories to form the 
stakeholder-agency theory. Agency theory would justifies the agent-principal 
relationship which leads to the existence of information expectations gap between 
management (agent) and shareholders (principal) from one side, and auditing 
expectations gap between auditors (agent) and shareholders (principal) from the other 
side. Hence, it is shown that shareholders are considered to be the common principal 
for both gaps. However, both agents, management and auditor, are required to satisfy 
not only the interests of the shareholders, but they are required to satisfy the 
conflicting interests of the different stakeholders. Therefore, agency theory alone 
would not describe these conflicting interests of other stakeholders, besides 
shareholders, which requires conjunction between stakeholders and agency theory 
where it is stated by Hill and Jones (1992) that stakeholder-agency theory is 
considered to be a generalized theory of agency. This would be comprised in the 
methodological chapter when selecting the research sample that reflects the different 
perceptions of stakeholders with their different backgrounds and interests. 
The previous discussion specified the meaning of the voluntary corporate disclosure 
its incentives, constraints, and its main categories in the light of the stakeholder- 
agency theory. The presented studies provide different evidences regarding the role of 
this audited voluntary disclosure in reducing both information expectations gap and 
auditing expectations gap. Many studies focused on the role of disclosure in reducing 
the information gap and solving the information asymmetry problem. The interesting 
point is that due to the agency conflicts, some studies showed that this role is still 
questionable due to the credibility and reliability of this type of disclosure. 
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Moreover, such studies requested the provision of an accepted degree of credibility 
and assurance to the voluntary disclosure to be reliable. At this extent appears the 
need for a third independent party to be involved in the voluntary disclosure provision 
process. This party is the auditor whom required extending his role to include auditing 
the voluntary disclosure and providing assurance services to his/her clients. Therefore, 
the need for the voluntary disclosure is associated with the need for additional 
auditing and assurance services to ensure the credibility of the disclosure and its 
usefulness for the decision-making. 
As a result of expanding the role of the auditor to include additional services towards 
satisfying the needs of the users, regarding the assurance of the voluntary disclosure, 
leads to reaching some of the user's expectations towards his roles and 
responsibilities. It is expected that this approaching from satisfying some of the users' 
needs and expectations would reduces the auditing expectations gap. To this extent, 
the research argues that the audited voluntary disclosure is playing dual roles. First, 
reducing the information expectations gap and solving the problem of information 
asymmetry. Second, role is expanding the auditor's role to include the provision the 
auditing and assurance services for such disclosure, which in turn might result in the 
reduction of the auditing expectations gap. 
Therefore, it is concluded that theoretically voluntary disclosure needs to be audited 
as to provide assurance for this type of disclosure. Consequently, credible voluntary 
disclosure would reduce the information expectations gap and solve the information 
asymmetry. While auditors performing the extended roles and responsibilities to 
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provide voluntary disclosure assurance, they would satisfy the diversified annual 
reports' users and in turn reduce the auditing expectations gap. 
As a result of this conclusion by prior studies, this argument needs to be examined 
empirically. The next part of the study is concerned by examining the validation of 
this theoretical argument. However, the empirical study needs to link between the 
audited voluntary disclosure as a proposed solution, and the auditing expectations gap 
as an existing problem that needs to be solved. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The cornerstone of the current research is the existence of the auditing expectations 
gap in Egypt investigated recently by Dixon et al. (2006). Therefore, the research 
would try to provide new solution for this problem. 
It is expected that the results of the research would be limited to the Egyptian context. 
The Egyptian economy is considered to be a unique system which has passed over 
different reform programs restructuring the Egyptian business culture as shown before 
in chapter two entitled background information on the Egyptian economy. The 
research would examine the effectiveness of the different solutions, beside the 
proposed solution, of reducing the auditing expectations gap. Therefore it would 
depend on primary and secondary data when applying the empirical analysis. 
The main objective of this chapter is to justify the used methodology that would be 
followed in the study's empirical analysis in the light of the research ontological and 
epistemological positions that stems from the employed theoretical background of the 
research shown by the theoretical framework chapter. Also the methodology shows 
the linkage between the two investigated empirical studies and justifies the vital 
importance of exploring the two sequential empirical chapters in the presented form. 
Moreover, the research focuses on measuring the level of voluntary disclosures 
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included in the annual reports of the Egyptian companies. It is argued that auditing 
this sort of voluntary disclosures would be a proposed solution for the reduction of the 
auditing expectations gap in Egypt investigated by Dixon et al. (2006). The first part 
of the empirical study depends on the designing a checklist that includes the main 
issues of the voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, the results of the checklist would 
form the index of the voluntary disclosure. 
Furthermore, the research justifies the investigated level of voluntary disclosure by 
examining the different determinants of this sort of disclosure. The determinants are 
classified into two groups: firms' characteristics (firm size, firm profitability, and 
industrial membership), and corporate governance characteristics (board size and role 
duality). Finally, the research used the questionnaire technique to examine the 
effectiveness of the traditional methods of reducing the auditing expectations gap 
compared to the auditing of voluntary disclosures as a proposed solution. 
5.2 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
There are different layers that link the basic assumptions to the employed 
methodological techniques. These layers range from the ontological and 
epistemological ones to the methodological techniques used to examine the research 
theoretical perspectives. These linked layers form a `justification of our choice and 
particular use of methodology and methods is something that reaches into the 
assumptions about reality that we bring to our work' (Crotty, 1998, p. 2). 
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The research process includes five layers named the research process 'onion'. The 
first layer is the research philosophy. Second, the research approach layer. Third, 
layer is the research strategy layer. Fourth, layer referred to the research time 
horizons. The fifth layer, data collection methods. Each layer includes different set of 
choices that the researcher is required to choose to imply his/her research (Saunders, 
2003). 
Referring to the discussion of the first research layer, it is argued by Ruddock (2001) 
that `ontology and epistemology are significant in that they illustrate how research 
begins by outlining theoretical suppositions that are taken as given by the research. 
Ontology relates to how we understand the nature of reality... epistemology refers to a 
theory of knowledge. It is related to ontology in that the nature of the reality you set 
out to explore influences the sort of knowledge that you can have of it 
methodological implications follow. Observations, measurement and interpretation 
depend on the understanding of the ontological and epistemological nature of the 
work at hand' (p. 27) 
Therefore, the choice of the suitable research philosophy that fits with the nature of 
the research is based on the ontological position of this sort of research. Ontology is 
described as `claims and assumptions that are made about the nature of social reality, 
claims about what exists, what it looks like, what units make it up and how these units 
interact with each other. In short, ontological assumptions are concerned with what 
we believe constitutes social reality' (Blaikie, 2000, p. 8). Therefore, the research 
ontological position is referred to the answer of the question of what is the nature of 
the investigated social and political reality; it is a theory of being (Marsh and Stoker, 
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2002). There are two ontological positions objectivism (realism) and subjectivism 
(constructionism) (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hirschheim, 1985; Chua, 1986; 
Hirschheim and Klein, 1989; Weber, 2003). 
Objectivism `is an ontological position that implies that social phenomena confront us 
as external facts that are beyond our reach of influence' (Bryman, 2001, p. 16). The 
Organization is considered to be social entities that have got a tangible reality. 
Therefore, it is characterised by being an object with an objective reality. On the other 
hand, subjectivism or construction asserts that `social phenomena and their meanings 
are continually being accomplished by their social actors. It implies that social 
phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction but that 
they are in a constant state of revision' (Bryman, 2001, p. 18). The subjectivism 
position argues that there is no objective reality. Therefore, this ontological position 
requires the construction of the research objective. 
It is noted that objectivists view the organisation's culture as something that the 
organisation `has'. On the other hand the subjectivist's view the culture as something 
that the organisation `is' as a process of continuing social enactment (Smircich, 1983). 
Epistemology is described as `the possible ways of gaining knowledge of social 
reality, whatever it is understood to be. In short, claims about how what is assumed to 
exist can be known' (Blaikie, 2000, p. 8). In other words, epistemology is the `theory 
or science of the method or grounds of knowledge' (OED 2004). Therefore, the 
epistemological position is considered to be the technical term of the theory of 
knowledge, and refers to how the world is seen. In other words, it is the theory of 
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knowledge (Marsh and Stoker, 2002). There are two main epistemological positions: 
positivism and interpretivism. 
Positivism refers to `working with an observable social reality and that the end 
product of such research can be law-like generalisations similar to those produced by 
the physical and natural scientists' (Remenyi et al., 1998, p. 32). According to this 
position the main objective of the theory is to generate hypotheses that can be 
examined. Hence, the role of research is to test theories and develop these theories if 
possible (Bryman and Bell, 2003). To do so, the researcher would employ highly 
structured methodology to facilitate replication (Gill and Johnson, 2002). 
Therefore, to generate a research strategy to collect the research data it is likely to use 
an existing theory to formulate the research hypotheses. These hypotheses are 
examined and confirmed, as a whole or partly, or refused, leading to further 
development of the examined theory (Saunders et al., 2003). The positivist approach 
assumes that `the researcher is independent of and neither affects nor is affected by 
the subject of the research' (Remenyi et al., 1998, p. 33). This is considered to be a 
critical assumption for the data collection process and the validity of the research's 
results. 
Interpretivism refers to `the details of the situation to understand the reality or perhaps 
a reality working behind them' (Remenyi et al., 1998, p. 35). Interpretivist 
epistemology indicates that researchers have to adopt `empathetic stance' which is 
considered to be a challenging task to enter the social world of the research subjects 
and understand their world from their point of view. This epistemological position is 
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associated with the constructionism ontology. Interpretivist argues that generalisation 
is not of crucial importance (Saunders et al., 2003). 
Moving to the second layer, research approaches are classified in to deductive (testing 
theory) approach and inductive (building theory) approach (Saunders et al., 2003). 
The deductive approach is considered to be the dominant approach in the natural 
sciences where `laws provide the basis of explanation, permit the anticipation of 
phenomena, predict their occurrence and therefore allow them to be controlled' 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997, p. 52). 
Moreover, Robson (2002) lists five sequential stages through which deductive 
research will progress: 
1. deducing a hypothesis (a testable proposition about the relationship between 
two or more events or concepts) from the theory; 
2. expressing the hypothesis in operational terms (that is, ones indicating exactly 
how the variables are to be measured), which propose a relationship between 
two specific variables; 
3. testing this operational hypothesis (this will involve an experiment or some 
other form of empirical inquiry); 
4. examining the specific outcome of the inquiry (it will either tend to confirm 
the theory, or indicate the need for its modification); 
5. if necessary, modifying the theory in the light of the findings. 
Therefore, the deductive research beginning point is the search to explain causal 
relationship between variables leading to the hypothesis development. Consequently, 
172 
it is required to collect quantitative data, or even qualitative data, to test the developed 
hypothesis using a highly structured methodology to facilitate replication of the 
findings (Gill and Johnson, 2002). 
The other alternative is the inductive approach. This approach begins with collecting 
and then analysing the data, the result of this analysis would lead to the formulation of 
a theory. Alternatively, the researcher may end with the same theory, but he/she 
would have gone about the production of that theory in an inductive way. Therefore, it 
is noted that theory would follow data rather than vice versa as in the deductive 
approach (Saunders et al., 2003). 
The current research argument is based on the agency-stakeholders theory which is 
considered to be an important part of the positive accounting theory (descriptive 
research). This sort of research has dominated since 1970s replacing normative 
accounting theory (prescriptive theories) prior to this date (Gaffikin, 2007). It is 
referred to the positive accounting theory as a neo-empirical research. That is due to 
the reliance on empiricism to establish theory from the best practices, as it is a 
systematic use of empirical evidence (Henderson et al., 1992). 
Ontologically neo-empirical research (positive accounting theory) adopts a strong 
realist (objective) position. It is believed that there is an objective reality that exists 
independent of any human agency (human involvement). As a result, human beings 
are viewed as interacting parties with reality passively, by means that they do not 
create reality but have to live around it. Therefore, human behaviour can be 
objectively observed and predicted as a respond to real world. Consequently, social 
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order is controllable and manageable (Gaffikin, 2005). 
The empiricism (positivism) is the epistemological foundation of positive accounting 
theory. The positivist epistemology is built on an assumption of dualism between 
subject and object. This position believes that it is possible to separate between the 
subject and the object that is required to be reached (Keat and Urry, 1975). Which 
indicates that role of the researcher is neutral showing that he/she does not influence 
what is being observed. This position is called `theory-neutral observational language' 
(Gill and Johnson, 1991). 
Both ontological and epistemological positions have direct impacts to the employed 
methodological approach. Accordingly, if the philosophical assumptions of positivism 
and its consequent of epistemological prescriptions are accepted, a nomothetic 
methodology would be suitable which means that it set out to establish law-like 
generalizations (Gill and Johnson, 1991). 
It is argued by Zimmerman (2002) that positive accounting theory advocates believe a 
theory is `succinctly stated, a theory explains what has been observed, tests 
empirically the hypothesis derived from the theory, and then predicts what is yet to be 
observed' (pp. 11 417-418). 
Consequently, based on the objectivist ontological position and positive 
epistemology, it would be suitable to use the hypothetico-deductive methodology. 
This methodological approach start with the development of a set of hypotheses, 
deduce what follows from them and then tests the conclusions to determine whether 
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they are in fact correct. 
Hypothetico-deductive methodological approach argues that data collection without 
hypothesis development is blind. Positivist epistemology is concerned with directly 
observed phenomena and with hypothetico-deductive testing of theories. The 
positivists develop a theory about the phenomenon and then test the theory. If the 
observation from the field and the theory match, the theory is true and if not, the 
theory is false (Keat and Urry, 1995; Giddens, 1979). 
As a key underlying assumption in whether quantitative or qualitative research 
approaches would be appropriate. It is believed that quantitative research considers 
objectivity not only desirable but rather an essential aspect of this type of research. On 
the other hand, qualitative research believed that objectivity is not possible therefore 
subjectivity is acknowledged for this sort of research. Consequently, with reference to 
the objective ontological position of the current research, it is believed that the 
quantitative research would be appropriate to test the developed hypotheses deduced 
from the stakeholder-agency theory employed by the study. 
The variable is considered to be central to quantitative research. Therefore, 
quantitative research uses the language of variables and is primarily concerned with 
the relationships between them to establish the causal structure of the variables. As 
this sort of research is based on the realist (subjective) ontology, variables are 
representation of the real world and can objectively determine the established causal 
relationship where the outcome can be generalized to other (similar) situations (set of 
variables). Moreover, while employing quantitative research the researcher remain 
175 
separate from data in order to maintain objectivity (Gaffikin, 2005). 
The survey technique is appropriate to this type of quantitative research and usually 
associated with the deductive approach (Saunders et al., 2003). Surveys give a picture 
of what many people think or report doing and are often used in descriptive or 
explanatory research (Neuman, 1997). The survey technique facilitates the research of 
the `what' question in the form of `how many' or `how much' (Yin, 2003). The logic 
of the traditional survey technique is strictly positivistic and the assumption of 
positivism is concerned with answering the `how many' or `how much' questions 
(Remenyi et al., 1998). 
Analytic or explanatory surveys aim to test a theory using the logic of experiment out 
of the laboratory into the field (Gill and Johnson, 2002). Surveys allow the collection 
of large amount of data from a sizable population in an economical way and give the 
researcher more control over the research process (Saunders et al., 2003). 
As a result, I am adopting an objectivism ontology and positive epistemological 
position because the current research is considered to be a neo-empirical research 
adopting a positive accounting theory (descriptive research) represented by the 
stakeholder/agency theory. Therefore, I am using aH ypothetico-deductive 
methodological approach because it fits with testing the employed theory by setting a 
set of research hypotheses. 
Consequently, I am employing a quantitative research to be appropriate with the 
objectivist ontological position to examine the set of developed 
hypotheses. 
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Strategically, the research is using the survey method to gather the required data based 
on two time horizons, longitudinal and cross-sectional, through two different sources, 
secondary and primary data respectively. The previously mentioned positions are 
presented in figure 5.2. 
5.3 RESEARCH PARADIGM 
Paradigm is a way of examining social phenomena from which understandings and 
explanations can be gained (Saundres et al., 2003). Research paradigm is based on 
the ontological and epistemological positions discussed above. Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) illustrate four research paradigms by the following figure: 
Figure 5.1 
Four Paradigms for the Analysis of Social Science 
Radical Change 
Subjectivist 
Radical 
Humanist 
Radical Structuralist 
Interpretive Functionalist 
Regulation 
Source: Developed from Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 22). 
Objectivist 
The previous figure shows four paradigms: functionalist; interpretive; radical 
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humanist; and radical structuralist. The four paradigms are arranged in correspond to 
four dimensions: radical change; regulation; subjectivist; and objectivist. Subjectivist 
and objectivist dimensions are discussed previously in the research philosophy 
section, where they present the research ontological positions. Radical change 
dimension adopts a critical perspective on organizational life. Regulatory perspective 
is less judgmental and critical. Regulations explain the way organizations are 
regulated and provide suggestions as to how they may be improved at present. On the 
other hand, radical change dimension explains organizational problems from the 
viewpoint of the existing state of affairs (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
The purposes of the four paradigms are noted by Burrell and Morgan (1979) as 
follows: 
1. Assisting researcher clarifying their assumptions regarding the nature of 
science and society; 
2. Offering useful understanding of the way in which researchers approach their 
work; 
3. To help researchers plotting their own route of research, to understand where 
it is possible to go and where they are going. 
In the top left corner the radical humanist paradigm is located within the subjectivist 
and radical change dimensions. Burrell and Morgan (1979) indicate that this is the 
state `to articulate ways in which humans can transcend the spiritual bonds and fetters 
which tie them into existing social patterns and thus realise their full potential' (p. 32). 
The ontological position that would fit with this state is subjectivist. 
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In the right corner of the quadrant is the radical structuralist paradigm. In this state, 
the researcher concern would be to approach the research with a view of fundamental 
change based upon an analysis of specific organizational phenomena (Saunders et al., 
2005). 
The bottom left corner of the quadrant contains the interpretive paradigm. Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) stated that this paradigm refers to that `everyday life is accorded the 
status of miraculous achievement' (p. 31). This state does not require the researcher to 
achieve change in the order of things, but it would be to understand and explain what 
is going on. 
Finally, the bottom right corner of the quadrant is the functionalist paradigm. It is 
noted by Burrell and Morgan (1979) that this paradigm `is often problem-oriented in 
approach, concerned to provide practical solutions to practical problems' (p. 26). This 
paradigm assumes that organizational are rational entities, in which rational 
explanations provide rational solutions to rational problems. Objectivism is the 
ontological position that fits with this paradigm. Referred to the research philosophy 
discussion, objectivism is the current research ontological position. Therefore, 
functionalist would be the appropriate paradigm that fits with the current research 
nature and philosophy. 
Consequently, the thesis would include two research models. The differentiation is 
based on the data collection method employed to perform the research objectives. The 
first method is secondary data collection using a checklist of different items that 
forms a secondary data index. The second method is a questionnaire that is employed 
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to gather primary data from the different survey respondents. 
Moreover, the two research models are classified based on the survey time horizons. 
The first model is considered to be a longitudinal survey for the selected sample. On 
the other hand, the second model is a cross-sectional survey over the different selected 
groups of respondents. 
Referred to the previous research philosophy and paradigm discussion, the following 
figure shows the research positions and models: 
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Figure 5.2 
Research Philosophy and Models 
Theory 
Stakeholder- 
agency Theory 
(Positive 
Accounting 
Theory) 
Ontology 
Objectivism 
Epistemology 
Positivism 
Methodology 
Hypothetico-Deductive 
Strategy 
Survey 
Time Horizon 
Longitudinal 
Technique 
Checklist 
(Secondary Data) 
Model (1) 
Examining the 
Level and 
Determinants of 
Voluntary Corporate 
Disclosure 
Paradigm 
Functionalist 
(Objectivist / 
Regulation) 
Time Horizon 
Cross-Sectional 
Technique 
Questionnaire 
(Primary Data) 
Model (2) 
Investigating the 
Effectiveness of the 
Different Methods of 
Reducing the 
Auditing 
Expectations Gap 
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5.4 MODEL (1) EXAMINING THE LEVEL AND DETERMINANTS OF 
VOLUNTARY CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
First model of the current thesis examines the level of voluntary disclosure in the 
Egyptian firms' annual reports. Moreover, the model justifies the examined level of 
voluntary disclosure by investigating the determinants of this sort of disclosure. The 
investigated determinants are classified in to two groups. First group of determinants 
is firm characteristics including; firm size; firm profitability; and industrial 
membership. Second group of determinants is corporate governance characteristics 
including; board size; and role duality. 
5.4.1 The Model Instrument 
This model is applied on the annual reports of the Egyptian companies using a pre- 
designed checklist that is referred to previous studies in which it is adapted and 
validated to fit with the Egyptian context. The employed checklist is constructed 
based on different studies that have examined the practices of one or more of 
voluntary disclosure categorise (see for example: Bar ako et al., 2006; Lajili and 
Zeghal, 2005; Gray et al., 1995a; Entwistle, 1999; Collett et al., 2005). The checklist 
would form a disclosure index that shows the level of voluntary corporate disclosure. 
The checklist is adapted to fit with the Egyptian culture through interviewing 10 
academic members regarding the validity of the checklist items to ensure that the 
items would be appropriate for the Egyptian companies' disclosures. The outcome of 
these interviews is the deletion of some items commonly indicated that they are not 
fitting with the Egyptian companies' disclosure practices. Therefore, the revised 
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checklist is reliable and valid to act as a benchmark for the Egyptian companies. The 
model aims to measure the disclosure level using un-weighted disclosure index or 
dichotomous scores to examine the presence or absence of the different items of the 
checklist using binary codes. The presence of the item in the annual reports is 
represented by (1), while the absence of the item in the annual reports is represented 
by (0). The checklist is composed of different sections showing the whole voluntary 
disclosure categories. The disclosure level is measured using the percentage of the 
present items over the whole disclosure index items. 
The voluntary corporate disclosure checklist is shown in the following table: 
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Table 5.1 
Voluntary Corporate Disclosure Checklist 
No Items 
1 General Disclosure' 
1.1 Mission & vision. 
1.2 Statement of corporate strategy. 
1.3 Top management names / experience. 
1.4 Majority of stockholders. (composition of shareholdings) 
1.5 Organization structure. 
1.6 Statement of corporate goals and objectives. 
1.7 Presentation of annual reports in Arabic & English. 
2 Market Disclosure2 
2.1 Industry size. 
2.2 Product (s) information. 
2.3 Customers' information. 
2.4 Supplier information. 
2.5 Market (s) information. 
2.6 Market share. 
2.7 Competitive environment. 
2.8 Productivity capacity. 
2.9 Productivity indicators. 
2.10 Marketing networks. 
2.11 Physical outputs. 
3 Risk management Disclosure3 
3.1 Financial risk (interest rate, currency, credit & fin. Instruments). 
3.2 Political risk (international business). 
3.3 Market risk (competition, market share). 
3.4 Technology risk (rapid change) 
3.5 Environmental risk (laws & regulations). 
3.6 Weather risk (climate conditions). 
3.7 Government regulation risk (control, regulation, taxation). 
3.8 Seasonality risk (natural seasonal patterns). 
3.9 Operational risk (technical, accidents, human error & loss). 
' adapted from Barako, D., et . al. 
(2006). 
2 adapted from Barako, D., et. al. 
(2006). 
3 adapted from Lajili, K. and 
Zeghal, D. (2005). 
184 
3.10 Cyclicality risk (natural cyclical trend). 
3.11 Supplier risk (key supplier). 
3.12 Natural resources risk (reserves quality and quantity). 
4 Financial Disclosure4 
4.1 Financial ratios & statistics. 
4.2 Industry ratios. 
4.3 Using charts, graphs, photos. 
4.4 Market Share price. 
4.5 Bank loans, mortgages and their uses. 
4.6 Information of capital structure. 
4.7 Information of dividends policy. 
4.8 Reasons and effects of acquisions / disposals on past results. 
4.9 Information of foreign sales. 
4.10 Financial information on quarterly basis. 
4.11 Changes in inventory level. 
4.12 Dividends per share compared with previous years. 
5 Human Resources Disclosure 5 
5.1 Consultation with employees. 
5.2 Employee share ownership. 
5.3 Employment data. 
5.4 Pension commitment. 
5.5 Employees' health & safety. 
5.6 Average compensation of employees. 
5.7 Percentage of foreign and national labour force. 
5.8 Information of training and employee development. 
5.9 Number of employees trained. 
5.10 Amount spent on training. 
6 Research & Development Disclosure6 
6.1 Inputs: Product. 
6.2 Inputs: People. 
6.3 Input: Infrastructure. 
6.4 Outputs: Actual achievements (Product development). 
6.5 Outputs: Actual achievements (Beyond Product development). 
6.6 Outputs: Potential achievements. 
6.7 Output: Product timing. 
4 adapted from Barako, D., et. al. (2006). 
5 adapted from Gray, R., et. al. (1995a). 
6 adapted from Entwistle, G. (1999). 
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6.8 Future expenditures. 
6.9 Financing Past, Present, Future. 
6.10 Accounting/ financing (Comparing prior years, competition, budget). 
6.11 R&D ratios. 
6.12 R&D as explanatory. 
6.13 Explaining R&D changes. 
7 Environmental, Social, and Ethical Disclosure? 
7.1 Environmental reports. 
7.2 Value added statement. 
7.3 Social activities & contributions. 
7.4 Environmental health safety. 
7.5 Energy information. 
7.6 Community information. 
7.7 Charitable donations information. 
7.8 Using photocopy of awarded certificates. 
7.9 Methods of provisions computation. 
7.10 Employment of disabilities. 
7.11 Ethical actions. 
8 Corporate Governance Disclosure 8 
8.1 Major share ownership and voting rights. 
8.2 List of board members. 
8.3 Picture of chairperson and/or other members. 
8.4 Board member qualifications. 
8.5 Number of shares held by members of the board. 
8.6 Remuneration policy for board members and key executives. 
8.7 Audit committee members: names, addresses, experiences. 
8.8 Corporate governance codes, policies, implementation extent. 
Total Corporate Voluntary Disclosure 
Total Corporate Voluntary Disclosure percentage (%) 
' adapted from Gray, R., et. al. (1995a). 
8 adapted from Collett, P., et. al. (2005). 
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5.4.2 The Sample Population 
The shown checklist is applied on the annual reports of the Egyptian companies in the 
most recent two years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 that shows disclosure level of the 
corporate voluntary disclosure. The selected companies are the 50 most active 
Companies based on the disclosure books issued by the Egyptian stock market (Cairo 
& Alexandria stock market) in June 2005 and June 2006. However, there are nine 
companies in 2004-2005, and 10 companies in 2005-2006 excluded from the sample 
which are the financial institutions, as they have their own regulations concerning the 
mandatory and the voluntary disclosures, so they are excluded to maintain the 
consistency of the annual reports of the different companies. 
The most active companies have been selected based on the activity of companies' 
stocks in the last six months of each year. To be considered as active, the stock must 
be traded at the stock exchange at least 50% of the working days during the last six 
months of each year. Arguably, the most active companies represent the highest level 
of voluntary disclosure among the listed companies. 
The self-selected companies based on the criteria of being most active, are restricted 
to the most recent two years as the capital market reform program and the disclosures 
standards updates are launched in year 2003 by preparing the first disclosure book of 
Cairo and Alexandria stock exchange in June 2003. Therefore, the most reliable data, 
consistent with these new disclosure reforms, are available from the beginning of year 
2004 which is the selected research sample. 
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5.4.3 Model Dependent and Independent Variables 
The variables of the model are shown by the following figure: 
Figure 5.3 
Examining the Level and Determinants of Voluntary Corporate Disclosure 
Dependent Variables 
Total Voluntary Corporate 
Disclosure Level 
General Disclosure 
Market Disclosure 
Risk Mgt. Disclosure 
Human Resources Disclosure 
Financial Disclosure 
R&D Disclosure 
Environmental, Social & Ethical 
Disclosure 
Corporate Governance 
Disclosure 
Independent Variables 
Firm 
Size 
Firm 
Profitability 
Industrial 
Membership 
L Board Size 
Role Duality 
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5.4.3.1 Dependent Variables Definition and Measurement 
The dependent variable of the current research is the Egyptian companies' total 
voluntary disclosure level. This variable is measured using the disclosure index of the 
Egyptian companies in the sample of the research. Moreover, the index is applied 
over a checklist that includes the different categories of the voluntary disclosure. The 
checklist includes all the possible categories of voluntary disclosure as the disclosure 
of the items of each group would contribute to the total voluntary disclosure's level. 
Furthermore, the index is based on examining of the presence or absence of the entire 
item in the annual reports, where the presence of the item in the annual report is 
represented by (1), while the absence of the item would be represented by (0), 
therefore the measurement of the voluntary disclosure level is based on binary (1 and 
0) scale. The different categories of total voluntary disclosure are presented as 
follows: 
5.4.3.1.1 General Disclosure 
The general disclosure includes additional illustration for the nature of the 
corporation. This disclosure is related to the format of the annual reports and 
its 
language. In addition, the main aspects of the corporation regarding the corporate 
strategy, objectives, and structure are included in the corporation's general 
disclosure 
(Barako et al., 2006). 
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5.4.3.1.2 Market Disclosure 
The corporation market disclosure includes different market indicators concerning the 
product, customers, suppliers, and markets information. These indicators reflect the 
competitive situation of the corporation. The disclosure is with a great importance for 
the corporation to identify the competitive opportunities and threats that affects the 
corporation. The voluntary disclosure regarding this type is dependent on the 
competitive status of the entire market (Barako et al., 2006). 
5.4.3.1.3 Risk Management Disclosure 
The risk management disclosure reflects the management's effectiveness towards 
dealing with different types of risk that their corporation is exposed to. Also, the 
uncertainty that is correlated with the different types of risk causes the relative 
importance such types of risk. On the other hand, the corporation is getting a 
competitive advantage by overcoming the risk and reducing the degree of risk 
exposure. The risk management disclosure is examined by the average of the different 
components of this group shown in the checklist (Lajili et al., 2005). 
5.4.3.1.4 Financial Disclosure 
The financial disclosure is represented by the voluntary financial disclosure regardless 
the mandatory financial disclosure. This group of disclosure shows the presentation of 
the financial information regarding the corporation's performance. In addition, this 
group includes the financial disclosures that are not obligated 
by the mandatory 
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disclosure as to offer a full picture about the performance of the corporation (Barako 
et al., 2006). 
5.4.3.1.5 Human Resources Disclosure 
The human disclosure is part of the company's social responsibilities. This disclosure 
represents the data concerning the employees of the corporation. Other information 
regarding the employees but having social perspective is included in the 
environmental, social, and ethical disclosure group (Gray et al., 1995a). 
5.4.3.1.6 Research and Development Disclosure 
The research and development disclosure is focusing on the research and development 
expenditures in the future. The research and development is categorized in to different 
perspectives. These perspectives are related to inputs, outputs, future expenditures, 
financing, and accounting / financial (Entwistle, 1999). 
5.4.3.1.7 Environmental, Social, and Ethical Disclosure 
The environmental, social, ethical disclosure is the most important information 
regarding the society. This group of disclosure is reflecting how the corporation is 
dealing with its environment, the social responsibility of the corporation, and the 
ethical actions regarding the different parties that the corporation is dealing with 
(Gray et al., 1995a). 
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The ethical reporting is defined as `those factors which are used by ethical investment 
funds to form an opinion on the appropriateness of an organization's business 
practices. This may not include much of the information on employees that is 
generally considered to fall within the definition of "social reporting", but may 
include other issues which are generally considered as "social reporting". 
Environmental reporting is clearly a subset of ethical reporting and generally also 
considered a subset of social reporting, but as the most common type of social and 
ethical reporting, warrants a separate label' (Adams, 2004; p. 731). 
As a result of the lack of ethical, social, and environmental reporting that may be 
reflected on the commitment to accountability and transparency (Gray, 1996; 
Elkington, 1997; Deegan, 2000; GRI 2002; Suggett and Goodsir, 2002). Therefore, 
there may be a significant expectation gap between users and preparers of the annual 
reports concerning the disclosure of the ethical, social, and environmental reporting 
(Corcoran, 1997). This expectation gap of ethical, social, and environmental reporting 
is also entitled "the green gap" (Gozali, 2000). 
There are different reasons that are motivating the companies to disclose the ethical, 
social, and environmental events in their financial reports and that may act as 
mechanisms to reduce the ethical, social, environmental reporting expectation gap: 
survival (Deegan and Blomquist, 2001; Deegan, 2002); corporate image (Gray, 1988; 
Deegan, 2000); forestalling corporate change (Deegan and Blomquist, 2001; Deegan, 
2002); unfavourable media attention (Neu, 1998; Hooghiemstra, 2000; Deegan, 
2002); industry affiliation (Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; 
KPMG 1999; Gray, 2001; Newson and deegan, 2002); financial performance (Clarke, 
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1998; Stanwick and Stanwick, 1998); corporate social responsibility (Gelb and 
Strawser 2001; Swift 2001); response to community and societal concerns (Gray, 
1998; Clarke, 1998; KPMG 1999; Hooghiemstra, 2000; Wilmshurst and Forst, 2000; 
Deegan and Blomquist, 2001; Deegan, 2002); company size (Gray, 1995b; Deegan 
and Gordon, 1996; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Neu, 1998; Stanwick, 1998; KPMG 
1999; Gray, 2001) and country of origin (KPMG 1999; Gray, 2001; Newson and 
Deegan, 2002). 
5.4.3.1.8 Corporate Governance Disclosure 
The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) development listed rule required the listed 
companies to disclose in its annual reports a statement indicated the corporate 
governance practices followed during the reporting period. Similar rule was applied in 
the London Stock Exchange based on the recommendations of Cadbury Committee 
report (1992) concerning the corporate governance issues in the UK. The ASX rule 
has not mentioned practices to be disclosed but referred to an indicative list of items 
that are recommended to be disclosed in its issued `Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations'. However, Carson (1996) specified 
that the corporate governance disclosure would vary in terms of comprehensiveness 
and specificity (Collett and Harsky, 2005). 
5.4.3.2 Independent Variables Definition and Measurement 
The model includes two groups of determinants that affect the level of corporate 
voluntary disclosure as follows: 
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5.4.3.2.1 Firm Characteristics 
The firm characteristics are vital determinants of the voluntary disclosure. There are 
increasing interests in the studies of accounting disclosures since the 1960s. 
Considerable academic research has investigated the relationship between corporate 
characteristics and voluntary disclosures in developed and developing countries 
(Alsaeed, 2006). Prior empirical evidence suggests that firm characteristics 
differentiate the level of voluntary disclosure by the different companies (e. g. 
Chandra, 1989; Lee and Morse, 1990; Ward, 1998). 
Regarding this relationship between disclosure level and firm characteristics, there are 
many studies applied in the developed countries as in as in the UK (Spero, 1979; 
Firth, 1979); the USA (Buzby, 1975; Lang and Lundholm, 1993); Canada (Belkaoui 
and Kahl, 1978); Sweden (Cooke, 1989); Switzerland (Raffournier, 1995); Japan 
(Cooke, 1992); Mexico (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987); and New Zealand (McNally 
et al., 1982). 
Few disclosure studies have been applied in the developing countries as in Egypt 
(Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Hassan et al., 2006); Jordan (Naser et al., 2002); 
Nigeria (Wallace, 1987); Saudi Arabia (Alsaeed, 2006); Bangladesh (Ahmed and 
Nicholls, 1994); India (Singhvi, 1968); Malaysia (Hossain et al., 1994); Zimbabwe 
(Owusu-Ansah, 1998); Kenya (Barako et al., 2006) . 
In addition, some comparative 
studies have examined the relationship between corporate characteristics and 
voluntary disclosures (e. g. Barrett, 1977; Zarzeski, 1996; Camfferman and Cooke, 
2002). 
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Among the different studies, each study selects firm characteristics to be examined in 
relation to the level of voluntary information disclosed by the entire companies. The 
research focuses on examining the relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm 
size, firm profitability, and industrial membership as representative of firm 
characteristics. 
5.4.3.2.1.1 Firm Size 
Regarding firm size, Jensen and Meckling (1976) assumed that the large sized firms 
have the incentive to disclose this sort of information to avoid political costs 
represented in the form of tight regulations and increasing tax and social obligations. 
Referred to the agency theory, larger firms disclose more information as they have 
higher agency costs and they are more sensitive to political cost (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman, 1981) Moreover, the advocates of 
stakeholder theory argues that firms are expected to have high level of voluntary 
disclosure in order to be registered in the stock market to attract more funds at lower 
cost of capital, as in this case they have greater responsibility to provide information 
to customers, suppliers, analysts and government (Choi, 1973; Cooke, 1991). It is 
mentioned that `the variable most consistently reported as significant in studies 
examining differences across firms in their disclosure policy is firm size' (Foster, 
1986; p. 44). 
Moreover, most of the studies provide evidence that there is a significant positive 
relationship between firm size and level of voluntary disclosure (Buzby, 1975; Firth, 
1979; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1992; Wallace et al. 1994; Raffournier, 
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1995; Zarzeski, 1996; McNally et al., 1982, McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; 
Hossain and Adams, 1995; Meek et al., 1995; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Choon et al., 
2000; Lee and Morse, 1990; Ward, 1998). In addition to other studies suggested that 
there is a positive relationship between environmental voluntary disclosure and size of 
the entity (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Choi, 1999; Williams, 1999; Cormier and 
Magnan, 2003). 
The firm size could be measured by different methods, depending on the previous 
studies; the number of shareholders, number of employees, total market value of the 
firm, total assets, sales volume (Salama, 2003). Regarding the research, the firm size 
would be measured using: total assets, as the examined sample is the 50 most active 
companies in the Egyptian stock market as the other measures would be redundant for 
these companies. 
The firm size of a certain corporation is considered to be the most statistically 
significant variable examining the differences between voluntary reporting practices 
of firms (McNally et al., 1982, McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; Hossain and 
Adams, 1995; Meek et al., 1995; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Choon, Smith and 
Taylor, 2000). Moreover, the previous literature offers evidences that the firm size is 
positively related to the voluntary disclosure level (Lee and Morse, 1990; Ward, 
1998). Consequently, the model tests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.1 - There is a positive significant relationship 
between firm size and 
voluntary corporate disclosure. 
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5.4.3.2.1.2 Firm Profitability 
Concerning the firm profitability, it is a reflection of the firm's performance for a 
specific year. Therefore, profitable firms choose to disclose more voluntary 
accounting information to distinguish themselves from the less profitable ones 
(Foster, 1986). It is suggested by Singhvi and Desai (1971) that stakeholder theory 
argues that the firm performing high profitability, induce management to disclose 
more information to attract the shareholders towards their high performance to 
increase their compensation. While on the other hand, low profitable companies avoid 
disclosing more information to hide their poor performance (Ullman, 1985; Richard, 
1992, Meek et al., 1995). However, there is unclear direction of the relationship 
between firm profitability and the level of disclosed information. It is emphasized that 
the firm profitability measures the level of disclosure in New Zealand (McNally et al., 
1982). On the other hand, it is found by Camfferman and Cooke (2002) that there is a 
significant negative relationship between firm profitability and the amount of 
information disclosed by the British firms. Finally, it is observed that there is no 
significant relationship between the disclosure of the Spanish firms and their 
profitability (Wallace et al., 1994). 
The profitability of the firm is mainly based on the revenues and the expenses of the 
entire accounting period, therefore profitability could be a major factor in the decision 
to produce summarized version of the annual reports (Gambino, 1987; Simon, 1988; 
Schneider, 1988; Hamilton, 1990; Lee and Morse, 1990) or detailed statements beside 
voluntary disclosure reports. In the current study the return on equity (ROE) 
is 
employed as a proxy for the firm profitability. Therefore, the firm profitability would 
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be a representative justification for the level of the voluntary disclosure level by the 
Egyptian companies. Consequently, the model tests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.2 - There is a positive significant relationship between firm 
profitability and voluntary corporate disclosure. 
5.4.3.2.1.3 Industrial Membership 
A great attention was drawn towards the bandwagon effect that could be produced by 
the leading firms in certain industry on the level of disclosure of the other firms 
working in the same industry (Cooke, 1989). Previous studies have not provided clear 
relationship between type of industry and level of voluntary disclosure. Some studies 
emphasized that there is a significant relationship between industry type and 
voluntary disclosure (Ness and Mirza, 1991; Cooke, 1992; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Ward, 1998; Choi, 1999; Williams, 1999; Mahmood, 
1999; Brown et al., 2004). However, other studies found that there is insignificant 
relationship between voluntary disclosure level and industry type (Lee and Morse's, 
1990; Gray et al., 1995b; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Brown, 2005). 
The industrial membership is an important factor that affects the level of the voluntary 
disclosure of the different corporations. Moreover, the firm's accounting policy, 
concerning the level of disclosure, is affected by the industry to which the firm 
belongs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1996). 
Furthermore, the industrial membership in the annual reports of the Egyptian 
companies is represented by the sector that the companies are member of and these 
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sectors could be represented by the following table: 
Table 5.2 
The Sectors of the 50 Most Active Companies 
Sector Number of 
Companies 
(2004 - 2005) 
Number of 
Companies 
(2005-2006) 
Building Materials & Constructions. 12 10 
Chemical Industry. 4 5 
Communications Industry. 3 3 
Electric Equipments & Engineering. 2 1 
Entertainment. 2 2 
Food & Beverage. 3 2 
Health & Pharmacy. 1 2 
Housing & Real Estate. 2 4 
Media. 1 1 
Mills & Storage. 5 2 
Mining & Gas. 1 1 
Textiles & Clothing. 4 5 
Canal Shipping Agencies 1 1 
Information Technology 0 1 
Financial services. 9 10 
Total 50 50 
Consequently, the model tests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.3 - There is a negative significant relationship between industrial 
membership and voluntary corporate disclosure. 
5.4.3.2.2 Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Agency theory represents the cornerstone of most of the studies regarding corporate 
governance characteristics, as these studies are employing the logic of the principal- 
199 
agent relationship towards the effectiveness of the corporate governance practices 
leading to firm behaviors that are consistent with owners' expectations, and achieving 
superior firm performance due to the reduction of agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Eisenhardt, 1985; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a). 
There are different definitions for the corporate governance, but the classical 
definition of corporate governance is `the system by which organizations are directed 
and controlled. Moreover, the corporate governance has been described as `the 
process and structure used to direct and manage the business affairs of the corporation 
with the objective of enhancing shareholder value' (Dey, 1994; p: 7). 
5.4.3.2.2.1 Board Size 
Regarding corporate governance characteristics, previous studies concerned with 
board size showed mixed findings. Board size represents the number of directors 
within the board. It is argued that the board size needs to be reduced to improve board 
effectiveness (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Kesner and Johnson, 1990), 
while to maintain the agency theory logic it is recommended to raise the board size 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). At the same time, big boards would be more 
diversified that would help the companies to secure critical resources and reduce 
environmental uncertainties (Pfeffer, 1987; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Goodstein et al., 
1994). Other studies mentioned that board size does matter on the corporate 
performance and corporate disclosures (Monks and Minow, 1995). 
From stakeholder theory perspective, large board size is believed to enable a high 
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degree of independency as it enables the election of a broad range of directors that 
lead to diversification of the board composition. This variation addresses wider scope 
for the stakeholder's interests, which leads to greater propensity to disclose more 
information (Williams, 2002). Moreover, it is argued that the large size of the board 
of directors increases the control and the opportunity to increase the manipulation by 
the management (Jensen, 1993). While, it is observed that larger board size makes it 
dysfunctional board which could limit the disclosure of information. Consequently, 
the model tests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.4 - There is insignificant relationship between board size and voluntary 
corporate disclosure. 
5.4.3.2.2.2 Role Duality 
Duality refers to the situation where the same person is holding the position of chief 
executive officer (CEO) and at the same time holds the position of Chairperson of the 
board of directors. In the sense of the stakeholder theory and the agency theory this 
situation affects the independency status and the bias as this person would accumulate 
much power by driving two critical positions at the same time (Williams, 2002). 
Chief Executive Director (CEO) role duality means that the CEO is also holding the 
chairman position of the board of directors, so there are dual roles played by the same 
person (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994). Agency theory argue that the separation 
between the two roles, the absence of role duality, provide monitoring and balances 
over managements' performance (Argenti, 1976; Rechner and Dalton, 1991; 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Forker, 1992; Shamser and Annuar, 1993, Stiles and 
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Taylor, 1993; Blackburn, 1994). However, there are other views, based on the 
stewardship theory, suggest that the existence of role duality would improve the board 
effectiveness in performing a good control on the board and selection of the other 
board members (Eisenhardt, 1989; Dahya et al., 1996; Rechner and Dalton, 1991; 
Donaldson and Davies, 1991). Therefore, it is argued that the separation of the roles 
of chairman and chief executive will increase monitoring quality and improve the 
level of disclosure (Forker, 1992). However, some studies argue that there is no 
association between CEO duality and the extent of voluntary disclosure of 
information (Haniffa and Cooke, 2000). 
Moreover, the relationship between the role duality and voluntary disclosure is 
arguable. Empirically, it is found that there is a negative relationship between role 
duality and voluntary disclosure (Forker, 1992). While in other study it is argued that 
there is no significant relationship between role duality and the amount of voluntary 
disclosure (Ho and Wong, 2001). Consequently, the model tests the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.5 - There is insignificant relationship 
between role duality and 
voluntary corporate disclosure. 
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5.4.4 Model Specification 
Econometric model (1. a) is shown as follows: 
TVCD=ßo+ß1 FS+ß2FP+ß3IM+ ß4BS+ ß5RD+e 
While, econometric model (1. b) is shown as follows: 
VCDC=ßo+ßl FS+ß2FP+ß3IM+ ß4BS+ ß5RD +e 
Where: 
TVCD = Total Voluntary Corporate Disclosure; 
VCDC = Voluntary Corporate Disclosure Category; 
(30 = Intercept; 
(31 to ß5 = Coefficient of slope parameters; 
E= Error term; 
FS = Firm Size; 
FP = Firm Profitability; 
IM = Industrial Membership. 
BS = Board Size; and 
RD = Role Duality. 
5.4.5 Econometric Model Statistical Tests 
The model is analyzed using descriptive statistics of the collected data using Pearson 
correlation to identify the correlation between the dependent and independent 
variables. Besides using Pie Chart figure to show the contribution of each disclosure 
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category to the whole voluntary disclosure level. 
The regression models would be applied on two dimensions. First, is investigating the 
association between total voluntary disclosure, as a dependent variable, and the 
different determinants of voluntary disclosure, as independent variables. Second, 
examination of the association between the different categories of voluntary 
disclosure, as dependent variables, and the different determinants of voluntary 
disclosure, as independent variables. 
The hypotheses are examined using cross sectional panel regression. A dummy 
variable is used to differentiate between the two groups of the examined sample of the 
two years 2004 - 2005 (41 observations) and 2005 - 2006 (40 observations). A 
pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression is applied in comparison to the panel 
regression as it deals with the whole observations as one unit with the same intercept 
and same error distribution. The standard error robust regression test would be used 
specially that the sample size is small (41 and 40 companies) and the data is not 
normally distributed. The data is analyzed under the assumption of a confidence level 
of 99%, 95%, and 90%. A dummy variable of 0 and 1 values is inhibited in the 
analysis to differentiate between the two panels as 0 represents year 2004-2005 (panel 
A), while 1 represents year 2005-2006 (panel B). The model is statistically analyzed 
using STATA 9 statistical package. 
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5.5 MODEL (2) INVISTIGATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 
DIFFERENT METHODS OF REDUCING THE AUDITING EXPECTATIONS 
GAP 
Second model of the current thesis examines the existence of the auditing 
expectations gap in Egypt. Moreover, the model investigates the effectiveness of the 
traditional methods of reducing the existing gap including; audit report form; users' 
education; and standards settings. Also, the model examines the effectiveness of the 
traditional methods in comparison to the role of the voluntary disclosures auditing as 
a proposed solution by the current research. 
5.5.1 The Model Instrument 
The model is applied using the questionnaire technique which is designed based on 5- 
Point Likert scale that include 5 different scales for the answers on the questions; 
strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree. These answers are 
numbered from 1 to 5.1 represents the strongly agree opinion, 2 represents the agree 
opinion, 3 is the neutral, 4 is the disagree opinion, and 5 is the strongly disagree 
opinion. The questionnaire aims to measure the perceptions of the different categories 
of the sample towards the different solutions of reducing the auditing expectations 
gap. The questionnaire is constructed based on previous studies that have examined 
the existence of auditing expectations gap and the different solution to reduce this gap 
The last section of the questionnaire, the role of voluntary corporate disclosure in 
reducing auditing expectations gap, is the checklist employed in the first model. This 
section is already validated and adapted to fit with the Egyptian context as previously 
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mentioned. Moreover, the other sections were used before in different studies in 
different developing countries which would fit with the Egyptian context (see for 
example: Best and Buckby, 1999; Fadzly and Ahmad, 2004; Manson and Zaman, 
2000; Dewing and Russell, 2002; Barako et al., 2006; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Gray 
et al., 1995; Entwistle, 1999; Collett et al., 2005). 
There are types of questionnaire to gather the research required data. The following 
figure provides a representation of the typology of questionnaires: 
Figure 5.4 
Types of Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
Self-administrated Interviewer administrated 
On-line Postal Delivery and 
questionnaire questionnaire collection 
questionnaire 
Source: Saunders et al. (2003, p. 282) 
Telephone Structured 
questionnaire interview 
The current research used the self administrated delivery and collection questionnaire 
to distribute and then collect the questionnaire hand to hand as to ensure having 
acceptable response rate which affect the validity of the research results. 
The questionnaire is validated by applying pilot study of randomly selected 10 
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subjects of each group of the sample that's to examine the reliability of the 
questionnaire. The results of the pilot study are similar to the findings of the analysis 
of the whole sample. The questionnaire is distributed in Arabic which is the formal 
language of Egypt. To overcome any translation problems back-to-back a translation 
is applied to the questionnaire to Arabic and then to English again to guarantee that 
the questionnaire is valid regarding the translation issue. 
The model is used to test the last hypothesis of the study regarding the examination of 
different methods of reducing the auditing expectation gap effectiveness, including 
the proposed solution, simultaneously. The analysis includes comparing the 
effectiveness of the different methods to each other and examining whether the results 
satisfies the hypothesis. The agreement or disagreement upon the entire statement 
shows the usefulness of this item in reducing the auditing expectation gap. Although 
the statement is useful in reducing such gap, it could not be effective in performing 
the required reduction of the gap. Therefore, there is further test used to examine the 
effectiveness of each statement which shows the overall effectiveness of the examined 
method of reducing the existing expectations gap. 
The Auditing expectations gap questionnaire is shown as follows: 
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Table 5.3 
Auditing Expectations Gap Questionnaire 
Dear respondent, 
I wish to have your attention towards my research. It aims to investigate the existence 
of the auditing expectations gap in Egypt and the different methods that reduces this 
gap. The research uses the questionnaire technique as to capture the data about the 
different perceptions of different samples about this problem. 
The questionnaire is designed to examine your perceptions concerning the auditing 
expectations gap in Egypt, and the effective solution to this problem. Your response 
would contribute to reaching the most effective solution that fits with the Egyptian 
context. 
Finally, I would like to thank you for having your attention towards this 
questionnaire, which considered being the corner stone of the research results. 
Thanks for your time and attention 
The Researcher 
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Section I 
Demographic Information9 
Please tick in front of the answer that fits with your personal information: 
1. Do you have Accounting qualifications? 
Yes [] No [] 
2. Do you have accounting experience? 
Yes [] No [] 
3. If yes, how many years? 
2-5 years []5- 10 years [] Over 10 years [] 
4. What is your occupation? 
Auditor [] Banker [] Investor [] Academic [] 
5. How long have you been in your present occupation? 
2-5 years []5- 10 years [] Over 10 years [] 
6. Do you wish to have a copy of the analyzed results emailed to you? 
Yes [] No [] 
7. If yes, please provide your email address. 
9 adapted from Best, P. J. and Buckby, 
S. (1999). 
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Section II 
Investigating the Existence of the Auditing Expectations Gap'° 
Identify to which extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
1-Management is responsible 
for producing the financial 1 2 3 4 5 
statements of the company. 
2-The auditor is responsible 
for the soundness of the 
1 2 3 4 5 
internal control structure of 
the company. 
3-The auditors is legally 
responsible only to the 1 2 3 4 5 
shareholders. 
4-The auditor is responsible 
for maintaining accounting 1 2 3 4 5 
records of the company. 
5-The auditor is responsible 
1 2 3 4 5 
for detecting all fraud. 
6-Management should be held 
responsible if the company 1 2 3 4 5 
goes bankrupt due to fraud. 
7-The auditor is responsible 
1 2 3 4 5 
for preventing fraud. 
8-The auditor is unbiased and 
objective. 
1 2 3 4 5 
IV 
adapted from Fadzly, M. N. and Ahmad, Z. (2004). 
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Statements Strongly A ree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
A ree Disagree 
9-The financial statements 
1 2 3 4 5 
give a true and fair view. 
10-Users can have absolute 
assurance that the financial 
1 2 3 4 5 
statements contain no material 
misstatements. 
11-The company is free from 
1 2 3 4 5 
fraud. 
12-The extent of audit work 
performed is clearly explained 1 2 3 4 5 
in the audit report. 
13-The extent of assurance 
given by the auditor is clearly 1 2 3 4 5 
indicated in the audit report. 
14-The auditor is trustworthy. 1 2 3 4 5 
15-The audited financial 
statements are useful in 
1 2 3 4 5 
monitoring the company's 
performance. 
16-The audited financial 
statements are useful for 1 2 3 
4 5 
decision making. 
17-The company is well 
1 2 3 4 5 
managed. 
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Section III 
The Role of Audit Report Form in Reducing the Auditing Expectations Gap11 
Identify to which extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements 
in the light of reducing the auditing expectations gap: 
Statements Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
1-The inclusion of an audit 
report enhances the credibility 
of financial statement. 
2-The purpose of the audit is 
clearly communicated in the 
audit report. 
3-The audit report is readable 
document. 
4-The audit report clearly 
summarizes the extent and 
nature of the evidence 
gathered in the formation of 
the audit opinion. 
5-The audit report clearly 
indicates the role of judgment 
in the formation of the audit 
opinion. 
6-The auditors' responsibility 
in relation to fraud is clearly 
indicated in the audit report. 
2345 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2345 
2345 
2345 
II 
adapted from Manson, S. and Zaman, M. 
(2000). 
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Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
7-The auditors' responsibility 
in relation to any illegal acts 
performed by the client is 1 2345 
clearly indicated in the audit 
report. 
8-In the future there should be 
an explicit statement in the 
audit report of the auditors' 1 2345 
assessment of the going 
concern status of the client. 
9-In the future there should be 
an explicit statement in the 
audit report of the auditors' 1 2345 
findings in relation to fraud or 
illegal acts. 
10-It should be useful for the 
auditor to indicate either in the 
audit report or in a separate 
1 2345 
statement, the extent of their 
examination of the chairman's 
statement. 
11-It should be useful for the 
auditor to indicate either in the 
audit report or in a separate 
statement, the extent of their 
examination of the director's 
1 2345 
report. 
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Statements Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
12-It should be useful for the 
auditor to indicate either in the 
audit report or in a separate 
12345 
statement, the extent of their 
examination of the operating 
and financial review. 
13- It should be useful for the 
auditor to indicate either in the 
audit report or in a separate 
statement, the extent of their 
12345 
examination of any other 
information included in the 
annual report but outside the 
financial statements. 
14-The value of the audit 
would be enhanced if the 
auditor reported, either in the 
audit report or in a separate 
12345 
statement, in respect of each 
audit engagement the scope of 
their study of the client's 
internal control. 
15-The value of the audit 
would be enhanced if the 
auditor reported, either in the 
audit report or in a separate 
statement, in respect of each 12345 
audit engagement the extent to 
which they relied on internal 
controls. 
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Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
16- The value of the audit 
would be enhanced if the 
auditor reported, either in the 
audit report or in a separate 1 234 5 
statement, in respect of each 
audit engagement the 
materiality level they used. 
17-The value of the audit 
would be enhanced if, for each 
audit, the report explained the 
1 234 5 
most difficult issues arising in 
the audit and how they had 
been resolved. 
18-An auditor should always 
report on corporate 
1 234 5 
governance issues for which 
they have a responsibility. 
19-The directors' statement in 
respect of corporate 1 234 5 
governance is useful. 
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Section IV 
The Role of Users' Education in Reducing the Auditing Expectations Gap'2 
Identify to which extent do you agree or disagree that educating users towards 
the following issues would contribute to the reduction of the auditing 
expectations gap: 
Statements Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
1-The auditor's responsibility 
for the soundness of the 1 
internal control structure of 
the company. 
2-The auditor's legal 
responsibility to the different 
1 
users. 
3-The auditor's responsibility 
for maintaining accounting 
1 
records of the company. 
4-The auditor's responsibility 1 
for detecting all fraud. 
5-The auditor's responsibility 1 
for preventing all fraud. 
6-The auditor's unbiased and 1 
objectivity. 
7-The financial statements' 1 
true and fair view. 
8-The assurance that the 
financial statements contain 
1 
no material misstatements. 
9-The extent of audit work 
performed explained in the 1 
audit report. 
" 
adapted from Fadzly, M. N. and Ahmad, Z. (2004). 
2345 
2345 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2345 
2345 
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Statements 
Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
10-The extent of assurance 
given by the auditor indicated 
1 2 3 4 5 
in the audit report. 
11-The auditor trustworthy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12-The audited financial 
statements usefulness in 1 2 3 4 5 
monitoring the company's 
performance. 
13-The audited financial 
statements usefulness for 
1 2 3 4 5 
decision making. 
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Section V 
The Role of Standards Settings in Reducing the Auditing Expectations Gap13 
Identify to which extent do you agree or disagree that the following standards 
regarding extending the auditors' roles and responsibilities would contribute to 
the reduction of the auditing expectations gap: 
Statements Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
1- Increasing regulation 
governing auditor 1 2 3 4 5 
appointment. 
2- Increasing regulation 
governing provision of non- 1 2 3 4 5 
audit services. 
3- Increasing regulation 
governing rotation of audit 1 2 3 4 5 
partner. 
4- Increasing regulation 
governing rotation of audit 1 2 3 4 5 
firm. 
5-Extending auditor 
responsibilities as regards 1 2 3 4 5 
fraud detection. 
6-Extending auditor 
responsibilities as regards 1 2 3 4 5 
going concern certification. 
7-Extending auditor 
responsibilities as regards 1 2 3 
4 5 
wider stakeholders. 
' 
adapted from Dewing, I. P., and Russell, P. 0. (2002). 
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Statements Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
8- Assigning independent 
body responsible for 
12345 
monitoring of audit work. 
9- Assigning independent 
body responsible for 12345 
disciplining of auditors. 
10- Joint and several liabilities 
of audit partners on its own 
12345 
provide assurance to the 
quality of auditors' work. 
11- Liability of auditors 
12345 
should be restricted. 
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Section VI 
The Role of Voluntary Corporate Disclosure Auditing in Reducing the 
Auditing Expectations Gap 
Identify to which extent do you agree or disagree that expanding the auditors' 
roles and responsibilities to include the provision of assurance for the following 
voluntary corporate disclosures would contribute to the reduction of the auditing 
expectations gap: 
Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
1. General Disclosure 14 
1.1 Mission & vision. 1 2 3 4 5 
1.2 Statement of corporate 
1 2 3 4 5 
strategy. 
1.3 Top management names / 
1 2 3 4 5 
experience. 
1.4 Majority of stockholders 
1 2 3 4 5 
(composition of shareholdings). 
1.5 Organization structure. 1 2 3 4 5 
1.6 Statement of corporate goals 
1 2 3 4 5 
and objectives. 
1.7 Presentation of annual reports 
1 2 3 4 5 
in Arabic & English. 
2. Market Disclosure15 
2.1 Industry size. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.2 Product (s) information. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.3 Customers' information. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.4 Supplier information. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.5 Market (s) information. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.6 Market share. 1 2 3 4 5 
14 adapted from Barako, D., et al. (2006). 
15 adapted from Barako, D., et al. (2006). 
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Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
2.7 Competitive environment. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.8 Productivity capacity. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.9 Productivity indicators. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.10 Marketing networks. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.11 Physical outputs. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Risk Management 
Disclosure16 
3.1 Financial risk (interest rate, 
currency, credit & fin. 1 2 3 4 5 
Instruments). 
3.2 Political risk (international 
1 2 3 4 5 
business). 
3.3 Market risk (competition, 
1 2 3 4 5 
market share). 
3.4 Technology risk (rapid 
1 2 3 4 5 
change) 
3.5 Environmental risk (laws & 
1 2 3 4 5 
regulations). 
3.6 Weather risk (climate 
1 2 3 4 5 
conditions). 
3.7 Government regulation risk 
1 2 3 4 5 
(control, regulation, taxation). 
3.8 Seasonality risk (natural 
1 2 3 4 5 
seasonal patterns). 
3.9 Operational risk (technical, 
1 2 3 4 5 
accidents, human error & loss). 
3.10 Cyclicality risk (natural 
cyclical trend). 
1 2 3 4 5 
16 adapted from Lajili, K. and Zeghal, D. (2005). 
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Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
3.12 Natural resources risk 
1 2 3 4 5 
(reserves quality and quantity). 
4. Financial Disclosure17 
4.1 Financial ratios & statistics. 1 2 3 4 5 
4.2 Industry ratios. 1 2 3 4 5 
4.3 Using charts, graphs, photos. 1 2 3 4 5 
4.4 Market Share price. 1 2 3 4 5 
4.5 Bank loans, mortgages and 
1 2 3 4 5 
their uses. 
4.6 Information of capital 
1 2 3 4 5 
structure. 
4.7 Information of dividends 
1 2 3 4 5 
policy. 
4.8 Reasons and effects of 
acquisions / disposals on past 1 2 3 4 5 
results. 
4.9 Information of foreign sales. 1 2 3 4 5 
4.10 Financial information on 
1 2 3 4 5 
quarterly basis. 
4.11 Changes in inventory level. 1 2 3 4 5 
4.12 Dividends per share 
1 2 3 4 5 
compared with previous years. 
5. Human Resources 
Disclosure18 
5.1 Consultation with employees. 1 2 3 4 5 
5.2 Employee share ownership. 1 2 3 
4 5 
5.3 Employment data. 1 2 3 4 5 
5.4 Pension commitment. 1 2 3 
4 5 
5.5 Employees health & safety. 1 2 3 4 5 
17 adapted from Barako, D., et al. (2006). 
18 adapted from Gray, R., et al. (1995). 
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Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
5.6 Average compensation of 
1 2 3 4 5 
employees. 
5.7 Percentage of foreign and 
1 2 3 4 5 
national labour force. 
5.8 Information of training and 
1 2 3 4 5 
employee development. 
5.9 Number of employees 
1 2 3 4 5 
trained. 
5.10 Amount spent on training. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Research & Development 
Disclosure19 
6.1 Inputs: Product. 1 2 3 4 5 
6.2 Inputs: People. 1 2 3 4 5 
6.3 Input: Infrastructure. 1 2 3 4 5 
6.4 Outputs: Actual achievements 
1 2 3 4 5 
(Product development). 
6.5 Outputs: Actual achievements 
1 2 3 4 5 
(Beyond Product development). 
6.6 Outputs: Potential 
1 2 3 4 5 
achievements. 
6.7 Output: Product timing. 1 2 3 4 5 
6.8 Future expenditures. 1 2 3 
4 5 
6.9 Financing Past, Present, and 
1 2 3 4 5 
Future. 
6.10 Accounting/ financing 
(Comparing prior years, 1 2 3 
4 5 
competition, budget). 
6.11 R&D ratios. 1 2 3 
4 5 
6.12 R&D as explanatory. 1 2 3 
4 5 
6.13 Explaining R&D changes. 1 2 3 4 5 
19 adapted from Entwistle, G. (1999). 
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Statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
7. Environmental, Social, and 
Ethical Disclosure20 
7.1 Environmental reports. 1 2 3 4 5 
7.2 Value added statement. 1 2 3 4 5 
7.3 Social activities & 
1 2 3 4 5 
contributions. 
7.4 Environmental health safety. 1 2 3 4 5 
7.5 Energy Information. 1 2 3 4 5 
7.6 Community information. 1 2 3 4 5 
7.7 Charitable donations 
1 2 3 4 5 
information. 
7.8 Using photocopy of awarded 
1 2 3 4 5 
certificates. 
7.9 Methods of provisions 
1 2 3 4 5 
computation. 
7.10 Employment of disabilities. 1 2 3 4 5 
7.11 Ethical actions. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Corporate Governance 
Disclosure21 
8.1 Major share ownership and 
1 2 3 4 5 
voting rights. 
8.2 List of board members. 1 2 3 4 5 
8.3 Picture of chairperson and/or 
1 2 3 4 5 
other members. 
8.4 Board member qualifications. 1 2 3 
4 5 
8.5 Number of shares held by 
members of the board. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20adapted from Gray, R., et al. (1995). 
21 adapted from Collett, P., et al. 
(2005). 
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Statements Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
8.6 Remuneration policy for 
board members and key 12345 
executives. 
8.7 Audit committee members: 
12345 
names, addresses, experiences 
8.8 Corporate governance codes, 
12345 
policies, implementation extent. 
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5.5.2 The Sample Population 
The current research is based upon the stakeholder-agency theory as previously 
mentioned. Therefore, the selected sample should be a representative of the different 
stakeholders with their various backgrounds, educations and empowerments. As a 
result, the current research is applied over the same sample that is applied by Dixon et 
al. (2006) which investigated the existence of the auditing expectations gap in Egypt 
using a sample composed of three groups of users; auditors, investors, bankers. The 
current research would add to the previously mentioned groups a sample of academics 
group. The academics are included in the sample as they play a consulting role in the 
standard setting process in Egypt. The four sample groups would have equal weights 
as to overcome any bias that may exists towards any category. Since the sample is 
categorized over four categories, therefore the sample size must be divisible equally 
by the 4 categories which may results in selecting a sample of 400 respondents (Dixon 
et al., 2006; Manson and Zaman, 2000; Best, 1999; Fadzly and Ahmad, 2004). 
5.5.3 Model Dependent and Independent Variables 
The variables of the model are shown by the following figure: 
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Figure 5.5 
Investigating the Effectiveness of the Different Methods of Reducing Auditing 
Expectations Gap 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables 
Audit Report 
Form 
Users 
Auditing 
Expectations 
Gap 
Education 
Standards 
Settings 
Voluntary 
Corporate 
Disclosure 
Auditing 
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5.5.3.1 Independent Variables Definition and Measurement 
As a matter of fact, any research needs to identify the thing that is going to be 
measured, and how to be measured. The model includes four independent variables as 
follows: 
1 The audit report form. 
2 The Users education. 
3 The standards settings. 
4 Voluntary corporate disclosure auditing. 
5.5.3.1.1 The Audit Report Form 
The audit report is one of the most important components of the annual reports and it 
is prepared by an independent external auditor who judges the trueness and fairness of 
the statements prepared by the company. The audit report could have the form of a 
short-form audit report with comprehensive view of his opinion about the statements 
of the company, or it takes the long-form view which shows in details the scope and 
responsibilities of his tasks to give his/her opinion in the statements and reports of the 
company. 
The effect of the audit report form on the auditing expectations gap is measured using 
the questionnaire technique by measuring the perceptions of the examined sample on 
a 5-Point Likert scale (1 strongly agree -5 strongly disagree). The data is collected 
from the different samples with their different perceptions. These perceptions are 
transformed to values from 1 to 5 which could then be analyzed using the proper 
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statistical test to identify the relationship of the audit report form with the auditing 
expectation gap in Egypt. By analyzing the significant differences between the 
different categories' perceptions it could be measured how effective this method in 
reducing the audit expectations gap. 
5.5.3.1.2 The Users Education 
The users of the annual reports are characterized by having a variation of education 
backgrounds. However, it is not a prerequisite to have accounting and auditing 
backgrounds to be a user of the annual reports. Therefore, the user's education may 
have a vital role in understanding the annual reports and the auditors' scope and 
responsibilities regarding auditing the statements and reports of the annual reports. 
The education of the users, as a method of reducing the auditing expectations gap, is 
examined by the perceptions of the different categories of the sample population and 
how effective it would be a reducing method for the auditing expectations gap. 
The perceptions of the respondents are measured by a 5-Point Likert scale (1 strongly 
disagree -5 strongly agree) 
by using a questionnaire technique the perceptions are 
converted to values applicable to be analyzed using the suitable statistical analysis. 
5.5.3.1.3 The Standards Settings 
The standards are the regulations of the accounting and auditing profession that 
cannot be violated. Otherwise, it is considered to be legally a crime which might 
lead 
to cheating in the company's statements and the annual reports, creating a misleading 
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impression for these reports' users and making wrong decisions. Therefore, the 
standards are considered to be the law of the accounting and auditing profession. 
However, the research is concerned with the auditing standards as it is considered one 
of the methods of reducing the auditing expectations gap is to settle standards that 
expand the scope and responsibilities of the auditors towards the auditing process to 
increase the trustiness and fairness of the audited statements and reports. Therefore, 
the auditors could meet the users' expectations and reduce the auditing expectations 
gap. 
This variable is measured by the perceptions of the examined population towards the 
effectiveness of this method to reduce the auditing expectations gap in Egypt. The 
perceptions are transferred to values using the 5-Point Likert scale (1 strongly 
disagree -5 strongly agree). The values of the respondents' perceptions are examined 
to identify how effective this method in reducing the auditing expectation gap 
compared to the other methods (independent variables). 
5.5.3.1.4 Voluntary Corporate Disclosure Auditing 
The voluntary disclosure is considered to be additional disclosure by the companies to 
their mandatory disclosure that is regulated by the standards. This disclosure 
is useful 
to improve the decision making process of the different users. As mentioned before it 
is composed of different categories as: general 
information disclosure, human 
resources disclosure, extra financial analysis tools 
disclosure, risk management 
disclosure, research and development disclosure. 
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Voluntary disclosure auditing is considered to be a proposed method of reducing the 
auditing expectations gap. It is measured using the different perceptions of the 
different categories of the examined sample by a five-point Likert scale that transform 
the perceptions to values as to identify the effectiveness voluntary disclosure auditing 
in reducing the auditing expectations gap compared to the other different methods 
(independent variables). 
5.5.3.2 Dependent Variable Definition and Measurement 
The main variable of the research is the auditing expectations gap. The aim of the 
current research is to measure the auditing expectations gap and to examine the 
effective methods that would be able to reduce this gap. 
The auditing expectations gap is measured using the same five-point Likert scale 
questionnaire used to examine the effectiveness of the different solutions to reduce the 
auditing expectations gap in Egypt. The relationships between the dependent variable 
and the independent variable would result in examining the most effective method for 
reducing the audit expectations gap. 
The audit report form, the users' education, and the standards settings are considered 
to be the traditional solutions to reduce the auditing expectations gap. While voluntary 
disclosure auditing represents the proposed solution of the study. Therefore, the 
proposed solution is the main concern of the study to examine its effectiveness to 
reduce the auditing expectation gap compared to the effectiveness of the other three 
traditional solutions. Consequently, this model tests the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2- The voluntary corporate disclosure audit is more effective method of 
reducing the auditing expectations gap in Egypt than the traditional methods (i. e 
auditing report form, users' education, standards settings). 
5.5.4 Model Statistical Tests 
The model would be examined using Mann-Whitney-U non-parametric test for 
significant difference between auditors and each non-audit group (academics, 
investors, and bankers) from one side, and between auditors and the overall non-audit 
groups from the other side. The Mann-Whitney-U non-parametric test was chosen as 
it examines the significant difference in response means between two populations 
based on the Z scores and p values of the examined variables without the need to test 
for normality as this test is used even if the distribution was normal. However, the 
normality of distribution is examined using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Best, 1999). 
A t-test is applied over the examined sample as to examine the sensitivity of the 
results towards changing the type of the test by using a parametric test instead of the 
main Mann-Whitney-U non parametric test. The t-test is applied using a confidence 
level of 95%. A dummy variable of value 0 and 1 is inhibited in data analysis to 
differentiate between the two examined groups as 1 represents the auditor group while 
the 0 represents the non - audit group. The model is statistically analyzed using 
STATA 9 statistical package. 
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
From the previous discussion it is concluded that the employed methodology is 
justified by the objectivist (realism) ontological position and the positive 
epistemology. This position is considered to be a consequence of the stakeholder- 
agency theory employed by the research and shown in the previously discussed 
chapter. The stakeholder - agency theory is considered to be a positive theory 
comprises the objective ontology. Therefore, the hypothetico-deductive approach 
(testing theory) would be the appropriate methodology to be employed with this type 
of research. Hence, the research uses two survey instruments to gather the data. First 
instrument is a pre-designed checklist used to gather the secondary data to examine 
the model's hypotheses through investigating the level and determinates of voluntary 
corporate disclosure. Second instrument is a valid and reliable questionnaire to gather 
the primary data used in investigating the effectiveness of the different methods of 
reducing the auditing expectations gap. Therefore, the current research includes 
primary and secondary data, beside using quantitative and qualitative analysis tests. 
The methodology of the research includes two groups of hypotheses that are related to 
the voluntary disclosure. The hypotheses are examined by two different models. First, 
examines the hypotheses of the relationship between the voluntary disclosure and its 
determinants including firm characteristics (firm size, firm profitability, industrial 
membership) and the hypotheses of the relationship between the voluntary disclosure 
and corporate governance characteristics (board size, role duality, and board 
composition). Second, examining the hypothesis of the effectiveness of voluntary 
corporate disclosure auditing, compared to the effectiveness of the audit report form, 
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users' education, and standards settings, towards reducing the existing auditing 
expectations gap in Egypt. 
The research methodology is considered to be the bridge between the theoretical 
perspective and the empirical analysis of the research. The theoretical framework 
indicates that the research is employing the stakeholder-agency theory as a positive 
accounting theory. The employed stakeholder - agency theory justifies the used 
research methodology to examine the different hypotheses which are developed based 
the same theory. Therefore, the research is testing the theory through its hypotheses 
rather than building a theory which directs the research towards using the 
hypothetico-deductive methodology. The selected deductive methodology shows the 
sequential stages through which the empirical analysis will progress in the following 
chapters. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
LEVEL AND DETERMINANTS OF VOLUNTARY CORPORATE 
DISCLOSURE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter has two main objectives. First objective is measuring the level of 
voluntary corporate disclosure and its different categories using descriptive analysis. 
Second objective is examining the determinants of voluntary corporate disclosure and 
testing the hypotheses of the association between these different determinants and the 
different categories of voluntary corporate disclosures. The level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of the Egyptian companies is characterized by being 
relatively low level whether in year 2004-2005 or in year 2005-2006. The findings of 
the empirical analysis showed the contribution of each voluntary disclosure category 
to the whole level of disclosure over the two examined years. These findings indicated 
that specific categories' level increase on the expense of the other group of disclosure 
categories. 
The second part of this chapter investigates the association between the total 
voluntary disclosure and its determinants from one side, and the association between 
each disclosure category and the different determinants from the other side. The 
determinants are classified in to two groups. First group is firm characteristics 
determinants. Second group is corporate governance characteristics determinants. 
235 
Finally, a sensitive analysis is applied to identify the effect of changing the statistical 
test on the results and findings of the main applied test. The applied sensitivity 
analysis findings have not got significant differences from the main test ensuring that 
the selected test fits with the examined sample. 
6.2 MEASURING THE LEVEL OF VOLUNTARY CORPORATE 
DISCLOSURE 
The main objective of this analysis is examining the level of voluntary disclosure and 
its different categories. The empirical study of this model is considered to be a 
descriptive analysis that shows the average voluntary disclosure and the averages of 
the different components of this voluntary disclosure. The descriptive study includes 
three different panels. First panel includes the disclosures of year 2004 - 2005. 
Second panel includes the disclosures of year 2005 - 2006. Third panel includes the 
average total disclosures of the two panels. 
The descriptive statistics of the different panels of voluntary corporate disclosure 
categories are shown in the following tables: 
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Table 6.1 
Descriptive Statistics of Panel A: 2004 - 2005 
Type of Mean Standard Min. Standard Standard 
Disclosure (Median) Deviation (Max. ) Skewness Kurtosis 
Total 
0.22 0.05 
Voluntary 0.11 1.03 3.56 
(0.20) (0.54) 
Disclosure 
General 0.24 0.00 
0.21 1.04 3.70 
Disclosure (0.29) (0.86) 
Market 0.39 0.00 
0.19 0.52 3.77 
Disclosure (0.36) (0.82) 
Risk 
0.11 0.00 
Management 0.13 1.29 4.05 
(0.08) (0.50) 
Disclosure 
Financial 0.27 0.00 
0.15 0.65 3.37 
Disclosure (0.25) (0.67) 
Human 
0.19 0.00 
Resources 0.15 0.70 3.14 
(0.20) (0.60) 
Disclosure 
Research & 
0.20 0.00 
Development 0.19 1.47 4.50 
(0.15) (0.77) 
Disclosure 
Environmental, 
Social, & 0.16 0.00 
0.16 1.36 4.49 
Ethical (0.09) (0.64) 
Disclosure 
Corporate 
0.19 0.00 
Governance 0.19 2.07 8.97 
(0.13) (1.00) 
Disclosure 
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Table 6.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the total voluntary disclosure level and 
the level of each of the voluntary disclosure's categories for the first panel of data at 
year 2004-2005. The total voluntary disclosure's level presents 22% of the examined 
checklist items which variant between 5% and 54% for the least and highest Egyptian 
companies disclosures respectively. Moreover, the market disclosure represents the 
highest disclosure level of 39%, while the risk management disclosure presents the 
lowest disclosure level of 11%. In addition, it is observed that the maximum 
disclosure is presented by the corporate governance disclosure of 100%. As common 
notice for the whole categories of disclosure is that the minimum disclosure for any 
category of disclosure is 0%, which means that at least one company of the examined 
companies miss at least one category of the presented categories of disclosure. This is 
an indicator that there is not yet a dominant category of voluntary disclosure that all 
companies in the examined sample agree to disclose. 
Moreover, in relation to standard skewness statistics the presented data is not 
normally distributed. As a common rule, the standard skewness of the data needs to be 
within the range of ±1.96 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). It is observed that the 
corporate governance standard skewness is 2.07 which exceed the range of ±1.96 
evidencing that the data is not normally distributed. Additionally, with respect to the 
standard kurtosis the data is not normally distributed. The data is said to be normally 
distributed if the standard kurtosis fall in the range of ±3 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
The standard kurtosis of the total voluntary disclosure and its different categories 
exceed the range of ±3 indicating that the data is not normally distributed. As a result 
any hypotheses test related to the entire data needs to use a robust analysis. 
238 
Table 6.2 
Descriptive Statistics of Panel B: 2005 - 2006 
Type of 
Disclosure 
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max. ) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Total 
0.22 0.05 
Voluntary 0.11 0.82 3.07 
(0.20) (0.5) 
Disclosure 
General 0.25 0.00 
0.22 0.95 3.20 
Disclosure (0.14) (0.86) 
Market 0.40 0.00 
0.20 0.18 3.33 
Disclosure (0.36) (0.82) 
Risk 
0.13 0.00 
Management 0.13 0.99 3.33 
(0.08) (0.5) 
Disclosure 
Financial 0.26 0.00 
0.15 0.76 3.60 
Disclosure (0.25) (0.67) 
Human 
0.19 0.00 
Resources 0.17 0.69 2.55 
(0.15) (0.60) 
Disclosure 
Research & 
0.21 0.00 
Development 0.19 1.24 
3.95 
(0.15) (0.77) 
Disclosure 
Environmental, 
Social, & 0.16 
0.17 
0.00 
1.18 3.78 
Ethical (0.09) (0.64) 
Disclosure 
Corporate 
0.19 0.00 
Governance 0.21 1.73 6.69 
(0.13) (1.00) 
Disclosure 
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Table 6.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the total voluntary disclosure level and 
the level of each of the voluntary disclosure's categories for the second panel of data 
at year 2005 - 2006. These results indicate that the mean total voluntary disclosure is 
22% which is considered a low level of voluntary disclosure. The highest component 
of the voluntary disclosure is the market disclosure of 40%, reflecting the severe 
competition between the different companies in the Egyptian market, as the market 
disclosure may act as a sort of promotion for the company. The lowest disclosure 
level is represented by the risk management disclosure of 13%, which is a bad sign 
that the company is exposed to high risk, that it is not disclosing their risk 
management activities and how they are dealing with the risk the company is exposed 
to. 
The descriptive statistics shows the normality of the different variables data. It is 
noted that the corporate governance represents the maximum skewness of 1.73, while 
the market disclosure shows the minimum skewness of 0.18. This indicates that the 
minimum and maximum skewness are within the normally distributed range of ±1.96 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). While the Kurtosis of the disclosure data indicate that 
most of the disclosure data is not normally distributed. The maximum Kurtosis is 
shown by the corporate governance disclosure of 6.69, while the minimum Kurtosis is 
shown by the human resources disclosure of 2.54. With reference to the Kurtosis most 
of the disclosure data is not normally distributed as they are out of the range of ±3 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
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Table 6.3 
Descriptive Statistics of Panel C: Average Total Disclosure 
Type of 
Disclosure 
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max. ) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Total 
0.22 0.05 
Voluntary 0.11 0.92 3.30 
(0.20) (0.54) 
Disclosure 
General 0.25 0.00 
0.22 1.00 3.44 
Disclosure (0.14) (0.86) 
Market 0.40 0.00 
0.19 0.34 3.53 
Disclosure (0.36) (0.82) 
Risk 
0.12 0.00 
Management 0.13 1.14 3.66 
(0.08) (0.50) 
Disclosure 
Financial 0.27 0.00 
0.15 0.71 3.48 
Disclosure (0.25) (0.67) 
Human 
0.19 0.00 
Resources 0.16 0.69 2.81 
(0.20) (0.60) 
Disclosure 
Research & 
0.21 0.00 
Development 0.19 1.35 4.21 
(0.15) (0.77) 
Disclosure 
Environmental, 
Social, & 0.16 
0.16 
0.00 
1.27 4.11 
Ethical (0.09) (0.64) 
Disclosure 
Corporate 
0.19 0.00 
Governance 0.20 1.89 7.70 
(0.13) (1.00) 
Disclosure 
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Table 6.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the average panel data (panel C) of 
years 2004 - 2005 (panel A) and 2005 - 2006 (panel B). The average total voluntary 
disclosure does not differ from the two panel averages which is 22% emphasizing that 
there is a sort of stability in the voluntary disclosure volume and practices over the 
examined period under study. Still the market disclosure scoring the highest 
disclosure level among voluntary disclosure categories of an average 40% showing 
that the companies are using this sort of disclosure as an effective method of 
advertising and promotion for their products and services. On the other hand, risk 
management disclosure presents the least disclosure level among the different 
categories of voluntary disclosure which may be either that the Egyptian companies 
are not exposed to different risks that make it worthy for them to disclose voluntarily 
additional information about these sort of risks, or that the companies are not yet 
recognizing their exposure to different types of risks that they need to disclose how 
they are managed and well prepared to face this sort of risk. 
Moreover, the average maximum disclosure is 54%, while the minimum average 
disclosure is 5% indicating a high distortion in voluntary disclosure volume and 
practices between the examined companies. However, the maximum disclosure score 
is performed by the corporate governance disclosure which means that at least one 
company has disclosed all the required corporate governance items, while the 
minimum score of disclosure is common among the different categories of voluntary 
disclosure which is 0% indicating that at least one company totally missed disclosing 
any information about at least one of the voluntary disclosure categories. 
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It is observable that, based on the standard skewness parameter, the data is considered 
to be normally distributed as it falls within the range of ±1.96 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006). While with respect to the standard Kurtosis, the data is not normally 
distributed as all of the voluntary disclosure categories, except the human resources 
disclosure, exceeds the range of ±3 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
Since the data is not normally distributed, that would have some shadows over the 
selected test to examine the research hypotheses applied over the entire data. 
Therefore, a robust analysis should be employed when testing the research hypotheses 
in the further analysis. 
The distribution of the different categories of voluntary disclosure in the different 
panels would be presented by the following pie charts: 
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Figure 6.1 
Voluntary Corporate Disclosure Categories of Panel A: 2004 - 2005 
10.66% 
8.858% 
Blow General Disclosure Market Disclosure 
Risk Management Disclosure Financial Disclosure 
Human Resources Disclosure Research & Development Disclosu 
Environmental Disclosure __] Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Figure 6.1 pie chart indicates the different percentages of the different categories of 
voluntary disclosure during the year 2004 - 2005 (panel A). The chart 
is built on an 
assumption that the total voluntary disclosure represents 100%. Therefore, the chart 
shows how this 100% is distributed over the different categories. It is observed that 
the largest portion of the total voluntary disclosure is the market disclosure of 
22.51 %, while the least portion is the risk management disclosure of 6.541 %. This is 
an expected result as both categories achieved the highest and lowest levels of 
disclosures respectively shown in table 6.1. Environmental, social, and ethical 
disclosure level is relatively low level 8.86% of the total voluntary disclosure 
level 
regarding the need for the introduction of new incentives that are related the corporate 
social responsibilities of the companies dealing with the Egyptian culture. 
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Figure 6.2 
Voluntary Corporate Disclosure Categories of Panel B: 2005 - 2006 
General Disclosure Market Disclosure 
S5] Risk Management Disclosure Financial Disclosure 
Human Resources Disclosure OEM Research & Development Disclosu 
Environmental Disclosure I Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Figure 6.2 pie chart indicates the different percentages of the different categories of 
voluntary disclosure during the year 2005 - 2006 (panel B). It is observed that the 
largest portion of the total voluntary disclosure is the market disclosure of 22.34%, 
while the least portion is the risk management disclosure of 7.173%. This is an 
expected result as both categories achieved the highest and lowest levels of 
disclosures respectively shown in table 6.2. The disclosure structure did not change 
much since the previous year 2004 - 2005 (panel A) 
indicating a low rate of 
disclosure improvements over this period of time. Therefore, Egyptian companies 
needs some stimulations and incentives to improve their voluntary disclosure without 
introducing any obligatory procedures as that contradicts with the voluntary 
disclosure of this sort of disclosure. 
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Figure 6.3 
Voluntary Corporate Disclosure Categories of Panel C: Average Total 
Disclosure 
NEW General Disclosure Market Disclosure 
Risk Management Disclosure Financial Disclosure 
Human Resources Disclosure Research & Development Disclosu 
Environmental Disclosure 
_____ý 
Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Figure 6.3 pie chart indicates the different percentages of the different categories of 
voluntary disclosure for an average (panel C) of year 2004 - 2005 (panel A) and year 
2005 - 2006 (panel B). 
It shows that the maximum component of voluntary corporate 
disclosure is the market disclosure representing 22.4% of the total voluntary 
disclosure. This is an indicator to the highly competitive market in Egypt, as the 
market disclosure in this case is used as a sort of promotion of the company which is 
the motive for the highly concern with this component of the voluntary disclosure. 
On the other hand, the risk management represents the minimum component of the 
voluntary corporate disclosure as it represents 6.826% of the total voluntary 
disclosure. The low level of the risk management may be a good sign or a bad sign. It 
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is a good sign that it indicates that the companies are not exposed to high degree of 
risk so therefore it has a limited risk management disclosure. This is considered to be 
a theoretical case as one of the main indicators of the company's survival and growth 
is how it deals with and manages the risk it is exposed to. The bad sign is that the 
companies are not recognizing the risk they are exposed to and so they are not 
managing this risk, or the risk is recognized but the companies have no strategy to 
manage the risk it is exposed to. In both cases it would be a reason not disclosing with 
a respectable level about managing risk. 
Moreover, the corporate governance disclosure is considered to be a low level of 
10.67%. The corporate governance is a new phenomenon of controlling and directing 
the company's activities which is not yet introduced with an acceptable level by the 
Egyptian companies. The corporate governance disclosure indicates that the Egyptian 
companies need more efforts and concern for introducing this phenomenon to their 
activities. Therefore, the corporate governance is not yet considered to be effective in 
the Egyptian context. This point is more illustrated in model (2) by examining the 
significance of some corporate governance to the voluntary disclosure. 
Accumulatively, the results are almost consistent in between the different panels 
indicating the stability of the voluntary disclosure volume and practices confirming 
that the selected sample is well representative to the whole population of the Egyptian 
companies registered in Cairo and Alexandria stock exchange. 
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6.3 MEASURING THE DETERMINANTS OF VOLUNTARY CORPORATE 
DISCLOSURE 
The model is examining the relationship between voluntary disclosure level and the 
determinants of this voluntary disclosure. The determinants of the level of the 
voluntary disclosure that are examined in this model are classified in to two group: 
firm characteristics including firm size, firm profitability, and industrial membership, 
and the other group is the corporate governance characteristics including board size 
and role duality. The model is examined after transforming the firm size and firm 
profitability variables to overcome the effect of the wide range of the observations of 
both variables. The variables are transformed using Log firm size and Log firm 
profitability. 
6.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of model (2) is shown in the following tables: 
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Table 6.4 
Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Corporate Disclosure Determinants of Panel 
A: 2004 - 2005 
Variables 
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max. ) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
6.03 5.19 
Firm Size 0.51 0.60 2.85 
(5.93) (7.39) 
Firm 1.15 0.00 
0.38 -1.19 4.06 
Profitability (1.28) (1.76) 
Industrial 0.83 0.00 
0.38 -1.75 4.06 
Membership (1.00) (1.00) 
8.20 3.00 
Board Size 3.70 1.54 7.19 
(7.00) (23.00) 
0.71 0.00 
Role Duality 0.46 -0.91 1.83 
(1.00) (1.00) 
The descriptive statistics of the voluntary disclosure determinants shown in table 6.4 
indicates that the determinants are grouped in to firm characteristics, including firm 
size, firm profitability, and industrial membership, and corporate governance 
characteristics including board size, and role duality. Referred to the standard 
skewness the data is considered to be normally distributed as 
it is in between the 
normality range of skewness of ±1.96 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006). On the other hand, 
with reference to the standard kurtosis the data 
is considered not to be normally 
distributed as the kurtosis of firm profitability, industrial membership, and 
board size 
exceeds the standard normality range of ±3 (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006). 
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Table 6.5 
Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Corporate Disclosure Determinants of Panel 
B: 2005 - 2006 
Variables 
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max. ) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
6.10 4.90 
Firm Size 0.55 0.59 3.36 
(5.96) (7.58) 
Firm 1.30 0.08 
0.45 -1.12 3.82 
Profitability (1.41) (1.99) 
Industrial 0.80 0 
0.41 -1.5 3.25 
Membership (1.00) (1) 
11.32 5 
Board Size 4.27 0.83 4.05 
(11) (24) 
0.67 0 
Role Duality 0.47 - 0.74 1.56 
(1.00) (1) 
Table 6.5 shows the descriptive statistics of the different determinants of the corporate 
voluntary disclosure. The determinants are classified into two groups. First group of 
determinants are firm characteristics, including firm size, firm profitability, and 
industrial membership. Second group of determinants are corporate governance 
characteristics, including board size, and role duality. This model is justifying the low 
level of corporate voluntary disclosure of 22% by its determinants. 
The skewness of the different determinants indicates that the data of the different 
variables is not normality distributed. The maximum skewness of 0.83is represented 
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by the board size, while the minimum skewness of -1.5 represented by the industrial 
membership. The minimum and maximum skewness are within the skewness range of 
±1.96 which indicates the normality of the variables data (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
Therefore, based on the skewness the data of the different variables is normally 
distributed and considered to be parametric data. 
The kurtosis shows that the minimum kurtosis is 1.56 which is represented by the role 
duality, while the maximum kurtosis is 4.05 represented by the board size. Since the 
minimum and maximum kurtosis are not within the range of ±3 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006). Therefore the data is not normally distributed and the data is considered to be 
non parametric. These contradictions between the Skewness and kurtosis results 
indicate that the data would be not normally distributed or non-parametric data. 
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Table 6.6 
Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Corporate Disclosure Determinants of Panel 
C: Average Total Disclosure 
Variables 
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max. ) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
6.07 4.901 
Firm Size 0.53 0.61 3.17 
(5.95) (7.58) 
Firm 1.22 0.00 
0.42 -1.02 3.78 
Profitability (1.31) (1.99) 
Industrial 0.81 0.00 
0.39 -1.62 3.62 
Membership (1.00) (1.00) 
9.74 3.00 
Board Size 4.27 1.04 4.56 
(10.00) (24.00) 
0.69 0.00 
Role Duality 0.46 -0.83 1.69 
(1.00) (1.00) 
The average statistics of voluntary disclosure determinants (panel C) includes the 
determinants of year 2004 - 2005 (panel A) and year 
2005 - 2006 (panel B). The 
data 
of determinants with reference to the Standard Skewness considered to 
be normally 
distributed as it falls in between the normality range of ±1.96 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006). On the other hand the data is not normally distributed as firm size, 
firm 
profitability, industrial membership, and board size exceeds the normally 
distribution 
range of ±3 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
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The correlation between the different categories of voluntary disclosure and the 
determinants of disclosure is shown using Pearson correlation coefficients in the 
following tables: 
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The Pearson correlations in table 6.7 show the significance association between the 
total and different categories of voluntary disclosures with the different determinants 
of this type of disclosure during year 2004 - 2005 (panel A). The significance 
association is identified using confidence level of 95%. The results of the table shows 
that at this level of voluntary disclosure there is a significance association between the 
total voluntary disclosure and firm characteristics, including firm size, firm 
profitability, and industrial membership. Referred to the correlation coefficients, there 
is a positive relationship between total voluntary disclosure and firm size and firm 
profitability, while there is a negative relationship between total voluntary disclosure 
and industrial membership. 
Concerning the corporate governance characteristics, there is insignificant 
relationship between total voluntary disclosure and board size and role duality. There 
is negative relationship between total voluntary disclosure and board size, while there 
is a negative relationship between total voluntary disclosure and role duality. The 
results of this table agree with research hypothesis regarding the association between 
total voluntary disclosure and the different disclosure's determinants. 
Regarding the different categories of the total voluntary disclosure, there is a 
significant relationship between, general disclosure, financial disclosure, 
environmental, social, and ethical disclosure, and corporate governance disclosure, 
and firm size. There is a significant relationship between, general disclosure, and 
corporate governance disclosure, and firm profitability. Also there is a significant 
relationship between, general disclosure, marketing disclosure, risk management 
disclosure, and corporate governance disclosure from one side, and industrial 
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membership from the other side. On the other hand, the findings show that there is 
insignificant relationship between the different categories of voluntary disclosure and 
corporate governance disclosure, including board size, and role duality. 
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The Pearson correlations in table 6.8 show the significance association between the 
total and different categories of voluntary disclosures with the different determinants 
of this type of disclosure during year 2005-2006 (panel B). The results of this panel 
of data do not differ significantly from the results of the previous panel of year 2004- 
2005 (panel A), except that there is insignificant relationship between risk 
management disclosure and industrial membership in year 2005-2006 (panel B) 
instead of the existence of significant relationship between the two variables during 
year 2004-2005 (panel A). 
Moreover, the relationship between total voluntary disclosure and role duality is a 
negative relationship during year 2005-2006 (panel B) instead of the existence of 
positive relationship during 2004-2005 (panel A). This difference indicates that the 
direction between the two variables is not a clear relationship. 
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The Pearson correlation coefficients in table 6.9 indicate that there is a significant 
relationship between total voluntary disclosure and firm characteristics, including firm 
size, firm profitability, and industrial membership, while there is insignificant 
relationship between total voluntary disclosure and corporate governance 
characteristics, including board size, and role duality. 
The relationship between the firm's size and the firm's profitability, and the voluntary 
corporate disclosure is a positive relationship. While the relationship between the 
industrial membership, board size and role duality, and voluntary corporate disclosure 
is a negative relationship. 
Regarding the different categories of total voluntary disclosure, there is significant 
relationship between, general disclosure, market disclosure, environmental, social, 
and ethical disclosure, and corporate governance disclosure, and firm size. There is a 
significant relationship between, general disclosure, market disclosure, 
environmental, social, and ethical disclosure, and corporate governance disclosure, 
and firm profitability. In addition, there is a significant relationship between, general 
disclosure, market disclosure, risk management disclosure, research and development 
disclosure, and industrial membership. 
Finally, there is insignificant relationship between total voluntary disclosure and the 
different categories of this sort of disclosure, and the corporate governance 
characteristics, including board size, and role duality. 
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6.3.2 Test of Hypotheses 
The model would be examined using multiple pooling ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression compared to the results using panel data regression. The examination of the 
hypotheses of the model is shown in the following tables: 
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Table 6.10 
Voluntary Corporate Disclosure Determinants 
OLS Cross Sectional Panel Regression Using Robust Standard Error 
(Fixed - Effects Regression) 
Number of Observations 
Obs. per Group: Min 
= 81 
= 40 
Number of Groups (Panels) =2 
: Average = 40.5 Max = 41 
Dep. Cons. FS FP IM BS RD R2 
Var. Coff. Coff. Coff. Coff. Coff. Coff. 
(t-stat. ) (t-stat. ) (t-stat. ) (t-stat. ) (t-stat. ) (t-stat. ) (Overall) 
-0.19 0.07*** 0.08*** -0.10*** -0.00 0.01 0.45 TVD 
(-1.19) (2.75) (4.37) (-4.29) (-1.21) (0.71) 
-0.09 0.09*** 0.13*** -0.33*** -0.01 -0.05* 0.61 GD 
(-0.40) (2.64) (4.30) (-6.25) (-1.51) (-1.71) 
0.43 * 0.03 0.10** -0.27*** -0.01*** -0.00 0.42 MD 
(1.87) (0.73) (2.36) (-5.16) (-2.97) (-0.06) 
0.33 -0.03 0.06** -0.12** -0.00 0.04* 0.17 RMD 
(1.87) (-1.18) (2.05) (-2.87) (-0.80) (1.80) 
-0.27 0.08* 0.08** -0.04 -0.00 0.02 0.19 FD 
(-1.02) (1.93) (2.55) (-0.92) (-0.75) (0.69) 
-0.36 0.08** 0.00 0.10** -0.00 0.03 0.11 
HRD 
(-1.54) (2.40) (0.02) (2.14) (-1.47) (0.72) 
0.02 0.03 0.07** -0.12** 0.00 -0.01 0.12 
RDD 
(0.06) (0.65) (2.26) (-2.13) (0.05) (-0.13) 
-1.02*** 0.16*** 0.07** 
0.05 0.01 0.05 0.34 
ESED 
(-4.08) (4.54) (2.30) (1.29) (1.27) (1.39) 
-0.75*** 0.16*** 0.15*** -0.20*** -0.00 
0.01 0.58 
CGD 
(-3.03) (3.95) (5.98) (-4.02) (-1.18) (0.35) 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.10. 
TVD Total Voluntary Disclosure, GD General Disclosure, MD Market Disclosure, RMD Risk Management 
Disclosure, FD Financial Disclosure, HRD Human Resources Disclosure, RDD Research & Development 
Disclosure, ESED Environmental, Social, and Ethical Disclosure, CGD Corporate Governance Disclosure, FS 
Firm Size, FP Firm Profitability, IM Industrial Membership, BS Board Size, RD Role Duality. 
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Table 6.10 shows the results of the data using Multiple Regression with Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) cross sectional panel regression technique to test the hypothesis 
of the econometric model. The descriptive statistics showed that the data is not 
normally distributed. Therefore, the data analysis needs to be applied using non- 
parametric test that fits with this non parametric data not normally distributed. The 
OLS is a parametric test, so to fit with the non parametric data it needs to be 
employed using robust standard error. 
The panel regression is used to differentiate between the data of year 2004 - 2005 
(panel A) and year 2005 - 2006 (panel B). Therefore, two groups are examined. The 
minimum number of observations 40 companies representing the data of year 2005 - 
2006 (panel B), while the maximum number of observations 41 companies 
representing the data of year 2004 - 2005 (panel A) resulting in average observation 
of 40.5 companies per each year. 
The results show that the total voluntary disclosure is positively significant (p < 0.01) 
with firm size, firm profitability, and role duality, while it is negatively significant (p 
< 0.01) with industrial membership and board size. The positive relations mean that 
the voluntary disclosure increases with the increase of the firm size, firm profitability, 
and with the separation between the roles of the CEO and the chairman of the board 
of directors. On the other, hand, the negative relations mean that the voluntary 
disclosure increases in the non manufacturing companies rather than in the 
manufacturing companies, and with the small board size rather than the large board 
size. 
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However, the results indicate there is a significant relationship (p < 0.01) between the 
total voluntary disclosure and the firm characteristics, including firm size, firm 
profitability, and industrial membership. On the other hand, there is insignificant 
relationship between total voluntary disclosure and the corporate governance 
characteristics, including board size, and role duality. This means that the changes 
that occur in the total voluntary disclosure could only be explained using the firm 
characteristics rather than the corporate governance characteristics. The adjusted R 
Squared of the models explains how much of the changes in the dependent variable 
explained by the changes in the independent variables. The R Squared is 0.45 
indicating that 45% of the changes of the total voluntary disclosure is explained by the 
changes its examined determinants. 
Referred to the different categories of voluntary disclosure, there is a significant 
relationship between, firm size and general disclosure (p < 0.01), financial disclosure 
(p < 0.10), human resources disclosure (p < 0.05), environmental, social, and ethical 
disclosure (p < 0.01), and corporate governance disclosure (p < 0.01). There is a 
significant relationship between, firm profitability and general disclosure (p < 0.01), 
market disclosure (p < 0.05), risk management disclosure (p < 0.05), financial 
disclosure (p < 0.01), research and development disclosure (p < 0.01), environmental, 
social, and ethical disclosure (p < 0.01), and corporate governance disclosure (p < 
0.01). Also, there is a significant relationship between, industrial membership and 
general disclosure (p < 0.01), market disclosure (p < 0.01), risk management 
disclosure (p < 0.05), human resources disclosure (p < 0.05), research and 
development disclosure (p < 0.05), and corporate governance disclosure (p < 0.01). It 
is observed that the majority of the voluntary disclosure categories have significant 
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relationship with the firm characteristics which is supporting the significant 
relationship between the total voluntary disclosure and the firm characteristics. 
Concerning the corporate governance characteristics, there is a significant relationship 
between board size and general disclosure (p < 0.10) from one side, and with market 
disclosure (p 5 0.01) from the other side. Also, role duality has a significant 
relationship (p < 0.10) with both general and risk management disclosure. The rest of 
the relationships between the different categories of voluntary disclosure, and 
corporate governance characteristics are insignificant which is supporting the 
insignificant relationship between the total voluntary disclosure and corporate 
governance characteristics, including board size, and role duality. 
The results of the panel regression analysis agree with the firm characteristics 
research hypotheses concerning the existence of positive significant relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and firm size (hypothesis 1.1), and firm profitability 
(hypothesis 1.2), and a negative significant relationship with industrial membership 
(hypothesis 1.3). 
Moreover, the results of the panel regression analysis agree with corporate 
governance research hypotheses concerning the existence of insignificant relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and board size (hypothesis 1.4), and role duality 
(hypothesis 1.5). 
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6.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 6.11 
Voluntary Corporate Disclosure Determinants 
OLS Pooled Regression Using Robust Standard Error 
Number of Observations = 81 
Dep. 
Var. 
Cons. 
Coff. 
(t-stat. ) 
FS 
Coff. 
(t-stat. ) 
FP 
Coff. 
(t-stat. ) 
IM 
Coff. 
(t-stat. ) 
BS 
Coff. 
(t-stat. ) 
RD 
Coff. 
(t-stat. ) 
R2 
-0.19 0.08*** 0.08*** -0.10*** -0.00 0.01 0.45 TVD 
(-1.19) (2.78) (4.37) (-4.32) (-1.34) (0.72) 
-0.09 0.09*** 0.13*** -0.33*** -0.01* -0.05* 0.61 GD 
(-0.39) (2.67) (4.25) (-6.52) (-1.80) (-1.71) 
0.42* 0.03 0.10** -0.27*** -0.01*** -0.00 0.42 MD 
(1.87) (0.73) (2.45) (-5.20) (-3.19) (-0.06) 
0.32 -0.03 0.06** -0.12*** -0.00 0.04* 0.17 RMD 
(1.84) (-1.20) (2.14) (-2.90) (-0.55) (1.81) 
-0.26 0.08* 0.08** -0.04 -0.00 0.02 0.19 FD 
(-1.02) (1.95) (2.54) (-0.92) (-0.94) (0.70) 
-0.37 0.08** 0.00 0.10** -0.00 0.03 0.11 HRD 
(-1.57) (2.40) (0.08) (2.14) (-1.40) (0.72) 
0.02 0.03 0.07** -0.12** 0.00 -0.01 0.11 RDD 
(0.07) (0.65) (2.30) (-2.14) (0.02) (-0.13) 
1.00*** 0.16*** 0.06** 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.34 
ESED 
(-4.11) (4.60) (2.15) (1.32) (1.03) (1.40) 
-0.74*** 0.16*** 0.15*** -0.20*** -0.00 0.01 0.58 CGD 
(-3.02) (3.97) (6.04) (-4.03) (-1.53) (0.34) 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.10. 
TVD Total Voluntary Disclosure, GD General Disclosure, MD Market Disclosure, RMD Risk Management 
Disclosure, FD Financial Disclosure, HRD Human Resources Disclosure, RDD Research & Development 
Disclosure, ESED Environmental, Social, and Ethical Disclosure, CGD Corporate Governance Disclosure, FS 
Firm Size, FP Firm Profitability, IM Industrial Membership, BS Board Size, RD Role Duality. 
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The main objective of the sensitivity analysis is to examine how sensitive the results 
and findings towards changing the statistical test. The used test is Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) pooled regression using robust standard error as the examined data is 
not normally distributed as stated before by the descriptive statistics. The pooled 
regression analysis deals with large number of observations as one unit without 
differentiating between the different groups of data as the panel data do. The results of 
the pooled regression showed the same adjusted R Squared as the panel data 
regression analysis indicating that the pooled regression has the same strength of the 
main panel regression. The pooled regression showed the same significant and 
insignificant relationship between the total voluntary disclosure and its categories 
with firm characteristics, and corporate governance characteristics. 
The results of the pooled regression showed that the results of the panel data analysis 
are not sensitive to changing the type of the test. Hence, the selected panel data 
analysis is considered to be well matching with the examined data. Moreover, the 
results of this sensitivity analysis confirm the reliability of the results and findings 
which support the generalization of such results. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The chapter includes two stages of analysis. First, examining the level of voluntary 
disclosure over two different years 2004-2005 (panel A) and 2005-2006 (panel B). 
Second, investigating the association between voluntary disclosures and two groups 
of determinants, firm characteristics, and corporate governance characteristics. 
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The first part of the analysis found that the level of voluntary disclosures is 
characterized by being stable from one period of time to another. In addition, this 
level is considered to be relatively low. Regarding the different categories of 
voluntary disclosure, the disclosure structure is relatively stable where market 
disclosure scores about 23% of the voluntary disclosure level on the expense of the 
other voluntary disclosures. The environmental, social, and ethical disclosures are 
relatively low as a result of the unfamiliarity of the corporate social responsibility 
concepts and practices in the Egyptian culture. Similarly, corporate governance 
disclosures are relatively low due to the recent launch of the codes and procedures of 
corporate governance within the Egyptian business culture. 
The second part of the analysis indicates that there is a significant relationship 
between the voluntary disclosures and firm characteristics, including firm size, firm 
profitability, and industrial membership, while there is insignificant relationship 
between the voluntary disclosures and corporate governance characteristics, including 
board size, and role duality. 
Consequently, these results indicated that the Egyptian culture needs to make some 
efforts to be familiar with the corporate social responsibilities of the working 
companies towards their society. On the other hand, the Egyptian business culture still 
not enough aware of the codes and practices of corporate governance. 
This chapter emphasized the different areas of disclosure that need improvements to 
raise the whole level of disclosure which satisfies the different users of the Egyptian 
annual reports whom represents the stakeholders of the companies, where the 
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existence of survival of these companies is dependent on the degree of satisfaction of 
these stakeholders. Therefore, offering the adequate level of information satisfy these 
stakeholders which is the main source of financing for the company to ensure its 
existence and survival. 
Accumulatively, it is concluded that the entire empirical study's results that the bigger 
and profitable the company, the higher level of information voluntarily disclosed in its 
annual reports. Also, the service sector companies' discloses higher level of voluntary 
disclosure than the manufacturing companies sector. However, the board size and role 
duality, as corporate governance determinants, do not justify any level of information 
disclosed voluntarily in the annual reports of the Egyptian companies. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
AUDITING EXPECTATIONS GAP AND DIFFERENT METHODS 
OF REDUCING THIS GAP 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter represents the second part of the empirical study which includes: first, 
investigating the existence of the auditing expectations gap in Egypt and second, 
examining the perceptions of the sample's respondents towards the traditional 
solutions to reduce this gap compared to their perceptions towards the proposed 
solution to reduce this gap. The analysis of the results expected to test the hypothesis 
related to the effectiveness of auditing voluntary corporate disclosure towards the 
reduction of the auditing expectations gap. 
The results of this chapter differentiate between the usefulness of the different 
methods to reduce the existing expectations gap, and its effectiveness to perform this 
objective. The usefulness is identified by the agreement of the examined sample of 
respondents upon that the entire method would contribute to the expectations gap 
reduction. On the other hand, the effectiveness is measured by the significant 
difference between each non-auditor group and the auditor group from one side, and 
between the overall non-auditor group and the auditor group from the other side. 
The objective of this empirical analysis is to illustrate the existence of the auditing 
expectations gap in Egypt, and the most effective methods that would contribute to 
the reduction of this existing gap. These methods includes traditional methods, 
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including audit report form, users' education, and standards settings, in comparison to 
the voluntary disclosure auditing as a proposed method. 
7.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The descriptive study shows the response rate of the study and the details of this 
response rate for each group of the examined sample. In addition, the analysis 
emphasizes the accounting qualification and past experience of the sample, and 
experience of each group in his/her occupation. 
Table 7.1 
Response Rates and Demographic Details of Participants 
Group Survey 
Sent 
Response 
Received 
Accounting 
Qualification 
Accounting 
Experience 
Yes No Yes No 
Auditors 100 31 31 0 31 0 
Academics 100 33 33 0 33 0 
Investors 100 34 18 16 15 19 
Bankers 100 29 24 5 26 3 
Total 400 127 106 21 105 22 
The results in table 7.1 indicate that the overall response rate is 31.75 per cent which 
is an acceptable rate for using this type of data collection tool (Dixon et al., 2006; 
Manson and Zaman, 2000; Best, 1999; Dewing and Russel, 2002; Fadzly and Ahmad, 
2004). It is noted from the table that the auditors and academics groups have got 
accounting qualifications, while the bankers and investors groups vary between 
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having accounting qualifications and not having accounting qualifications as nearly 
half the investors group sample have accounting qualifications while the second half 
not, which presents a variety of the sample qualifications. Moreover, similar to the 
accounting qualifications, all the auditors and academics included in the sample have 
accounting experience, while the majority of the bankers have got accounting 
experience. Although most of investors group have no accounting experience, the 
sample is considered to be balanced representing variety of different investors which 
supports the well representation of the sample for the whole population. 
Table 7.2 
Accounting Experience of Responses 
Group None 2-5 Years 5-10 Years More than 10 
Years 
n Percent n Percent 
Auditors (n=31) 0 0 11 35.5 
Academics (n=33) 0 0 14 42.4 
Investors (n=34) 18 53 3 8.8 
Bankers (n=29) 0 0 3 10.3 
Total (n=127) 18 14.2 31 24.4 
n Percent n Percent 
8 25.8 12 38.7 
2 6.1 17 51.5 
7 20.6 6 17.6 
11 38 15 51.7 
28 22 50 39.4 
The results of table 7.2 present the variation of the accounting experience of the 
different respondents. Most of the auditors' sample had more than 10 years 
experience indicating the inclusiveness of senior members in the sample as indicator 
of the awareness of the relatively new terminologies included in the questionnaire. 
However, the sample includes other auditors with different experiences to ensure that 
the sample is well representative for the whole population. Regarding the academics 
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group, it contains diversified groups of accounting experience to maintain the balance 
between the different experiences which is reflected on the perception of the 
respondent. However, the majority of the bankers sample had more than 10 years 
experience which indicates that the study focused on the perceptions of the senior 
bankers rather than the other categories of experienced bankers. Accumulatively, the 
overall sample is balanced between having no experience and having more than ten 
years' experience, indicating that the sample is representative of the whole population 
of the four examined groups. 
Table 7.3 
Occupational Experience of Responses 
Group 2-5 Years 5-10 Years More than 10 Years 
n Percent n Percent n Percent 
Auditors (n=31) 12 38.7 15 48.4 4 12.9 
Academics (n=33) 14 42.4 5 15.2 14 42.4 
Investors (n=34) 28 82.4 4 11.8 2 5.8 
Bankers (n=29) 8 27.6 11 37.9 10 34.5 
Total (n=127) 62 48.5 35 27.5 30 24 
The occupational experience of responses presented in table 7.3 shows the number of 
years each group of respondents still in his occupation as auditor, academic, investor, 
and banker. This table indicates that most of the auditors are in their career for 5-10 
years, which is the period of the new reform regulations that affected the accounting 
and auditing structures and practices in Egypt and the new regulations of the Egyptian 
capital market (Cairo & Alexandria stock exchange). Therefore, the auditors group 
got most of their work experience during this period which is reflected on their 
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perceptions. However, the academics sample is scattered over the scale as it includes 
equal proportion of the new fresher academics with 2-5 years academic experience, 
and the experienced academics with more than 10 years academic experience. That's 
reflected on the diversification of the academic perceptions. In contrast with the 
academic sample, the bankers sample is well distributed over the different ranges of 
experience, which guarantee that the sample represents the whole population. 
However, the investors sample is concentrated on those whom are dealing with the 
stock market for 2-5 years which is a logical finding, as since the Egyptian stock 
market regulations and reforms the investors were attracted to invest in the capital 
market to get benefit of the different incentives offered by the government to refresh 
the stock exchange market as part of the Egyptian reform program (The Egyptian 
Ministry of Foreign Trade, 2004). Therefore, the sample is concentrated by this way 
to reflect the radical changes in the regulations and polices of the capital market on 
their perceptions. The overall sample is concentrated towards the 2-5 years experience 
with nearly equally distribution on the remaining experience ranges. 
7.3 TEST OF HYPOTHESIS 
The hypothesis examined by this analysis is that voluntary corporate disclosure 
auditing is an effective method of reducing the auditing expectation gap in Egypt, 
compared to the effectiveness of the other traditional method. Therefore, as a 
prerequisite for the study, it is useful to investigate the existence of the auditing 
expectations gap in Egypt before examining the effectiveness of the different methods 
of reducing this gap. 
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The hypothesis is tested based on the significant differences between the perceptions 
of the auditors' group compare to each non-audit groups including academics, 
investors and bankers. In addition it compares the significant difference of the 
auditors' group compared to the overall perceptions of the non-auditor groups. The 
perceptions of the different groups is measured using 5 point Likert scale, as 1 
represents strongly agree, 2 agree, 3 neutral, 4 disagree, and 5 strongly disagree. 
Therefore, the analysis is based on the mean score of the different perceptions as a 
mean score below 3 presents that the perception tend to be towards the agreement 
perception, while a mean score beyond 3 presents that the perception tend towards the 
disagreement perception. Accordingly, using the Likert scale is useful in the analysis 
of the different perceptions as it has a cutting point, which is 3 in our case, a yardstick 
used to differentiate between the different perceptions. 
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Table 7.4 
Investigating the Existence of the Auditing Expectations Gap in Egypt 
(Comparative Mean Response) 
Statements Mean Responses 
Auditors Academics Investors Bankers Overall 
1-Management is 1.42 2.24*# 1.50 1.45 1.74 
responsible for producing 
the financial statements of 
the company. 
2-The auditor is 
responsible for the 
soundness of the internal 
control structure of the 
company. 
3-The auditors is legally 
responsible only to the 
shareholders. 
4-The auditor is 
responsible for 
maintaining accounting 
records of the company. 
5-The auditor is 
responsible for detecting 
all fraud. 
6-Management should be 
held responsible if the 
company goes bankrupt 
due to fraud. 
7-The auditor is 
responsible for preventing 
fraud. 
8-The auditor is unbiased 
and objective. 
9-The financial statements 
give a true and fair view. 
10-Users can have absolute 
assurance that the financial 
statements contain no 
material misstatements. 
11-The company is free 
from fraud. 
12-The extent of audit 
work performed is clearly 
explained in the audit 
report. 
4.00 4.12 1.44*# 2.48*# 2.68*# 
4.23 3.76 1.68*# 4.03 3.10*# 
3.77 4.24# 1.41 *# 3.24*# 2.94*# 
2.94 1.39*# 1.62*# 1.41 *# 1.48*# 
2.00 1.76 1.44*# 1.69 1.63 *# 
4.26 4.21 1.41*# 3.45*# 2.99*# 
1.35 1.48 1.56 1.52 1.52 
1.58 1.55 1.56 2.52*# 1.84 
1.39 2.91 *# 3.79*# 2.55*# 3.11 *# 
4.03 4.48*# 3.18*# 3.10*# 3.60*# 
1.55 3.09*# 4.00*# 2.41 *# 3.21 *# 
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Statements Mean Responses 
Auditors Academics Investors Bankers Overall 
13-The extent of assurance 1.45 3.00*# 3.06*# 2.31 *# 2.81 *# 
given by the auditor is 
clearly indicated in the 
audit report. 
14-The auditor is 1.42 1.73 4.03*# 1.69*# 2.53*# 
trustworthy. 
15-The audited financial 1.32 1.67*# 3.91*# 1.55 2.43*# 
statements are useful in 
monitoring the company's 
performance. 
16-The audited financial 1.42 1.79*# 3.41 *# 1.41 2.25*# 
statements are useful for 
decision making. 
17-The company is well 4.00 2.64*# 3.97 1.86*# 2.88*# 
managed. 
1 strongly agree, 2 agree, 3 neutral, 4 disagree, and 5 strongly di sagree. 
*Significantly different from auditors at p<0.05 (Mann-Whitney U test) 
#Significantly different from auditors at t<0.05 (t-test) 
The results in table 7.4 investigate the existence of the auditing expectations gap in 
Egypt. There is total agreement by the different groups that the management is 
responsible for preparing the financial statement (statement 1). Therefore, there 
is 
insignificant difference between the auditors and the non-auditors groups. However, 
there is significant difference concerning the responsibility of the auditor towards the 
internal control structure of the company (statement 2). There is high disagreement 
towards this statement by the auditors and academics group. While the investors and 
bankers require that the auditors need to be responsible for the internal control 
structure which results in this significant difference. 
Moreover, an expected result indicated by statement 3 that the auditor 
is only 
responsible towards the shareholder, as there is a high agreement 
by the investors to 
get the greater attention of the auditors to satisfy their needs regardless the 
interests of 
the other stakeholders, which is, of course, disagreed by the academics, 
bankers, and 
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even the auditors group', which results in the overall disagreement towards this 
statement. 
Similarly, there is disagreement of the different groups concerning the responsibility 
of the auditor towards maintaining the accounting records of the company (statement 
4), which is an internal task that needs to be performed by the company rather than 
the auditor, but the agreement of the investors' group results from the subjects 
included in the sample that have no accounting qualification and experience. 
There is strong agreement by the different groups of stakeholders about the 
responsibility of the auditor to detect all fraud (statement 5). In contrast, it is not 
strongly agreed by the auditors group as this would result in expanding the 
responsibilities of the auditors to ensure the fulfilment of this task. Therefore, there is 
significant difference between the auditors group and each non auditors group and the 
overall non auditors group. 
Interesting result indicated concerning the responsibility of the company if it goes to 
bankruptcy due to fraud (statement 6), the examined stakeholders groups strongly 
agreed towards this statement, while the auditors group agreed less strongly as they 
believe that they had to accept part of the responsibility towards this bankruptcy 
which results in the occurrence of significant difference between the auditors group 
and each non auditors group from ones side, and between the auditors' group and the 
overall non-auditors group from the other side. Referred to the results of the previous 
two statements, it is indicated that the auditors accept to be responsible for the fraud 
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detection. Although, the auditors are responsible for fraud detection, they are not the 
only party responsible but the company involved in the responsibility of this issue. 
In contrast, auditors group disagree strongly that they are responsible for the 
prevention of the existence of fraud (statement 7). To do so, the auditor needs to have 
full control over the company and that would contradict with his independence. It is 
observed that the academics and bankers groups agree with the auditors' group, 
indicating that if the auditor is having full control over the company that would lead 
to the violation of the auditor's independency standard. On the other side, investors 
strongly agree that the auditor is responsible for preventing fraud which represents the 
misunderstanding of the scope of the auditors' responsibilities as perceived by the 
investors group. This diversified perception results in the significant difference of the 
auditors' group and the overall non-auditors groups. 
Moreover, there is strong agreement between the different auditors and non-auditors 
groups that the auditor is unbiased and objective (statement 8), which represents the 
main reason that the stakeholders requires more services and responsibilities from the 
auditors as they believe that due to their objectivity, the auditor's opinion is reliable 
for making their decisions. Therefore, the auditors and non-auditors groups' 
perceptions are insignificantly different from each other regarding the objectivity of 
the auditor's opinion. 
Similarly, there is a strongly agreement that the financial statements give a true and 
fair view (statement 9). This perception is given under the assumption that these 
statements are audited by external independent auditor, as the main objective of the 
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auditing process is to make the financial statements trustful and fairly presented. This 
supports the previous results concerned with the agreement that the auditor is 
objective and unbiased (statement 8). Therefore, the overall perceptions indicate 
insignificant difference between the auditors and non auditors groups. 
Investors disagree that the financial statements have absolute assurance and get no 
material mis-statements (statement 10). This is related to the responsibilities and tasks 
performed by the auditors as investors believe in the objectivity of auditors (statement 
8) but they think they need to expand their responsibilities to get absolute assurance 
about the fairness and trustiness of the financial statements. The other non-auditors 
groups agree to have this absolute assurance but within the limit of the responsibilities 
performed by the auditors. Therefore, there is significant difference between the 
auditors and non-auditors perception regarding this statement. 
Moreover, there is a disagreement among the auditors and the non-auditors groups 
that the company is free from fraud (statement 11). This is a logical consequence to 
the failure of the auditor to guarantee the freedom or prevention of fraud. There is a 
significant difference between the perceptions of the auditors group and the non- 
auditors groups due to the different degrees of disagreement within the different 
groups. 
There is an extreme differentiation between the auditors group and the non-auditors 
groups regarding the extent to which the audit work performed is clearly explained in 
the audit report (statement 12). There is strongly agreement by the auditors group, 
while there is disagreement by the non audit groups indicating an existing problem 
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with the message communicated by the audit report showing that what is sent by the 
report is not perceived by the non auditors groups. Therefore, there is a significant 
difference between the auditors and each non auditors group's perceptions for one 
side, and between the auditors group and the overall non auditors groups' perceptions 
from the other side. 
In contrast, there is significant difference between auditors group and non auditors 
groups regarding the extent of clearly indication of the assurance given by auditor in 
the audit report (statement 13). This result ensures that there is an existing problem 
with the message conveyed by the audit report to the different non auditors groups. 
Regarding the auditor's trustworthiness (statement 14), the investors disagree that the 
auditor is trustworthy while the other groups agree that the auditor is trustworthy. This 
differentiation indicates the investors' awareness concerning the trustworthiness of 
the auditor resulting in the significant difference between the auditors group's 
perception and the perception of the overall non-auditors groups. This problem 
reflected on how the investors perceive the usefulness of the audited financial 
statements in monitoring the company's performance (statement 15) and for decision 
making (statement 16). The differentiated results of the investors from the other 
groups, resulting in the overall significant difference, indicates the effect of the lack 
of accounting qualification and experience, which needs to be overcame by the 
detailed audit report which is directed to the different users with the different needs 
and qualifications. However, investors and auditors disagreed that the company is 
well managed (statement 17), which contradict with perceptions of the academic and 
bankers groups resulting in the overall significant difference of perceptions. 
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Accumulatively, the analysis shows major significant differences in the perceptions of 
the auditors group and the non auditors groups indicating the existence of a gap 
between what the stakeholders, represented by academics, investors, and bankers, 
expects to be performed by the auditors, and the actual auditor's performance. This 
results in the existence of an auditing expectations gap that needs to be reduced 
effectively. 
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Table 7.5 
The Role of Audit Report Form in Reducing the Auditing Expectations Gap 
(Comparative Mean Response) 
Statements Mean Responses 
Auditors Academics Investors Bankers Overall 
1-The inclusion of an 1.29 1.48 1.94*# 1.51 1.65*# 
audit report enhances the 
credibility of financial 
statement. 
2-The purpose of the 
audit is clearly 
communicated in the 
audit report. 
3-The audit report is 
readable document. 
4-The audit report clearly 
summarizes the extent 
and nature of the 
evidence gathered in the 
formation of the audit 
opinion. 
5-The audit report clearly 
indicates the role of 
judgment in the 
formation of the audit 
opinion. 
6-The auditors' 
responsibility in relation 
to fraud is clearly 
indicated in the audit 
report. 
7-The auditors' 
responsibility in relation 
to any illegal acts 
performed by the client is 
clearly indicated in the 
audit report. 
8-In the future there 
should be an explicit 
statement in the audit 
report of the auditors' 
assessment of the going 
concern status of the 
client. 
1.23 2.58*# 1.88*# 1.83*# 2.09*# 
1.26 1.76*# 1.74*# 1.66*# 1.72*# 
2.48 2.91 1.41 *# 1.37*# 1.88*# 
4.26 
4.29 
3.94 1.47*# 2.20*# 2.52*# 
3.55# 1.32*# 1.69*# 2.17*# 
4.29 2.82*# 1.38*# 2.43*# 2.21*# 
1.81 3.82*# 1.26*# 1.31 *# 2.11 
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Statements Mean Responses 
Auditors Academics Investors Bankers Overall 
9-In the future there 1.58 3.67*# 1.68 1.40 2.23# 
should be an explicit 
statement in the audit 
report of the auditors' 
findings in relation to 
fraud or illegal acts. 
10-It should be useful for 4.13 2.30*# 1.44*# 1.26*# 1.66*# 
the auditor to indicate 
either in the audit report 
or in a separate statement, 
the extent of their 
examination of the 
chairman's statement. 
11-It should be useful for 2.81 1.82*# 1.32*# 1.46*# 1.53*# 
the auditor to indicate 
either in the audit report 
or in a separate statement, 
the extent of their 
examination of the 
director's report. 
12-It should be useful for 2.74 2.67 1.24*# 1.46*# 1.77*# 
the auditor to indicate 
either in the audit report 
or in a separate statement, 
the extent of their 
examination of the 
operating and financial 
review. 
13- It should be useful for 4.10 1.64*# 1.65*# 1.32*# 1.53*# 
the auditor to indicate 
either in the audit report 
or in a separate statement, 
the extent of their 
examination of any other 
information included in 
the annual report but 
outside the financial 
statements. 
14-The value of the audit 1.48 3.33*# 1.82*# 
1.34 2.15*# 
would be enhanced if the 
auditor reported, either in 
the audit report or in a 
separate statement, in 
respect of each audit 
engagement the scope of 
their study of the client's 
internal control. 
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15-The value of the audit 1.55 2.88*# 1.76 1.49 2.03*# 
would be enhanced if the 
auditor reported, either in 
the audit report or in a 
separate statement, in 
respect of each audit 
engagement the extent to 
which they relied on 
internal controls. 
16- The value of the audit 1.61 2.39*# 1.53 1.69 1.86 
would be enhanced if the 
auditor reported, either in 
the audit report or in a 
separate statement, in 
respect of each audit 
engagement the 
materiality level they 
used. 
17-The value of the audit 1.97 2.52*# 1.29*# 1.31 *# 1.70* 
would be enhanced if, for 
each audit, the report 
explained the most 
difficult issues arising in 
the audit and how they 
had been resolved. 
18-An auditor should 2.39 2.67 1.35*# 1.71*# 1.90*# 
always report on 
corporate governance 
issues for which they 
have a responsibility. 
19-The directors' 1.84 3.12*# 1.32*# 1.54*# 1.98 
statement in respect of 
corporate governance is 
useful. 
1 strongly agree, 2 agree, 3 neutral, 4 disagree, and 5 strongly disagree. 
*Significantly different from auditors at p :S0.05 (Mann-Whitney U test) 
#Significantly different from auditors at t :S0.05 (t-test) 
Table 7.5 shows the role of the audit report form in reducing the auditing expectations 
gap. The audit report could be articulated either in a short brief form or in a 
long 
detailed form. The aim of this analysis is to indicate how effective changing the form 
of the audit report would contribute to the reduction of the auditing expectations gap. 
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Regarding the effect of including an audit report in the enhancement of the credibility 
of financial statements (statement 1), all the examined groups agree on this issue. 
However, there is a significant difference between the overall non-auditors groups and 
the auditor group due to the different degrees of agreement among the different 
groups. 
Moreover, the examined sample groups agreed with different degrees that the purpose 
of the audit is clearly communicated in the audit report (statement 2) and whether the 
audit report is a readable document (statement 3) reflecting how each group perceives 
the audit report. Due to the different qualifications and experiences of the different 
groups, there are significant differences between the auditors group and each group of 
non-auditors, resulting in the overall non-auditors groups in a significant difference 
from the auditors group. 
Similarly, the different auditors and non-auditors groups agreed that the audit report 
clearly summarizes the extent and nature of the evidence gathered in the formation of 
the audit opinion (statement 4). It is observed that the investors and bankers groups' 
degree of agreement are stronger than that of auditors and academics, which results in 
the significant different between the auditors group and the other overall groups. 
An interesting finding is derived from the significant difference between auditors 
group and non-auditors groups regarding the role of judgment in the formation of the 
audit opinion indicated by the audit report (statement 5), the auditor's responsibility in 
relation to fraud as indicated in the audit report (statement 6), and the indication of the 
audit report regarding the auditor's responsibility in relation to any illegal acts 
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performed by the clients (statement 7). The previously presented statements indicate 
how effective do the audit report communicates a certain message from the auditors to 
the stakeholders. 
It was shown that the auditors strongly disagree with the previously mentioned 
statements, while the other non-auditors groups, specifically investors and bankers, 
agreed with these statements. This indicates that the auditors are concerned about the 
message conveyed by the audit report and it needs to be modified, while the other 
groups are satisfied by this unqualified audit report, from the auditors own view, 
which means that the non-auditors did not realize that this report needs some 
improvement and this shows how vague is the audit report that the non-auditors could 
not judge it in a right way. Consequently, this phenomena takes place due to the 
existing of the wide auditing expectations gap realized in the previous analysis. 
Regarding the future, the auditors and non auditors groups (except academics group) 
strongly agree with inclusion of an explicit statement in the audit report of the 
auditor's assessment of the going concern status of the client (statement 8). This 
perception indicates the critical user's needs to have some information that facilitates 
the future predictions, while the academics view is that future predictions not 
necessary based on the audit report, but there would be other separated reports that 
could offer these information. On the overall level, there is insignificant difference 
between the auditors group and the overall non auditors group regarding this 
statement. 
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Similarly, the academic group disagree with the auditors and non-auditors groups 
regarding that in the future there should be an explicit statement in the audit report of 
the auditor's findings in relation to fraud or illegal acts (statement 9). The reason of 
this significant difference between academics and other groups is that they believe 
that there would be a separated report that shows these issues. But there is 
insignificant difference between the auditors and overall non auditors groups. 
On the other hand, the auditors group disagree with the non-auditors groups about the 
indication of the extent of their examination of the chairman's statement either in the 
auditor's report or in a separate statement (statement 10). This significant difference 
between the auditors group and overall non-auditors groups results from the 
expanding of the responsibilities of the auditors by accepting the burden of auditing 
the chairman's statement, while for the users it is critical to them to be assured from 
this statement as it is the corner stone of the corporate governance of the company as 
it would be shown latter. 
However, the auditors agree with the non-auditors that it should be useful for the 
auditor to indicate either in the audit report or in a separate statement, the extent of 
their examination of the director's report (statement 11), and the extent of their 
examination of the operating and financial review (statement 12). This auditors' 
agreement indicate that they believe that these reports need to be critically audited 
due 
to the existing conflict of interests between the directors and the other users. 
The 
overall result illustrates the significant difference between the auditors and overall 
non auditors groups due to the different levels of agreement 
between the different 
groups. 
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Moreover, auditors group disagreed with the non-auditors groups regarding the 
usefulness for the auditor to indicate either in the audit report or in a separate 
statement, the extent of their examination of any other information included in the 
annual report but outside the financial statements (statement 13). The reason of this 
significant difference is previously mentioned to justify the significant difference of 
statement 10, as the auditors were not willing to expand their responsibilities to 
include auditing of other additional information. In addition, it is clear that the users 
requested additional assurance statements beside the auditors report, indicating their 
additional needs for other information offered by the auditors rather than the stated 
ones in the audit report. Therefore, there is a significant difference between the 
auditors group and no auditors groups' perceptions towards this statement. 
The auditors group and non-auditors groups agreed that the value of the audit would 
be enhanced if the auditor reported, either in the audit report or in a separate 
statement, in respect of each audit engagement the scope of their study of the client's 
internal control (statement 14), and in respect of each audit engagement the extent to 
which they relied on internal controls (statement 15). These results shows the 
importance of evaluating the internal control structure of the company, and that it 
could be disclosed separately from the audit report showing the in inclusive nature of 
the existing audit report form. The significance difference between the auditors and 
overall non auditors' perceptions results from the different degrees of agreements 
towards these statements. 
It is agreed by the auditors group as well as the non-auditors groups that the value of 
the audit will be enhanced if the auditor reported, either 
in the audit report or in 
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separate statement, in respect of each audit engagement the materiality level they used 
(statement 16). The materiality level shows the extent of the auditor's scope which 
indicates the differentiation between the material and immaterial errors discovered 
during the auditing inspection which is in turn reflected on the users' expectations 
towards the auditing process and reduces the auditing expectations gap. Therefore, 
there is insignificant difference between the auditors group's perception and the 
overall non auditors groups' perception towards this statement. 
Moreover, explaining the most difficult issues arising in the audit and how they had 
been resolved (statement 17) is agreed by the auditors and non auditors to enhance the 
value of audit due to the degree of transparency associated with the auditing process 
leading to avoid having users' over expectations. However, there is significant 
difference between the auditors group and overall non auditors group due to the 
inconsistency of agreement among the diversified groups towards this issue. 
Regarding corporate governance issues, there is significant difference between 
auditors group and overall non auditors' groups towards the inclusive of the audit 
report the corporate governance issues they are responsible 
for (statement 18). 
However, there is an agreement trend towards this issue. In addition, there 
is 
insignificant difference between auditors group and overall non auditors groups 
towards the usefulness of the directors' statement in respect of corporate governance 
(statement 19). 
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Table 7.6 
The Role of Users' Education in Reducing the Auditing Expectations Gap 
(Comparative Mean Response) 
Statements 
Auditors 
Mean Responses 
Academics Investors Bankers Overall 
1-The auditor's 1.84 3.21 *# 1.35 3.07*# 2.51 *# 
responsibility for the 
soundness of the 
internal control 
structure of the 
company. 
2-The auditor's legal 1.29 1.94*# 1.47 2.62*# 1.98*# 
responsibility to the 
different users. 
3-The auditor's 1.13 2.58*# 1.26 2.00*# 1.94*# 
responsibility for 
maintaining 
accounting records of 
the company. 
4-The auditor's 1.26 1.94*# 1.65*# 1.90*# 1.82*# 
responsibility for 
detecting all fraud. 
5-The auditor's 3.06 4.18*# 1.79*# 2.55 2.84 
responsibility for 
preventing all fraud. 
6-The auditor's 1.23 2.70*# 1.62*# 1.86*# 2.06*# 
unbiased and 
objectivity. 
7-The financial 1.65 2.79*# 1.56 1.97 2.10* 
statements' true and 
fair view. 
8-The assurance that 1.40 3.42*# 1.65 2.00*# 2.36*# 
the financial 
statements contain no 
material 
misstatements. 
9-The extent of audit 1.71 2.42*# 1.79 1.52 1.93 
work performed 
explained in the audit 
report. 
10-The extent of 1.74 3.81 *# 1.62 2.10*# 2.52*# 
assurance given by the 
auditor indicated in the 
audit report. 
11-The auditor 1.77 2.15* 1.56 2.00* 1.90* 
trustworthy. 
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12-The audited 1.61 2.39*# 1.59* 2.48*# 2.14*# 
financial statements 
usefulness in 
monitoring the 
company's 
performance. 
13-The audited 2.39 3.15*# 1.47# 2.31 2.30 
financial statements 
usefulness for decision 
making. 
I strongly agree, 2 agree, 3 neutral, 4 disagree, and 5 strongly disagree. 
*Significantly different from auditors at p<0.05 (Mann-Whitney U test) 
#Significantly different from auditors at t< 0.05 (t-test) 
The results of table 7.6 show the role of educating the different users towards the 
responsibilities of the auditors in reducing the auditing expectations gap. The 
education process is an indicator that the auditor is more transparent to his clients 
which may leads to controlling the users' expectations regarding the auditors' 
responsibilities. 
There is an agreement that users' education towards the auditor's responsibilities for 
the soundness of the internal control structure of the company (statement 1), to the 
different user's (statement 2), for maintaining accounting records of the company 
(statement 3), and for detecting all fraud (statement 4). However, there is significant 
difference between auditors group and non auditors groups concerning these issues 
indicating that although it is useful, it is not effective issues to reduce the auditing 
expectations gap. 
There is insignificant difference between the auditors group and overall non auditors 
groups concerning the disagreement that educating users towards preventing all fraud 
(statement 5) would reduce the auditing expectations gap as the auditor actually is not 
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responsible to prevent fraud so this expansion of the auditors responsibilities would 
raise the users' expectations and expand the auditing expectations gap instead of 
reducing it. 
In contrast, there is agreement among the different auditors and non auditors groups 
regarding educating users towards the auditor's unbiased and objective opinion 
(statement 5), the financial statements trustiness and fairness (statement 7), and the 
assurance that the financial statements contain no material misstatements (statement 
8). However, there is significant difference between the auditors group and the non 
auditors groups indicating that although the agreement of the auditors and non- 
auditors groups towards the usefulness of the awareness of these issues, it is not 
effectively reducing the auditing expectations gap. 
However, there is insignificant difference between the auditors group and the overall 
non auditors groups regarding that educating the users towards the extent of audit 
work performance explained in the audit report (statement 9) would reduce the 
auditing expectations gap. That is due to the expansion of the users' awareness 
towards the scope of the audit work. 
In addition, the auditors and non-auditors groups agree that educating users towards 
the extent of assurance given by the auditor and indicated in the audit report 
(statement 10), the auditor trustworthiness (statement 11), and the audited financial 
statement usefulness in monitoring the company's performance (statement 
12) would 
reduce the auditing expectations gap. However, the auditors group's perception 
significantly different from the overall non-auditors' perceptions regarding these 
293 
issues, which indicates the ineffectiveness of educating the users toward these issues 
would reduce the expectations gap. 
The auditors and non auditors agree about educating users towards the usefulness of 
the audited financial statements for decision-making (statement 13). In addition, there 
is insignificant difference between auditors group and overall non-auditors group 
regarding this issue, indicating its effectiveness in reducing the auditing expectations 
gap. 
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Table 7.7 
The Role of Standards Settings in Reducing the Auditing Expectations Gap 
(Comparative Mean Response) 
Statements Mean Responses 
Auditors Academics Investors Bankers Overall 
1- Increasing regulation 1.81 2.33# 1.29*# 1.31 *# 1.66* 
governing auditor 
appointment. 
2- Increasing regulation 
governing provision of 
non-audit services. 
3- Increasing regulation 
governing rotation of audit 
partner. 
4- Increasing regulation 
governing rotation of audit 
firm. 
5-Extending auditor 
responsibilities as regards 
fraud detection. 
6-Extending auditor 
responsibilities as regards 
going concern 
certification. 
7-Extending auditor 
responsibilities as regards 
wider stakeholders. 
8- Assigning independent 
body responsible for 
monitoring of audit work. 
9- Assigning independent 
body responsible for 
disciplining of auditors. 
10- Joint and several 
liabilities of audit partners 
on its own provide 
assurance to the quality of 
auditors' work. 
11- Liability of auditors 
should be restricted. 
2.23 2.52 1.18*# 1.90*# 1.85*# 
1.77 3.45*# 1.55 2.31 *# 2.44*# 
1.61 2.52*# 1.44 2.07*# 2.00*# 
2.32 
1.81 
2.61 1.32*# 1.86*# 1.93*# 
2.58*# 1.32*# 1.38*# 1.77 
1.81 3.55*# 1.56*# 1.31*# 2.17 
4.39 2.55*# 1.35*# 2.66*# 2.16*# 
4.35 2.67*# 1.29*# 2.52*# 2.14*# 
3.06 3.97*# 1.32*# 1.93*# 2.42*# 
3.35 3.39 1.47*# 2.00*# 2.29*# 
1 strongly agree, 2 agree, 3 neutral, 4 disagree, and 5 strongly disagree. 
*Significantly different from auditors at p: 5 0.05 (Mann-Whitney U test) 
#Significantly different from auditors at t :s0.05 (t-test) 
Table 7.7 shows the role of setting standards towards the expansion of the auditors' 
responsibilities in reducing the auditing expectations gap. The table's result indicates 
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the effectiveness of the different areas of standards that could be modified to expand 
the auditor's roles and responsibilities to reduce the existing auditing expectations 
gap. 
There is an agreement among the auditors and non-auditors groups that increasing 
regulation governing auditor appointment (statement 1), provision of non-audit 
services (statement 2), rotation of audit partner (statement 3), and rotation of audit 
firm (statement 4) would reduce auditing expectations gap, as these issues are 
concerned by maintaining the auditor's independence. However, there is significant 
difference between the auditors group and the overall non-auditors groups regarding 
that the setting of standards governing these issues would reduce the auditing 
expectations gap. 
In addition, auditors and non-auditors groups agreed that setting standards that 
extends auditors' responsibilities as regards fraud detection (statement 5) would 
contribute to the reduction of the auditing expectations gap. However, there is 
significant difference between the auditors group and non-auditors groups, indicating 
that although it is useful to settle such standards, it is not effective in reducing the 
auditing expectations gap. 
Setting standards regarding extending auditors responsibilities as regards the going 
concern certificate (statement 6), and wider stakeholders (statement 7) have been 
agreed upon by the auditors and non-auditors groups. In addition, there is in 
significant difference between the auditors' group and overall non-auditors groups 
indicating that the wider range of stakeholders are interested in being offered more 
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information by the auditor concerning the future, and the auditors accepting the need 
to offer this sort of information to wider range of users. In turn, this would meet the 
users' expectations and reduces the auditing expectations gap 
Auditors group disagree with setting standards regarding assigning independent body 
responsible for monitoring of audit work (statement 8), and disciplining of auditors 
(statement 9), as they believe that this would affects their independence while 
performing their responsibilities. While there is an agreement among non-auditors 
groups towards setting standards that regulate these issues. Of course, the different 
perceptions results in significant difference between the auditors group and the non 
auditors groups regarding these statements. 
Similarly, auditors group disagreed with setting standards concerned with providing 
assurance to the quality of auditors' work by joint and several liabilities of audit 
partners on its own (statement 10), and restricting the auditor's liabilities (statement 
11), while the non auditors groups agreed on the issuance of such standards. These 
perceptions distortion result in the significant difference between the auditors group 
and non auditors group regarding that these standards would reduce auditing 
expectations gap. 
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Table 7.8 
The Role of Voluntary Corporate Disclosure Auditing in Reducing the Auditing 
Expectations Gap 
(Comparative Mean Response) 
Statements Mean Responses 
Auditors Academics Investors Bankers Overall 
1. General Disclosure 
1.1 Mission & vision. 3.97 1.27*# 1.29*# 1.24*# 1.27*# 
1.2 Statement of corporate 2.32 1.49*# 1.56*# 1.34*# 1.47*# 
strategy. 
1.3 Top management 3.65 1.85*# 1.26*# 1.66*# 1.58*# 
names / experience. 
1.4 Majority of 2.06 1.64*# 1.32*# 1.59*# 1.51 *# 
stockholders (composition 
of shareholdings). 
1.5 Organization structure. 2.23 1.52*# 1.65# 1.41*# 1.53*# 
1.6 Statement of corporate 2.03 1.61 1.65 1.31 *# 1.53# 
goals and objectives. 
1.7 Presentation of annual 2.50 1.24*# 1.74*# 1.55*# 1.51 *# 
reports in Arabic & 
English. 
2. Market Disclosure 
2.1 Industry size. 3.71 1.42*# 1.50*# 1.52*# 1.48*# 
2.2 Product (s) 3.71 1.33*# 1.56*# 1.41*# 1.44*# 
information. 
2.3 Customers' 3.68 1.69*# 1.35*# 1.41 *# 1.48*# 
information. 
2.4 Supplier information. 3.55 2.22*# 1.38*# 1.55*# 1.72*# 
2.5 Market (s) information. 3.74 2.09*# 1.41 *# 1.38*# 1.64*# 
2.6 Market share. 2.32 1.82*# 1.82*# 1.41 *# 1.70*# 
2.7 Competitive 2.26 1.67*# 2.03 1.69*# 1.80*# 
environment. 
2.8 Productivity capacity. 2.55 1.85*# 1.91*# 1.52*# 1.77*# 
2.9 Productivity indicators. 2.35 1.91*# 1.76*# 1.55*# 1.75*# 
2.10 Marketing networks. 3.35 1.91 *# 2.09*# 1.69*# 1.91 *# 
2.11 Physical outputs. 3.84 2.06*# 1.82*# 1.86*# 1.92*# 
3. Risk Management 
Disclosure 
3.1 Financial risk (interest 1.48 1.39 2.03*# 1.72*# 1.72* 
rate, currency, credit & fin. 
Instruments). 
3.2 Political risk 1.55 1.48 1.91 1.28 1.57 
(international business). 
3.3 Market risk 1.68 1.45 1.79* 1.55 1.63* 
(competition, market 
share). 
3.4 Technology risk (rapid 1.68 1.44 1.88* 1.38 1.67* 
change) 
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3.5 Environmental risk 1.68 1.55 1.82* 1.41 1.65 
(laws & regulations). 
3.6 Weather risk (climate 1.77 2.18 2.09* 1.69 2.00* 
conditions). 
3.7 Government regulation 1.77 1.42* 1.97* 1.52 1.65 
risk (control, regulation, 
taxation). 
3.8 Seasonality risk 1.48 1.81 1.79* 1.55* 1.78* 
(natural seasonal patterns). 
3.9 Operational risk 1.42 3.15*# 2.06*# 1.69* 2.40* 
(technical, accidents, 
human error & loss). 
3.10 Cyclicality risk 1.26 1.88*# 2.03*# 1.86*# 1.86*# 
(natural cyclical trend). 
3.11 Suppliers risk (Main 1.29 1.79*# 1.71*# 1.72*# 1.73*# 
Supplier). 
3.12 Natural resources risk 1.19 2.24*# 1.91 *# 1.28* 1.98*# 
(reserves quality and 
quantity). 
4. Financial Disclosure 
4.1 Financial ratios & 1.26 1.61*# 1.88*# 1.86*# 1.63*# 
statistics. 
4.2 Industry ratios. 1.23 1.33 2.00*# 1.79*# 1.67*# 
4.3 Using charts, graphs, 2.10 2.24 1.79* 2.03 1.65*# 
photos. 
4.4 Market Share price. 1.16 2.00*# 1.74# 1.86*# 2.00*# 
4.5 Bank loans, mortgages 1.90 2.15 1.71* 1.90 1.65*# 
and their uses. 
4.6 Information of capital 1.65 1.42 1.91 1.90 1.78 
structure. 
4.7 Information of 2.06 1.82 1.85 2.00 2.40 
dividends policy. 
4.8 Reasons and effects of 1.81 2.24*# 2.15# 1.90 1.86 
acquisions / disposals on 
past results. 
4.9 Information of foreign 1.77 2.85*# 2.21# 1.86 1.73 
sales. 
4.10 Financial information 1.42 1.82*# 1.97*# 1.55 1.98*# 
on quarterly basis. 
4.11 Changes in inventory 1.65 2.00*# 1.47* 1.72 1.73 
level. 
4.12 Dividends per share 1.39 2.06*# 1.91# 1.86*# 1.95*# 
compared with previous 
years. 
5. Human Resources 
Disclosure 
5.1 Consultation with 4.35 1.85*# 2.06# 1.45*# 1.80*# 
emnlovees. 
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Auditors 
Mean Responses 
Academics Investors Bankers Overall 
5.2 Employee share 1.84 3.06*# 1.97* 1.52 2.21 *# 
ownership. 
5.3 Employment data. 3.94 3.27*# 2.09*# 1.62*# 2.35*# 
5.4 Pension commitment. 1.77 2.91 *# 2.21 1.72 2.30*# 
5.5 Employees health & 1.65 3.28*# 1.79 1.72* 2.27*# 
safety. 
5.6 Average compensation 3.90 3.12*# 1.97*# 1.83*# 2.32*# 
of employees. 
5.7 Percentage of foreign 4.06 3.24*# 1.68*# 1.62*# 2.20*# 
and national labour force. 
5.8 Information of training 3.68 3.24*# 2.21 *# 1.86*# 2.46*# 
and employee 
development. 
5.9 Number of employees 3.35 3.12 1.88*# 1.83*# 1.73*# 
trained. 
5.10 Amount spent on 3.52 2.03*# 1.79*# 1.62*# 1.95*# 
training. 
6. Research & 
Development Disclosure 
6.1 Inputs: Product. 1.52 1.79 1.47* 1.93*# 1.80*# 
6.2 Inputs: People. 3.94 2.24* 1.70# 1.66*# 2.21 *# 
6.3 Input: Infrastructure. 1.68 2.15*# 1.79* 1.62 2.35*# 
6.4 Outputs: Actual 2.68 2.24*# 1.41# 1.59*# 2.30*# 
achievements (Product 
development). 
6.5 Outputs: Actual 2.26 2.64 1.24*# 1.86*# 2.27 
achievements (Beyond 
Product development). 
6.6 Outputs: Potential 3.00 2.33*# 1.38*# 1.69*# 2.32*# 
achievements. 
6.7 Output: Product 1.74 2.27*# 1.38*# 1.52 2.20*# 
timing. 
6.8 Future expenditures. 1.81 2.30*# 1.65 1.66 2.46*# 
6.9 Financing Past, 1.71 2.39*# 1.65 1.79 1.95 
Present, and Future. 
6.10 Accounting/ financing 1.74 2.12*# 1.41 *# 1.66 1.73 
(Comparing prior years, 
competition, budget). 
6.11 R&D ratios. 1.74 1.73 1.38*# 1.66 1.58 
6.12 R&D as explanatory. 2.65 2.73 1.76*# 1.72*# 2.08*# 
6.13 Explaining R&D 3.06 2.48*# 1.53*# 1.76*# 1.93*# 
changes. 
7. Environmental, Social, 
and Ethical Disclosure 
7.1 Environmental reports. 1.94 2.21 * 1.44*# 2.00 1.88 
7.2 Value added statement. 2.03 1.70 1.38*# 2.03 1.69# 
7.3 Social activities & 1.61 1.48 1.76 2.04* 1.75 
contributions. 
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7.4 Environmental health 1.77 2.03 * 1.47 1.45* 1.66 
safety. 
7.5 Energy Information. 3.32 2.76*# 1.47*# 1.66*# 1.97*# 
7.6 Community 3.35 2.18*# 1.59*# 1.52*# 1.77*# 
information. 
7.7 Charitable donations 3.39 3.52 1.88*# 1.83*# 2.43*# 
information. 
7.8 Using photocopy of 1.77 3.27*# 1.79 1.90 2.33*# 
awarded certificates. 
7.9 Methods of provisions 1.32 1.88*# 2.62*# 1.90*# 2.15*# 
computation. 
7.10 Employment of 3.61 2.33*# 1.88*# 1.62*# 1.96*# 
disabilities. 
7.11 Ethical actions. 2.29 2.18 1.82*# 2.45 2.14 
8. Corporate Governance 
Disclosure 
8.1 Major share ownership 1.26 1.61*# 1.82*# 1.41 1.63*# 
and voting rights. 
8.2 List of board members. 3.23 1.82*# 1.71 *# 1.97*# 1.82*# 
8.3 Picture of chairperson 3.45 2.12*# 1.91 *# 1.90*# 1.98*# 
and/or other members. 
8.4 Board member 3.42 3.12 1.88*# 1.83*# 2.29*# 
qualifications. 
8.5 Number of shares held 2.00 2.21 1.91 1.66 1.94 
by members of the board. 
8.6 Remuneration policy 2.97 2.24*# 1.76*# 2.00*# 2.00*# 
for board members and 
key executives. 
8.7 Audit committee 3.84 3.12*# 1.68*# 2.10*# 2.30*# 
members: names, 
addresses, experiences 
8.8 Corporate governance 1.49 1.55 1.76 1.76 1.69 
codes, policies, 
implementation extent. 
1 strongly agree, 2 agree, 3 neutral, 4 disagree, and 5 strongly disagree. 
*Significantly different from auditors at p<0.05 (Mann-Whitney U test) 
#Significantly different from auditors at t<0.05 (t-test) 
Table 7.8 represents the proposed method for the reduction of the existence auditing 
expectations gap. The method is based on expanding the auditors' roles and 
responsibilities to include voluntary disclosure auditing, which satisfies the different 
stakeholders' expectations, represented by the non auditors groups, and in turn 
reduces the auditing expectations gap. 
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Regarding the general disclosure (statement 1), there is agreement among the non 
auditors groups that auditing general disclosure items would contribute to the 
reduction of the auditing expectations gap. On the other hand, auditors group 
disagreed that auditing of the company's mission and vision (statement 1.1), and the 
top management names and experiences (statement 1.3) would reduce the auditing 
expectations gap, while agreed that auditing the rest of general disclosure items would 
reduce the auditing expectations gap. 
However, there is only insignificant difference between auditors group and overall 
non-auditors group regarding auditing the statement of corporate goals and objectives 
to reduce the auditing expectation gap, while there is significant difference between 
auditors group and overall non auditors groups concerning the rest of the general 
disclosure items. 
In relation to the market disclosure (statement 2), auditors group agreed that auditing 
the market share (statement 2.6), competitive environment (statement 2.7), 
productivity capacity (statement 2.8), and productivity indicators (statement 2.9) 
information would reduce the auditing expectations gap. On the other hand, this group 
disagreed that auditing any of the remaining items would reduce the auditing 
expectations gap. The non-auditors groups agreed that auditing any of the market 
disclosure items would reduce the auditing expectations gap. However, there is 
significant difference between auditors group and overall non auditors group 
indicating that auditing the items of market disclosure items would not effectively 
reduce auditing expectations gap. 
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With respect to the risk management disclosure (statement 3), it was interesting 
observation that both auditors and non auditors groups agreed that auditing risk 
management disclosure would contribute to the reduction of the auditing expectations 
gap. However, there are insignificant differences between auditors group and overall 
non auditors groups regarding that auditing political (international) risk disclosure 
(statement 3.2), environmental risk disclosure (statement 3.5), and government 
regulation risk disclosure (statement 3.7) would effectively reduces the auditing 
expectations gap. While on the other hand, there are significant differences between 
auditors group and non auditors groups regarding the rest of the risk management 
disclosure items. 
Similarly, regarding the voluntary financial disclosure, both auditors and non auditors 
groups agree that auditing voluntary financial disclosure items would reduce the 
auditing expectations gap. However, there are insignificant differences between 
auditors group and non auditors groups regarding auditing information of capital 
structure disclosure (statement 4.6), information of dividends policy disclosure 
(statement 4.7), reasons and effects of acquisions / disposals on pat results disclosure 
(statement 4.8), information of foreign sales (statement 4.9), and changes in inventory 
disclosure (statement 4.11) would effectively reduce auditing expectations gap. On 
the other hand, auditing of the other voluntary financial disclosure items would not 
contribute effectively to the reduction of auditing expectations gap. 
Concerning human resources disclosure (statement 5), auditors group agreed that 
auditing only employee share ownership disclosure (statement 5.2), pension 
commitment disclosure (statement 5.4), and employees health and safety disclosure 
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(statement 5.5) would reduce the auditing expectations gap. Other wise, none of the 
other human resources disclosure's auditing would reduce the expectations gap. 
While non-auditing groups agreed that auditing all the human resources disclosure 
items leads to the reduction of the auditing expectations gap. However, there is 
significant difference between auditors group and overall non auditors groups 
concerning the auditing of human resources disclosure, which indicates that the 
human resources disclosure auditing would not effectively reduce the expectations 
gap. 
With respect to research and development disclosure (statement 6), auditors group 
agreed that auditing the items of this sort of disclosure would reduce that auditing 
expectations gap, except for the auditing of the inputs (people) disclosure (statement 
6.2), output (potential achievement) disclosure (statement 6.6), and explaining the 
research and development changes disclosure (statement 6.13), they disagree upon 
that auditing of these items would reduce the auditing expectations gap. On the other 
hand, non-auditors groups agreed upon auditing the different items would reduce the 
expectations gap. 
There is insignificant difference between the auditors' group and the non-auditors 
groups regarding the suggestion auditing outputs (actual achievements beyond 
product development ) disclosure (statement 6.5), financing past, present and future 
disclosure (statement 6.9), accounting/financing (comparing prior years, competition, 
budget) disclosure (statement 6.10), and research and development ratios (statement 
6.11) would contribute effectively to the reduction of the auditing expectations gap, 
while the other items would not. 
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Moreover, the non-auditors groups agreed that auditing of all the environmental, 
social, and ethical disclosure (statement 7) items would reduce the existing auditing 
expectations gap, while the auditors group disagreed that auditing of the energy 
information disclosure (statement 7.5), community information disclosure (statement 
7.6), charitable donations information disclosure (statement 7.7), and employment of 
disabilities disclosure (statement 7.10) would reduce this gap. 
There is insignificant difference between auditors group and overall non-auditors 
groups regarding the suggestion that auditing of the ethical reports (statement 7.1), 
value added statement (statement 7.2), social activities contributions disclosure 
(statement 7.3), environmental health and safety disclosure (statement 7.4), and 
ethical actions disclosure (statement 7.11) would effectively reduce this existing gap 
rather than the other environmental, social, and ethical items. 
Finally, concerning corporate governance disclosure (statement 8), as usual non- 
auditors groups agreed that auditing these items would reduce the expectations gap, 
while the auditors' group agreed that auditing only the major share ownership and 
voting rights disclosure (statement 8.1), number of shares held by members of the 
board disclosure (statement 8.5), remuneration policy for board members and key 
executives (statement 8.6), and corporate governance codes, policies, implementation 
extent disclosure (statement 8.8) would reduce the existing gap. 
Therefore, there is insignificant difference between auditors group and overall non 
auditors groups regarding the idea that auditing of the number of shares held by 
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members of the board disclosure (statement 8.5) would reduce this auditing gap, while 
there are significant differences between the both groups regarding the other items. 
7.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
To examine how sensitive the results, a t-test is applies over the previously examined 
data using the Mann-Whitney U non parametric test. The significant differences 
between the score means of the various respondents is measured using the t-test, as 
there is an existence of significant difference between the auditor and the non auditor 
group if the t value < 0.05, otherwise the different between the two groups is not 
significant. The results of the t-test are compared to the results of the Mann-Whitney 
U non parametric test to examine the sensitivity of the results towards changing of the 
applied test. 
It is observable from the previous analysis that the significant difference analysis 
using the t-test analysis do not differ significantly from the results of the Mann- 
Whitney U non-parametric test, specially on the overall level, which indicates that the 
results are non sensitive to change of the statistical test. This sensitivity analysis result 
confirms, and support, the results of the Mann-Whitney results, and evidence that this 
selected statistical test fits with the examined data. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
It is shown from the previous discussion that there is an existing auditing expectations 
gap in Egypt, which is consistent with the previous study applied on Egypt (Dixon et 
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al., 2006). There is effectiveness variation between the different traditional methods 
of the auditing expectations gap reduction compared to the role of voluntary 
disclosure auditing in reducing this gap. The results indicate that although most of the 
solutions are useful in reducing such a gap, they are not effective, based on the 
significant difference between auditors group and overall non-auditors groups. The 
interesting point about the results is that auditing voluntary disclosure items score 
insignificant differences between the auditors group and non-auditors groups 
indicating that auditing this sort of disclosure would effectively reduce the auditing 
expectations gap. It is observed that these items focus on future aspects, 
environmental, social, and ethical perspectives of disclosure, in addition to the 
voluntary financial disclosure. Therefore, it is worth auditing these items in order to 
reduce the auditing expectations gap, as this auditing process would be accepted by 
both auditors and non auditors. 
Therefore, the results and findings of this empirical analysis agree with the research 
hypothesis that the voluntary disclosure auditing is an effective method in reducing 
the existing auditing expectations gap in Egypt compares to the traditional methods, 
including audit report form, users' education, and standards settings. As a result, it is 
concluded that voluntary corporate disclosure auditing is an effective approach, in 
comparison to the traditional methods, to reduce the existing auditing expectations 
gap from one side, and improving the assurance quality of this sort of disclosure from 
the other side. Also, these results introduced a new field of auditing titled `Auditing of 
Voluntary Disclosures'. This new area requires more efforts to initiate the appropriate 
guidelines and code of practice. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The thesis is expected to contribute to auditing knowledge in different perspectives. 
First, the thesis provides a comprehensive view of the previous studies that have 
discussed the auditing expectations gap paradigm and the different recommended 
methods that are believed to contribute to the reduction of this existing gap in the 
developing as well as the developed countries. Second, the thesis reviews the different 
theories that could offer the scientific base for the proposed method of reducing this 
gap, and provided a conceptual framework showing the relationship between the 
auditing expectations gap and voluntary corporate disclosure auditing as a proposed 
method of reducing this existing gap. Third, the thesis provides an updated 
examination of the level of voluntary disclosure in Egypt during the most recent two 
years. In addition, the thesis investigates the determinants of voluntary disclosure, 
whether on the aggregated level of voluntary disclosure or for each category of this 
sort of disclosure. 
Finally, the thesis examines recently the existence of the auditing expectations gap in 
Egypt. In addition, it investigates the usefulness and effectiveness of the traditional 
methods of reducing this existing gap compared to the voluntary disclosure auditing 
as a proposed method of auditing expectations gap reduction. 
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This chapter illustrates the relationship between the auditing expectation gap and the 
audited voluntary corporate disclosure by summarizing the results of the two 
empirical chapters. In addition, the chapter shows the suggested conceptual 
framework of this relationship in relation to the empirical analysis performed by the 
thesis. 
The following sections of the chapter discuss the implications of the findings of the 
thesis, and the limitations and future research suggestions. 
8.2 SUGESTED CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The suggested conceptual model provides a comprehensive view of the relationship 
between the voluntary corporate disclosure and the auditing expectations gap as 
shown in the following figure: 
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Figure 8.1 
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Figure 8.1 views the audited voluntary corporate disclosure as the focal point of the 
model. It is argued that audited voluntary disclosure is plying dual roles in reducing 
the information expectations gap (information asymmetry) between the directors and 
users, which is the traditional role of voluntary disclosure (Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1991), from one side, and reducing the auditing expectations gap between auditors 
and users, which is the proposed role, from the other side. 
It is clear that both gaps form the financial reporting expectations gap. Therefore, 
reducing any or both of the two gaps would contribute to the reduction of the 
reporting gap which in turn improves the financial reporting quality which satisfies 
the needs of the different stakeholders whom are the main incentive for any company 
based on the stakeholder-agency theory. 
The information gap exists as a result of the certain items absence from being 
disclosed which fails to satisfy the stakeholders' expectations towards the firm's 
disclosure (Hooks et al. 2002). Voluntary disclosure reduces the information 
expectations gap (information asymmetry) as it provides stakeholders with relative 
confidence that the stock transactions occur at a fair price which increase stock 
liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). In addition, 
voluntary disclosure reduces uncertainty and therefore reduces the information 
asymmetry gap and reduces the cost of external financing (Healey and Palepu, 1993, 
2001). 
Accordingly, voluntary disclosure is considered to be an effective solution for the 
reduction of the information gap. Therefore, increasing the level of voluntary 
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corporate disclosure reduces the information expectations gap. This result indicates 
that the existence of low level of voluntary disclosure is considered to be a sign of the 
existence of the information expectations gap, which in turn contributes to the 
existence of the aggregated financial reporting expectations gap. 
On the other hand, the stakeholders' reliance on the voluntarily provided information 
is increased when assurance is provided on this type of information (Coram, 2004). 
That is due to the increasing demand for audit of regulated and unregulated 
information providing assurance to stakeholders (Abdel-Khalik, 1993; Chow, 1982; 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Therefore, the effectiveness of voluntary disclosure in 
reducing information expectations gap is restricted by auditing this sort of 
information, which introduces the role of assurance provision for this sort of 
disclosure by voluntary disclosure auditing. 
Voluntary disclosure auditing is related to assuring that the voluntary provided 
information is fair and true and is provided for the benefit of the stakeholders in 
making right decisions based on complete and assured information, rather than for the 
sake of manipulating and directing these stakeholders to take specific decisions that 
are in the advantage of the firm on the expense of their interests. 
The introduction of this auditing service means expanding the role of the auditors to 
include additional services besides the traditional services they are currently offering 
to their clients. As a result of this expansion of the auditors' responsibilities, the 
auditors will tend to meet the stakeholders (users) needs, and in turn meet their 
expectations and reduces their expectations gap towards the tasks and responsibilities 
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performed by the auditors. There are different traditional methods employed to reduce 
this existing auditing expectations gap, including audit report form, users' education 
and standards settings. These methods need to be taken in consideration in 
comparison to the voluntary disclosure auditing as a proposed method to reduce this 
gap. 
It is clear in the conceptual model that the audited voluntary corporate disclosure is 
performing two basic roles. First, role is reducing the information expectations gap 
from one side. Second, role is reducing the auditing expectations gap from the other 
side. The dual roles played by the audited voluntary disclosures require that this sort 
of disclosure is assured by means of auditing. The direct effect of the audited 
voluntary disclosure in reducing both gaps is on the reduction of the financial 
reporting expectations gap. Hence, the aggregated effect of auditing this sort of 
disclosure would contribute to the improvement of the quality of financial reports. 
The common party between the two gaps of financial reporting is the stakeholders' 
expectations. Therefore, the research is based on the stakeholders-agency theory as a 
basic motive for the efforts made in order to reduce both gaps. Thus, the indicator of 
the effectiveness of the audited voluntary disclosures in reducing both gaps is 
measured by reaching the stakeholders' expectations through the directors, to reduce 
the information gap, from one side, and through the auditors, to reduce the auditing 
gap, from the other side. 
However, voluntary corporate disclosure is considered to be dependent to great extent 
on two groups of determinants. First, group is firm characteristics determinants, 
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including firm size, firm profitability and industrial membership. Second, group is 
corporate governance characteristics, including board size and role duality. These 
determinants justify the level of information voluntarily disclosed by the firm. 
The conceptual framework draws attention towards the relationship between the 
audited voluntary corporate disclosure and the auditing expectations gap. This 
relationship is examined on two stages. First, examining the level of voluntary 
corporate disclosure in the annual reports of the Egyptian companies, and justifying 
this resulting level by the different determinants of this sort of disclosure. Second, 
investigating the usefulness and effectiveness of auditing this voluntary disclosure in 
reducing the auditing expectations gap compared to the other traditional methods. 
8.3 RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
The empirical study of the thesis is divided into two parts. First, the examination of 
the level and determinants of voluntary corporate disclosure in the most active listed 
Egyptian companies during years 2004-2005, and 2005-2006. Second, investigating 
the usefulness and effectiveness of voluntary disclosure auditing compared to the 
different traditional methods in reducing the auditing expectations gap. 
The results and findings of the first empirical part of the thesis showed that the 
Egyptian companies are characterised by relatively low level of this sort of disclosure 
(22%). This result is based on a validated and adapted checklist check list that fits 
with the Egyptian context. The voluntary disclosure is categorized in to eight main 
categories; general disclosure, market disclosure, risk management disclosure, 
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financial disclosure, human resources disclosure, research and development 
disclosure, environmental, social and ethical disclosure and corporate governance 
disclosure. The data is analysed using ordinary least square (OLS) cross sectional 
panel regression (fixed - effect) regression. Since the data is not normally distributed, 
a robust standard error is employed to overcome this problem. Panel (A) represents 
the voluntary disclosure of year 2004-2005, panel (B) represents the voluntary 
disclosure of year 2005-2006 and panel (C) represents the average voluntary 
disclosure of both panels (A) and (B). The descriptive statistics shows that the 
voluntary disclosure of the Egyptian companies is condensed in the market disclosure 
on the expense of the other categories of disclosure. The relationship of the voluntary 
disclosure and its determinants is examined on two different dimensions. First 
dimension is the examination of the relationship between the total voluntary 
disclosure and the disclosure determinants. Second is the examination the relationship 
between each voluntary disclosure category and the disclosure determinants. 
A dummy variable is employed to differentiate between the two panels when applying 
the regression analysis at confidence levels of 99%, 95%, and 90%. The findings of 
the panel regressions showed that there is significant association between the total 
voluntary disclosure and the different firm characteristics. There is a positive 
significant association between total voluntary disclosure, firm size and firm 
profitability. This indicates that the bigger the size and the more profits performed by 
the firm, the higher the level of total voluntary disclosure. Moreover, there is negative 
significant association between total voluntary disclosure and industrial membership. 
This relationship indicates that the non manufacturing (services) firms got a higher 
level of voluntary disclosure than the manufacturing company. This is an expected 
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result as the high scores of voluntary disclosures are achieved by the services firms in 
the telecommunications sector. 
Consequently, there is an in significant association between total voluntary disclosure 
and corporate governance characteristics, including board size and role duality. This 
relationship is a result of the recently launched paradigm of corporate governance and 
this is also reflected in a level of corporate governance disclosure in the annual reports 
of 19% which is relatively low disclosure level. 
On the voluntary disclosure categories level, the results of the association between 
each voluntary disclosure category and the disclosure determinants are mainly similar 
to those of the total voluntary disclosure association with the same determinants. It is 
noted that the majority of voluntary disclosure categories have the same relationships 
with voluntary disclosure determinants as the relationships on the total level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
As a matter of confirming the previous results and findings, a sensitivity analysis 
is 
applied on the entire data using ordinary least squares (OLS) pooled regression using 
robust standard error. The results of the sensitivity analysis showed similar results to 
the panel data regression, indicating that the examined data is not sensitive to the 
change of the employed test. These findings showed that the results of the panel 
data 
regression are reliable, which is reflected on the strength of generalizing the sample 
results on the whole population of the Egyptian companies. 
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The results and findings of the second empirical part of the thesis are related to the 
investigation of the different methods of reducing the auditing expectations gap. As 
an introductory section of this part of the empirical analysis, the existence of the 
auditing expectations gap in Egypt is examined to confirm that this gap is still existing 
compared to the examined gap by Dixon et al. (2006). This part of analysis is 
different than Dixon et al. (2006) analysis as it includes the academics as a non 
auditor group beside the other included groups, investors, bankers and auditors. The 
results of this part indicate that there is an existing auditing expectations gap in Egypt. 
The thesis argues that voluntary disclosure auditing is an effective method in reducing 
auditing expectations gap compared to the different traditional methods. The thesis is 
considered to be the first to compare between the traditional methods in reducing the 
expectations gap from one side, and to compare between the traditional methods and 
the proposed method presented in voluntary disclosure auditing from the other side. 
The results differentiated between the usefulness of the examined method in reducing 
the existing gap based on the agreement or disagreement that the examined statement 
is useful to reduce the auditing expectations gap, and the effectiveness of each method 
in reducing the gap based on the significance difference between the auditor group 
and non auditor groups. The insignificant difference between the auditor and non- 
auditor groups indicates that the examined statement is effective in reducing the 
existing gap. The effectiveness of the different statements reflects the effectiveness of 
the whole examined method. 
This part of empirical study depends on the questionnaire tool to gather primary data 
from the Egyptian context. The questionnaire is designed based on the Likert 5 scale 
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to measure the different perceptions of the examined sample. The questionnaire is 
composed of six different sections. The first section includes the demographic data of 
the respondents which reflects their accounting education and experience. The second 
section includes different statements measuring the existence of the auditing 
expectations gap in Egypt. The third section includes different statements measuring 
the significant differences between the different groups of respondents toward the 
effectiveness of the audit report form as method of reducing the existing gap. The 
fourth section shows the different responses of the respondents towards the 
effectiveness of educating the users about the task and responsibilities performed by 
the auditor in reducing the expectations gap. The fifth section illustrates the different 
perceptions of the respondents towards setting standards regarding expanding the 
roles and responsibilities performed by the auditor to reduce the expectations gap. The 
final section examines the effectiveness of voluntary disclosure auditing, which is the 
proposed method, to reduce the auditing expectations gap. 
The questionnaire technique is characterised by having low response rate from the 
respondents. The current research shows a response rate of 31.75%, which an 
acceptable response rate compared to the relevant studies at the same area (Dixon et 
al. 2006; Manson and Zaman, 2000; Best, 1999; Dewing and Russel, 2002; Fadzly 
and Ahmad, 2004). A dummy variable is used to differentiate between the auditors 
and non auditors groups. 
The results are derived using Mann-Whitney U non parametric test to investigate the 
significant difference between the perceptions of the different respondents. The entire 
results showed that there is an existing wide auditing expectations gap in Egypt 
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between the auditors group and the non-auditors group which is consistent with the 
results of Dixon et al. (2006) applied on Egypt. The efforts achieved by the different 
methods of reducing this gap, whether the traditional or the proposed method, seems 
to be useful in reducing this gap. However, most of the traditional methods are not 
effective enough to reduce such a gap as there are various significance differences 
between the perceptions of the different groups regarding the effectiveness of these 
methods on reducing this gap. 
Regarding the auditing of voluntary disclosure as a proposed method to reduce the 
auditing expectations gap, the categories used in the questionnaire are similar to the 
disclosure categories measured in the checklist examining the level of these disclosure 
categories. It is found that auditing the items focusing on future aspects, 
environmental, social and ethical perspectives of disclosure, in addition to the 
voluntary financial disclosure, would contribute to the reduction of the auditing 
expectations gap. 
By this conclusion, the previously mentioned perspectives of voluntary disclosure 
need to be audited as to contribute to the reduction of the auditing expectations gap. 
Therefore, as a prerequisite for this method of reduction is to increase these categories 
of audited voluntary disclosure to satisfy the stakeholders' needs and desires. With 
respect to the disclosure level of these categories, it is clear that these categories are 
disclosed in a limited level. 
The research and development disclosure is restricted to 21 % over the years 2004- 
2005 and 2005-2006 representing 11.50% of the total voluntary disclosure of 
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Egyptian companies. Consequently, this indicates un-satisfaction of stakeholders 
towards the auditing of this sort of disclosure and its level. 
Similarly, the environmental, social, and ethical disclosure's level is limited to 16% 
over the examined years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, which represents 8.96% of the 
total voluntary disclosure of Egyptian companies. Therefore, stakeholders request to 
audit this sort of disclosure which satisfies their needs. However, to do so requires 
first expanding the disclosure level of this category of disclosure to perform a 
satisfactory audit process for the diversified stakeholders. 
Financial voluntary disclosure scores a relatively higher disclosure level than the 
previously mentioned categories of 26% which represents 14.93% of the total 
voluntary disclosure of Egyptian companies during 2004-2005 and 2005-2006. 
However, this category of disclosure presents an acceptable level in comparison to the 
other categories, and this illustrates the stakeholders' concern about the financial 
figures especially in developing countries. 
Finally, stakeholders were the main motive of the results and findings of the thesis, as 
their satisfaction is reflected to a great extent on the performance and survival of the 
company. However, satisfying diversified stakeholders with conflicting interests is 
not an easy mission. Therefore, the company needs to avoid being biased to any of the 
different stakeholders which is reflected on the selection of the examined sample to 
present the whole population in a fair way, which in turn strengthen the reliability and 
the generalization power of the results and findings of the entire thesis. 
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8.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT 
The results and findings of the thesis draw a great attention towards an existing 
problem that is facing management regarding the stakeholders' expectations and 
satisfaction in respect to the quality of the provided information and its reliability. The 
thesis emphasized that there is a joint responsibility of management and auditors 
towards the existence of the auditing expectations gap. The management is 
responsible for the level of information of disclosure provided to the stakeholders, 
while the auditor is responsible for the provided information assurance. However, the 
auditor's responsibilities are restricted to the provided information by the 
management. Therefore, the thesis refers the problem of auditing expectations gap to 
the management in the first instance. 
The management would benefit from the implications of this thesis, as it illustrates the 
link between the information voluntarily disclosed by the management, and the 
auditor's performance and responsibilities resulting in the existence of the auditing 
expectations gap. It is shown from the results and findings that the auditing 
expectations gap is effectively reduced by voluntary disclosure auditing in 
comparison to the other traditional methods, including audit report form, user's 
education, and standards settings, specifically research and development, 
environmental, social, and ethical, and financial disclosures. 
Therefore, management can satisfy its stakeholders and contribute to the reduction of 
auditing expectations gap by focusing on increasing the level of voluntary disclosure. 
However, it may be not feasible to raise the voluntary disclosure of the different 
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categories at the same time. Therefore, it would be worth it to begin increasing the 
level of research and development, environmental, social, and ethical and, financial 
disclosures. Doing so, would induce auditors to audit increasingly categories of 
disclosure. The thesis provided management with the first step of improving the 
quality of information by raising the disclosure level of specific categories of 
disclosure rather than increasing the whole categories of disclosure. The thesis takes 
into consideration the resources and capabilities limitations which supports the 
applicability power rather than being just theoretical framework. 
Regarding the auditors, the management needs to assign qualified auditors who are 
willing to satisfy their clients, to achieve a competitive advantage, or at least maintain 
their competitive edge, by providing this sort of service of voluntary disclosure 
auditing. Since this sort of disclosure has not got any standards, as it is voluntary, 
therefore, it needs a diversified and qualified auditing team that can perform this sort 
of auditing. The auditing team is composed of diversified backgrounds and 
educational disciplines, which again needs some attention by the management to 
assign the suitable team. 
Voluntary disclosure auditing is considered to be a recent area that needs a great 
amount of development in the future, as this type of auditing solves different 
problems regarding the stakeholders' satisfaction towards the level of information 
voluntarily disclosed by the management from one side, and expanding the auditor's 
roles and responsibilities to audit this type of information which is in turn reduces the 
auditing expectations gap. Therefore, it could be concluded that the audited voluntary 
disclosure is playing dual roles. First, increasing the level of voluntarily disclosed 
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information avoids the existence of the information asymmetry problem between 
stakeholders and management. Second, expanding the roles and responsibilities of the 
auditors to include auditing this sort of information reduces auditing expectations gap. 
8.5 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are some limitations that need to be taken in consideration when assessing the 
thesis' results and findings. The thesis is applied to the Egyptian context without 
comparison to any developed or even developing country. The research is considered 
to be specified to the Egyptian context for different reasons. First, it is indicated in the 
second chapter of the thesis that the Egyptian economy is considered to be a unique 
situation that passed over a great deal of reform programs which shaped its business 
culture leading to the limitation of the derived results to other contexts. Second, the 
objective ontological position and the positive epistemology of the research shown in 
the research methodology chapter which are driven from the research theoretical 
framework limits the generalization of the results only to the examined context using 
this sort of philosophical approach. Third, the adaptation of the research instruments, 
checklist and questionnaire, to fit with this unique Egyptian context limits the results 
of the thesis to the Egyptian culture using the tailored research instruments. 
Regarding the first part of the empirical study, it includes only the 50 most active 
companies without expanding the sample to include other countries. At the same time, 
the results are based on only two years. Therefore, the sample could be expanded to 
include more companies and over a longer period of time. 
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The results and findings are based on the simplest form of content analysis (0/1) 
which may affect the significance of the analyzed data. Therefore, the same study 
could be applied using more detailed type of content analysis, number of pages, 
number of sentences, and number of words. Moreover, the thesis analyzed the data 
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with robust standard error for cross 
sectional panel data, and employed a sensitivity analysis using pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression with robust standard error. The data analysis could be 
extended to be analyzed using TOBIT and LOGIT analysis. 
Regarding the second empirical part of the thesis, it depends on the questionnaire 
technique in gathering the required data, which is characterised by a degree of bias 
and subjectivity as it is a common limitation for the different studies carried on this 
type of research (Dixon et al. 2006; Manson and Zaman, 2000; Best, 1999; Dewing 
and Russel, 2002; Fadzly and Ahmad, 2004). 
In addition to this, the sample size could be extended either to include more 
respondents of each of the examined groups, or to include other groups of 
respondents. Moreover, the data is analyzed using Mann-Whitney U non-parametric 
test to investigate the significant differences between the auditors group from one side 
and the non auditors groups from the other side. The research could be extended using 
Kruskal-Wallis test to examine the significant differences in between the non auditors 
groups. 
Furthermore, the thesis examined the existence of auditing expectations gap and the 
different methods of reducing this existing gap in Egypt as a developing country. The 
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research may be extended to compare the expectations gap in Egypt with the 
expectations gap in other developed or developing country and compare the effective 
methods in reducing the gap in both countries in the form of a comparative study. 
8.6 CONCLUSION 
The previous discussion explained in a comprehensive fashion the overview of the 
whole thesis. This thesis is considered to be unique for the following reasons. First, it 
is examining the voluntary corporate disclosure with one of the most detailed 
checklist in this area of research. Second, the checklist categorized the voluntary 
disclosure in to eight categories of disclosure, general disclosure, market disclosure, 
risk management disclosure, human resources disclosure, financial disclosure, 
research and development disclosure, environmental, social, and ethical disclosure, 
and corporate governance disclosure, and examined the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure not just for the total voluntary disclosure, but for every single category over 
the examined period of time. Third, the thesis examined its effectiveness compared to 
the traditional methods of reducing the expectations gap in a unique comparative form 
between the different methods. Fourth, the thesis is introducing a recent area of 
auditing, voluntary disclosure auditing, which acts as an effective method in reducing 
auditing expectations gap compared to the other traditional methods. 
The chapter also showed how the management can obtain benefit from the 
implications of the entire thesis. In addition, this chapter illustrated the limitations and 
future research that could be done to overcome the limitations of this research. 
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